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AEm'RACT 
This thesis is 1art of the tradition in rhetorical criticism of 
st~~ying movements; however, it is djfferent ln that it looks at the 
rhetoric of a movement once the movement r-as attained its goal(s) ant 
begins the process of becoming a permanent participant in the social 
order. The thesis focuses on the rol~ of rhetoric tn the process of 
institutionali%ation. In particular, this th~sis inv~stigat~s the 
rhetoric directed toward the member of a movement which attempts to 
encourage continuei membership in the movement's org!m.ization and, thus, 
helps to insure the :permanency of the organization. 
The industrial union movement of the 1930s in the United States 
is an example of a movement whoee auccesa required changing movement 
organization~ into permanent organizations$ The conflict betwe~n 
employers and members of the industrial union movement, workers, 
threatened the stability of .Ai::ierican society. Successful resolution 
of this conflict :required that both parties, employ!,rS and workers 
repres~nted by tneir union, ne~otiate a mutually a.cceptabl~ contract 
of employment through Jollective bargaining. This contractp however, 
could not be neglltiated once, for the conflict ~hich the contract 
resolved never entirely went affay. ~ecause of the continual r~-emergence 
of this conflict, it had to be l')6riodicall7 reaclved by renegotiating 
contracts through collective bargaining. The conflict and th~ means 
of confl1ct resolution, coll~ctiv~ bargai41ngt became iastitutionali~ed, 
part of the social o=der. ~ecaus~ this m~~hod of periodic conflict 
a~d resolution of the confljct bec8.Tl;e a social ina~itution, th~ 
organizations represe~ting eM~lcy~Ts ani work~rs also had to become 
institutions to main ta.i!'l strong l'legotiating positions. 
I aelcted the United Automobile Workers (UAW) as a union which 
exemplifies the industrial union mov~ent of the 1930s and the process 
of institutionalization of a movement, especially in its conflict with 
the General Motors Corporation (GM). Unli~ited conflict, into which 
any strike may erupt, threatens the pennanency of the collective 
bargaining relationship, as well as the p!rma~ency of the organizations 
in that relationship. ~cause of this threat, unio~ rhetors during a 
strike utilize all rhetorical means to induce commitment to the uni~n 
among the membership, thus, providing a ~jndow for a critic to study 
rhetoric in th~ :process ef institutionalization. 
There weTe three national strikes between the UAW and GM in 
1936-1~37, 1,~s-1,46 and 1970, which occur at different sta~es of th~ 
process of institutionalization. In the first atrike th~re was no 
collective bargaining relationship between the parties; th~s, no 
institutionalized relationship existed. '"By the second strike ~r.e 
parties had participated in such a rela~ionship for ten years and oy 
the 1970 strike for twenty-fiv~ year~. 
The methodology for this thesis includes periorriing a car~ful 
descriptive analysis of all availsbl~ rhetoric from theae strikes, 
identifying key te:t:"'la "lnd :perfo.f."lll.j_ng a. cluste:r.-ag'(;n analy-sia of ~h ... se 
terms. I pay special attenti~n to dramati~ el~ments in the discours~ 
which I use to r1'cr,nstroct a "myth of concern 11 for ~a.ch strik~.. A 
"myth of conc~rn" is the dramati.c counterpart o.f a movement's or 
organization's ideology. I argue that evidenc~ of the process of 
institutionalization (strategies for increasing commitm~nT. to th~ 
union and the loss of power by the rank and file) should be detectable 
when compa-ring th~ 11111yths of concern'' of each strike. 
I found rhetorical evidence of institutionali2ation by comparing 
the role of union ~ember in ea.ch strike. In the 1936-1937 strike the 
rhetoric encouraged workers to change their roles from wage slaves to 
union members to gain self-respect, pride, industrial democracy and a 
living wage. :By the 1,45-1946 strik~ the role of union member in rhetoric 
directed toward nembers characterized members as soldiers in battle, 
sacrificing to save the union. In the 1970 strike there were two 
union "myths of concern~" one for leaders and the other for rank and 
file members. The roles of leaders and rank and file members were 
different--leade:rs were active decision makers while the rank and file 
followed these decisions with quiet determination. Furthermore, the 
leader's "myth of concern" described the strike as one in a series of 
battles for justice, focusing on the union's future, while the rank and 
file's "myth of concern" focused on the pres6nt in its descriptions of 
the status of negotiationso There were few references to the future 
of l'tembers or of the UAW. The leader's "myth of concern" and th~ role 
of leader encouraged continued commitm~nt to the union, while the rank 
and file's "myth of concern" ant role of rank a.ni file member did not. 
Fotential dissatisfaction with the role of rank and file member could 
be the source of future conflict within th9 union. 
Through my criticism o~ t.he rhetoric of these strikes I found not 
only evidence of the process o~ institutionalization, but also that the 
role of the union ntember which transformeil the au to worker from a wage-
slave to a union member contained the basis of the role of union member 
in 1945 and of rank and file memb~r in 1970 which constrained a m~mber's 
behavior. 
In short, the constraints found in institutionalization are implicit 
in the changes resulting from a ~overoent's conflict with the social order. 
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I thank the staff of the Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs 
in Detroit, Michigan for their interest in my research. With their 
permission, I searched through uncatalogued files to locate speeches 
and press releases which otherwise were unavailable to me. 
Finally, I wish to thank Edward David Pribble, my husband, 
who encouraged me to work whenever I tried to avoid it. I thank 
him for introducing me to the union movement and to people who have 
participated in many facets of it. My thanks, gratitude and love 
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IN MEMORY OF 
Earl "Mike" Pribble, 1894-1959 
An auto worker and United Automobile Workers member 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE 
I. Introduction and Purpose .. 
II. Research Materials and Organization of the Study. 
CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK . • . . . • . 
I. Conflict and Institutional Change ••. 
II. The Similarity of Conflict and Movement Theory. 
III. Institutionalization of Conflict ...... . 
IV. A Perspective on Non-discursive Uses of Language 
V. The Role of Rhetoric in the Institutionalization 
of Conflict. . . . . • . . . . . . . . • . . . . 
VI. A Perspective Drawn from Rhetorical Criticism. 
VII. Methodology. • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
CHAPTER THREE: THE CONTEXT FOR INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT 
I. The Bases of Industrial Conflict . 
II. Institutionalization of Industrial Conflict. 
III. Rhetorical ImplicatJons •..... 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE WAGE SLAVE AND THE UNION MEMBER: UiE 
1936-1937 SITDOWN STRIKE ....•.• 
I. The General Motors Corporation .. 
II. The Environment of Protest ..... 
III. The History of the Sitdown Strike. 
IV. The Beginning of Institutionalized Conflict. 
V. The Rhetoric of the S1tdown Strike . 
VI. From Wage Slave to Union Member .• 
























CHAPTER FIVE: TWO BATTLES: THE 1945-1946 STRIKE . 108 
I. The UAW Between 1937-1945. . • 108 
II. The 1945-1946 Strike . . . • . . . . . 112 
III. An Institutionalized Conflict. . . . 113 
IV. The Home-Front War--Publlc IU1etor1c. 117 
V. The Fight of All Organized Labor--Intra-Union 
Rhetoric 126 
VI. Summary. . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . 141 
CHAPTER SIX: QUIET DETERMINATION AND THE BATTLE OF PRINCIPLE: 
THE 1970 STRIKE . . . . . . . . . . 143 
I. The UAW from 1946-1970 • • • • • • . . . . • . • 147 
II. The 1970 Strike. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 
III. Non-offers and Private Negot1at1ons--the Public 
Rhetoric . • . . . . . . . . . . 




• I • • 
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE ROLE OF RHETORIC IN THE PROCESS OF 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION •......•. 
I. Conflict and Inst1tut1onal1zat1on ... 
II. The Role of Rhetoric 1n the Process of 
Institutionalization ........ . 













INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE 
I. Introduction and Purpose 
Rhetorical critics ,have not investigated the process by which a 
protest movement is incorporated into the established social order and 
the role of rhetoric is that transfomation; instead, they h~ve 
investigated the conflict between a movement and an established order. 
In his seminal essay, "The Rhetoric of Historical Movements," Leland 
Griffin focuses on the conflict between rhetors of the movement and 
rhetors of the established order. 
Let us say that within each movement two classes of 
rhetoricians may be distinguished: 1. agressor orators 
and Journalists who attempt, in the pro movement, to 
establish, and in the anti movement, to destroy; and, 
2. defendant rhetoricians who attempt, 1n the pro 
movement, to resist reform, and 1n the anti movement, 
to defend institutions.I -
•More recent rhetorical theory also emphasizes a movement's conflict 
with the established order. The following statement by Robert Cathcart 
1s illustrative: 
1Leland M. Griffin, "The Rhetoric of Historical Movements," 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, 38 (April 1952)2, p. 184-188, rpt. in 
Methods of Rhetorical Criticism: A Twentieth Century Perspective, 
eds. Robert L. Scott and Bernard L. Brock (New York: Harper and Row, 
1972) p. 348. ' 
It is not the alientation of an out-group alone that 
produces a movement, for there is always alienation and 
dissatisfaction in any social order. Rather, it is the 
fonnulation of a rhetoric proclaiming that the new order, 
the more perfect order, the desired order, cannot come about 
through the established agencies of change, and this, 
in turn, produces a counter-rhetoric that exposes the 
agitators as anarchists or devils of destruction. 2 
2 
Thus, a rhetorical critic analyzes the rhetoric of a movement and of 
the established order which produce "a dialectical tension growing 
out of moral conflict. 113 
I 
Few movements succeed in changing the established order. Some 
movements which do achieve their goals fall apart after success because 
there is no further reason, for their existence. For example, after the 
passage of the nineteenth amendment, the organized movement for woman's 
suffrage disintegrated, apparently because it could not successfully 
' 4 redirect its efforts to organizing women as a political force. 
More recently, the movement for peace in Vietnam ended with the with-
drawal of American forces from that country. Once the goal for these 
movements and their organizations was achieved, there was no reason 
for the movement's continued existence. 
2Robert S. Cathcart, "New Approaches to the Study of Movements: 
Defining Movements Rhetorically," Western Speech 36(Spring 1972)86, 
p. 87. 
3cathcart, p. 87. 
4The National American Woman Suffrage Association did not 
continue as an organization after the ratification of the suffrage 
amendment, although notions about women's rights did continue. 
Eleanor Flexner, Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in 
the United States (1959; rpt. New York:Atheneum, 1972) p. 325-331-.-
3 
The industrial union movement of the 1930s5 presents a somewhat 
different situation to a student of movements. The union movement is 
a protest movement which not only succeeded in changing the social and 
legal order, it also succeeded in becoming a permanent part of the 
new order. The industrial union movement provides the rhetorical 
critic with the opportunity to study how a movement becomes a 
permanent part of the social order and the role of rhetoric in that 
transformation. 
The goal of the industrial union movement was to establish unions 
as organizations which bargained with the employers of its members 
for wages, working conditions, and the like. Bargaining for a, contract 
was intended to reduce the violent expression of conflict in strikes 
and lockouts between employers and unions representing workers; conflict 
was to be limited to the bargaining table. Within limits, unions 
maintained the right to strike against employers, and employers main-
tained the right to lock employees out of the workplace in order to 
force the other party to negotiate at the bargaining table. 
To limit industrial conflict successfully via collective 
bargaining, both unions and companies had to become permanent 
organizations so that neither the union nor the company would 
possess so much bargaining power that it could force the less 
5For a discussion of the industrial union movement see Frances 
Fox Pivan and Richard A. Cloward, Poor People's Movements: Why They 
Succeed, How They Fail, Vintage Books edn. (~ew York: Random House, 
1977). ----- , 
4 
6 permanent party to agree to a contract. Thus, the union movement was 
forced to change itself from an organiLation seeking to change the 
industrial social order to a permanent organization within the new 
social order. Union leaders became concerned with how to maintain 
the union as a permanent organization--retaining members, encouraging 
commitment and loyalty to the union, and maintaining unified action. 
For a union, the strike 1s the point at which the members' 
loyalty and commitment are needed most by the union organization. To 
win a strike, union members must act as a collective and unified 
body, following the directives of the union leaders. Disloyalty or 
lack of commitment threatens the success of the strike, and, indirectly, 
the permanency of the union organization. B.ecause a strike requires 
unified and disciplined action by all union members, rhetoric which 
encourages colilIIlitment to the union becomes important for success; 
thus, during a strike, union rhetors use all rhetorical devices 
available to them which·encourage loyalty to an organization. 
When the rhetoric of an emerging union movement during a strike 
is compared w1 th an analysis of the strike rhetoric of an establi1shed wiion, 
a critic may be able to identify the processes by which a movement in 
conflict with the established order becomes a permanent participant 
in the new order. This process I call the institutionalization of a 
movement. The movement's conflict with the established order 1s 
I 
institutionalized so that the conflict's threat to the stability of 
the new order is diminished. A critic may identify changes in the 
6Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements 
(New York: Prentice-Hall, 1973) p. 264. 
5 
discourse which are indicative of the process of institutionalization 
of which may facilitate it. 
In this thesis I shall analyze the rhetoric of the International 
Union, United Automobile Aerospace a~d Agricultural Implement Workers 
of America (UAW) in three consecutive, national strikes against the 
General Motors Corporation (GM) as an example of the institutionalization 
of a protest movement. These strikes occurred in 1936-1937, 1945-1946 
and 1970. National strikes, instead of local disputes, were chosen 
because they threaten the process of institutionalization by increasing 
the possibility of unlimited conflict between the union and the 
corporation. Since national strikes are points of tension in the 
process of institutionalization, they provide a window through wnich 
a critic may view this process and the role of rhetoric in it. Each 
of these strikes is located at a different stage in the institutional-
ization of union-management relations. During the 1936-1937 strike 
there were no institutionalized procedures to resolve a strike. The 
UAW had yet to establish itself as a legitimate organization both to 
GM'and to many auto workers. By the 1945-1946 strike, the UAW had 
participated in a collective ba~gaining relationsh1p with GM for 
ten years. The organization and the rhetoric of the union should 
' 
exhibit tendencies toward institutionalization and organizational 
permanency. During the 1970 strike, definite patterns of 
institutionalization and organizational permanency should be present 
in the rhetoric of the UAW. 
'6 
II. Research Materials and Organization of the Study 
Two different types of primary materials were necessary for this 
analysis, rhetoric of the UAW which addresses non-members (often, but 
not always, the general public) and rhetoric which addresses union 
members. The former was found primarily in the New York Times which 
printed verbatim statements made by representatives of the UAW and GM 
during the 1945-1946 strike and closely reported the events of all 
three strikes. During the 1945-1946 strike, news magazines such as 
the Nation and the New Republic also contained discourse written by 
a rhetor representing the UAW. The public rhetoric of the 1970 strike 
was found 1n transcripts of press conferences and of a television 
interview at the Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Walter Reuther 
Library, Wayne State University in Detroit, Michigan, hereafter referred 
to as the Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs. In 1970, the news media 
rarely printed verbatim statements made by representatives of the 
UAW or GM. 
Rhetoric addressed to union members, or intra-union rhetoric, 
is located in the official magazine of the UAW, the United Automobile Worker 
later renamed UAW Solidarity. The collections of the Archives of 
Labor and Urban Affairs provided copies of ephemeral documents central 
to the strike activity, such as the Punch Press, a strike bulletin 
printed during the 1936-1937 strike, letters to union locals, letters 
to all union members, songs sung by strikers and speeches made by 
Leonard Woodcock, president of the UAW during the 1970 strike. The 
following collections were especially helpful: Mary Van Kleeck RSF 
Labor Research Papers, Bud and Hazel Simons Collec~ion, George 
Lyons--Local 174 Collection, R. J. Thomas Collection and Leonard 
Woodcock Presidential Speech Series in process. 
·7 
This study will first discuss the relationship between conflict 
and institutionalization. It will develop a theoretical perspective 
on the role of rhetoric in the process of institutionalization. 
There will be a discussion of the bases of industrial conilict and 
how that conflict has been institutionalized. Then the rhetoric of 
the three UAW-GM strikes will be analyzed. 
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
This chapter provides an introduction to the notion 
that conflict is a productive process, that it provides 
the opportunity for new structures and traditions to be 
institutionalized. The similarities between conflict 
and movement theory are discussed, indicating that the 
two concepts are interchangeable and that the study of 
the rhetoric of movements might provide insight into 
the role of rhetoric in institutionalization. Richard B. 
Gregg's discussion of the ego-function of the rhetoric of 
protest when combined with George Herbert Mead's notions 
about the development of the human self provides a 
theoretical perspective on rhetoric in the process of 
institutionalization and a critical perspective for the 
analysis of the UAW rhetoric during the strikes. 
Chapter 3: The Context for Industrial Conflict 
An understanding of industrial conflict is necessary to 
comprehend the social pressure to institutionalize this 
conflict and the structure of collective bargaining 
that results. This chapter helps to explain some of 
the mechanisms by which conflict is limited in industrial 
relations. 
Chapter 4: The Wage Slave and the Union Member: 
The 1936-1937 Sitdown Strike 
This chapter is an analysis of the UAW rhetoric during its 
first maJor strike against GM, before the process of 
• institutionalization began. 
Chapter S: Twq Battles: The 1945-1946 Strike 
This chapter analyzes the rhetoric of the UAW strike 
8 
against GM after unions are seen as legitimate participants 
in the social structure. The process of institutionalization 
1s underway. 
Chapter 6: Quiet Determination and the Battle of Principle: 
The 1970 Strike 
This chapter analyzes the UAW rhetoric during the 1970 
strike, which occurs when institutionalization of the 
union-management relationship is virtually complete. 
Chapter 7: The Role of Rhetoric in the Process of 
Institutionalization 
This chapter is a summary and evaluation of the thesis. 
It describes the functions of rhetoric in the 




I. Conflict and Institutional Change 
Conflict is commonly viewed in our society as something to be 
avoided, as a destructive force. Conflict destroys cherished 
traditions, breaks apart rela~ionships and forces changes in behavior. 
A healthy society does not experience conflict. This, however, is 
an incomplete perspective, for conflict does not simply destroy the 
accepted ways of doing things; it helps to establish new traditions 
and organizations. 
Conflicts may be said to be "produci:1:-ve-n- in two-
related ways: (1) they lead to the modification and 
creation of law; (2) the application of new rules leads 
to the growth of new institutional structures cynteri~g 
on the enforcement of these new rules and laws. 
Conflict is part of the social process of change, ,for it helps establish 
new institutions. In a sense, conflict provides a link between the 
old and the new order. 
Sociologists have recognized that conflict is crhcial in the 
establishment of new social organizations. In his Theory of Social 
and Economic Organizations, Max Weber begins to describe this process. 
J 
Weber identifies three types of organization--charismatic, rational-
1Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: 
Free Press, 1956) p.126. -
legal and traditional. A charismatic organization is organized 
around one person who 1s seen by the members as someone with super-
natural or exceptional powers. 2 A rational-legal organization 1s 
better known as a bureaucratic organization. It is characterized by 
the rational division of labor, a hierarchy of authority, rules and 
impersonal relationships. 3 A traditional organization 1s based on 
custom. Loyalty to the head of the organization governs relationships. 
Arbitrary decisions made by the leader replace the rules and rational 
division of labor of the bureaucratic organization. A feudal society 
4 is a typical traditional organization. 
· According to Weber, the charismatic organization is a 
revolutionary force in society which wil-1 evolve into either a 
rational-legal or a traditional organization or a combination of 
both. The charismatic organization's revolutionary force is found 
in the individual's personal experience rather than in the conclusions 
of rational argwnent. 
2Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations, 
trans. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, ed. Talcott Parsons 
(New York: Oxford Union Press, 1947) p. 358-359. 
JWeber, Social and Economic Organizations, p. 329-333. 
4weber, Social and Economic Organizations, p. 341-346. 
Charisma ... may involve a subjective or internal 
reorientation born out of suffering, conflicts or 
enthusiasm. It may then result in a radical alteration 
of the central system of attitudes and directions of 
action'with a completely new orientation of all attitudes 
toward the different problems and structures of the 
"world. 11 5 
11 
Because the charismatic organization is unstable, it must go through 
a process of 11 rout1.nization. 11 "Indeed, in its pure form charismatic 
authority may be said to exist only in the process of originating. 
It cannot remain stable, but becomes either traditionalized or 
rationalized, or a combination of both. 116 Providing for the needs of 
the organization is a primary motive for "routinization . 11 The 
problems of finding a successor for the charismatic leader exemplify 
this process. Members of the organization, especially those in high 
offices, become concerned with how to continue the organization, so 
that they may continue to receive the material benefits of mem,bership 
The members also must establish rules for the selection of a new 
leader. The legitimacy of a new leader depends upon the legitimacy 
7 of the selection process to members. 
Robert Merton further discusses the relationship between 
,_ 
conflict and institutional change 1.n his theory of functionalism, 
which focuses on the behavioral responses of human beings 
to social structure. These responses may help to adJust the social 
structure. 
5weber, Social and Economic Organizations, p. 363. 
6weber, Social and Economic Organizations, p. 364. 
7weber, Social and Economic Organizations, p. 364-369. 
Functions are those observed consequences which make 
for the adaptation or adJustment of a given system; 
and dysfunctions. those observed consequences which 
lessen the adaptation or adjustment of the system. 
There is also the empirical possibility of non-
functional consequences, which are simply irrelevant 
to the system under cons1deration.8 
12 
At first, soci,ologists used functionalism to study how society 
maintained itself instead of how 'it changed. 
Of key problematic importance to them has been the 
maintenance of existing structure and the ways,and 
means of insuring their smooth functioning. They have 
focused upon maladjustments and tensions 'which interfere 
with consensus. 9 ' 
This view of social structure helped to produce the notion that con-
flict is widesirable, something to avoid, because it indicates that 
10 society is wistable. 
Such a perspective on the fwictions of social structure and 
of human response to structure produces a distorted view of society 
as a static system which suppresses all conflict and change. Merton, 
however, argues that: 
8Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, 
second edn. (1949: rpt., New York: The Free Press, 1957) 
p. 51. 
9coser, Fwictions, p. 20. 
· 10coser, Fwictions, p. 23. 
... functional analysis conceives of the social 
structure as active, as producing fresh motivations 
which cannot be predicted on the basis of knowledge 
about man's native drives. If the social structure 
restrains some dispositions to act, it creates others. 
The functional approach therefore abandons the 
position, held by various individualistic theories, 
that different rates of deviant behavior in diyerse 
groups and social strata are the accidental result 
of varying proportions of pathological personalities 
found in these groups and strata. It attempts instead 
to determine how the social and cultural structure 
generates pressure for socially deviant behavior 
upon people variously located in that structure~ll 
13 
Merton identifies five discrete modes of behavior which are 
adaptations to social and cultural structure: conformity, ritualism, 
' I innovation, retreatism and rebellion. One can perceive a possible 
progression of adaptive behaviors from conformity to rebellion, if 
the behavior does not reduce the tension caused by social and cultural 
structures. Innovation, retreatism and rebellion are modes of 
socially deviant behavior which may produce some change in the social 
or cultural structure. Innovation occurs when individuals subscribe 
to cultural goals, while modifying the socially acceptable means of 
, 12 attaining those goals. Retreatism occurs when individuals renounce 
culturally accepted goals and their behavior does not fit into 
socially acceptable patterns. Merton considers this "more a private 
than a collective" form of adaptive behavior. 13 As adaptive 
behaviors, innovation and retreatism do not result in radical 
llMerton, Social Theory, p. 121-122. 
12Merton, Social Theory, p. 141. 
13Merton, Social Theory, p. 153-1~5. 
changes in cultural and social structure; however, successful 
rebellion does result in such change. Rebellion 11 represents a 
transitional response seeking to institutionalize new goa:l.s and 
14 
new procedures to be shared by other members of society. It thus 
refers to efforts to change the existing cultural and social structure 
rather than accommodate efforts within this structure. 1114 Rebellion 
is the point at which social change and social stability meet, for 
rebellion seeks to change social structure. Implicit in a rebellion 
are the traditions, institutions and bureaucracies of the new social 
order. 
II. The Similarity of Conflict and Movement Theory 
Study of the stages in the process of conflict enables one to 
understand the process of institutionalization referred to in Weber's 
and Merton's theories. Conflict includes the processes of mobil-
ization of potential members of the protesting group, of confrontation 
between groups and of resolution of the conflict, which leads to 
conflict regulation and institutionalization. These are not 
necessarily discrete processes. If conflict.is continuous, as is 
the conflict between an employer and workers over the allocation of 
profits and of power in the workplace, regulation and institutional-
ization are necessary to control the potential destructiveness of 
the conflict. 15 
14Merton, Social Theory, p. 140n. 
lSA.nthony Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973) p. 31. 
15 
There are many similarities between theories of conflict and 
theories of social movements. The goal of conflict, as of a social 
movement, is to change the social order. A social movement arises 
because there is a sense of strain caused by an ambiguity or 
inconsistency in values, which motivates potential members to 
resolve that strain by changing the social order. Similarly, conflict 
is a product of the motivation to reduce tension caused by the 
inconsistency between cultural goals, such as wealth, and the socially 
acceptable means for achieving those goals, such as talent and hard 
work. A movement has members and leaders and is organized in some 
manner. Likewise, theories of conflict discuss mobilization and the 
formation of conflicting groups. The ideology of a movement explains 
why an ambiguity in values exists and indicates that membership in the 
movement will reduce the tension. Theories of conflict, however, 
16 contain little or no discussion of ideology. 
The similarity between social movements and the role of conflict 
in institutional change 1s evident in a perspective which considers 
17 social movements naturally developing historical processes. From 
this perspective there are four stages in the development of a social 
movement. First, there 1s a "preliminary stage of mass (1ndiv1dual) 
16virgil W. Balthrop, "The Rhetoric of Social Movements: 
Towards a Perspective for Criticism," M.A. Thesis, University of 
Kansas, 1967, p. 41-52 and Oberschall, Social Conflict, p. 31. 
17Rex D. Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process: A Frame of 
Reference for the Study of Revolutionary Movements," Social 
Forces, 28(March 1950)3, p. 270-279. 
16 
excitement" when potential members become aware of their discontent, 
'~ 
but cannot resolve it. This 1s comparable to the mob1l1zat1on stage 
in conflict theory. The second stage 1s the "popular stage of crowd 
(collective) excitement and unrest" in which the individuals organize, 
identify the opposition and begin to develop an ideology. This also 
is ,comparable to mobilization of conflict groups. The third stage 
is the "formal stage of formulation of issues and formation of publics" 
in which the ideology, the movement organization and a program for 
action are developed. Confrontation with the opposition would occur 
here. This is comparable to the confrontive stage 1n conflict theory. 
The final step is the "institutional stage of legalization and societal 
organi~ation" in which the social movement becomes part of the 
social structure against which it rebelled. This is the process of 
conflict resolution, regulation and institutionalization. Obviously, 
social movement and conflict theory describe the same phenomenon. 
The terms "conflict" and "social movement" can be used almost 
interchangeably. 
Rhetoric is crucial to the stages of mobilization and con-
frontation in conflict. Rhetoric identifies the potential members 
' of a protesting group or movement and distinguishes them from-
nonmembers. Rhetoric explains the reality of potential members in a 
sensible manner, by legitimizing the expression of their private 
feelings and frustrations, and indicates that the solution to their 
problems is found 1n membership in the conflict group. 
What is largely expressive for the isolated individual 
is rhetorical to the movement's leadership. Particularly 
in militant movements, the leader wins and maintains 
adherents by saying to them what they cannot say to others 
or even to themselves. A major rhetorical process, then, 
consists of legitimizing privately-held feelings by 
providing social support and rationalizations for those 
feelings. 18 
The co~frontation between the movement or conflict group and 
17 
its opposition may occur on several different levels, such as 
legislative, physical, economic and rhetorical. Rhetorical con-
frontation, however, is crucial for the success of all other levels 
of confrontation, because it Justifies and explains the proposed 
change to members, the opposition and interested observers. Rhetorical 
confrontations attempt to explain why there was a physical con-
frontation, why economic boycotts were necessary or why direct action 
was needed, for example. Rhetoric places the legislative and 
physical confrontations in the context of the overall goals of the 
movement. However, for the confrontation between the movement and 
the established order to develop, there must be rhetorical recognition 
by the established order that the movement is a threat to its 
existence. In short, if leaders of the established order do not 
perceive the movement as a threat and ignore the arguments made by 
the movement, no confrontation will develop. 
18Herbert W. Simons, "Requirements, Problems a~d Strategies: 
A Theory of Persuasion for Social Movements," Quarterly Journal of 
Speech, 56 (February 1970)1, p. 6. 
... I:F!J or a movement to come into being there 
must be one or more actors who, perceiving that the 
"good order" (the established system) is in reality 
a faulty order full of absurdity and inJustice, cry 
out through various symbolic acts that true communication, 
justice, salvation cannot be achieved unless there is 
an l.llllilediate corrective applied to the established 
order. On the other hand there must be a reciprocating 
act from the establishment or counter rhetors which 
perceives the demands of the agitator-rhetors, not 
as calls for correction or re-righting the prevailing 
order, but as direct attacks on the foundations of the 
established order. 
The essential attribute here in the creation of 
a dialectical tension growing out of moral conflict. 19 
18 
There has been little analysis of rhetoric in the third stage 
of conflict, that of resolution, and especially of the resulting 
regulation and institutionalization of conflict. A portion of 
this lack of interest may be attributed to Leland Griffin's discussion 
of the rhetorical analysis of movements. Griffin identifies three 
phases of a movement--a period of inception, of rhetorical crisis 
and of conswnmation. The first two periods are characterized by 
much rhetorical activity--pre-existing sentiment is "nourished by 
interested rhetor1cians" in the inception period, while during a 
rhetorical crisis one of the "opposing groups of rhetoricians .. 
succeeds in irrevocably disturbing that balance between the groups 
which had existed in the mind of the collective audience." The 
,period of consumat1.on, in contrast, is "a time when the great 
proportion of aggressor rhetoricians abandon their efforts, either 
19Robert Cathcart, "New Approaches to the Study of Movements: 
Defining Movements Rhetorically," Western Speech 36 (Spring 1972) p. 87. 
because they are convinced that opinion has been satisfactorily 
developed and the cause won, or because they are convinced that 
perseverance is useless, or merely because they meet the press 
20 of new interests." The critic is left with the impression that 
rhetoric in this phase is unimaginative and less important, because 
there is no further conflict. A critic may conclude that the first 
two phases of a movement are much more interesting to study. Yet, 
rhetoric continues to play an important role in the third phase 
of a movement, as the remainder of this thesis will attempt to 
demonstrate. 
III. Institutionalization of Conflict 
The decision by conflicting parties to regulate a conflict 
19 
is based on a decision not to resolve their differences by cestroy1ng 
each other. The minimum condition for regulating, and later 
institutionalizing conflict, 1s recognition of the other party's 
right to exist. 
201eland M. Griffin, 11The Rhetoric of Historical Movements," 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, 38 (April 1952), p. 184-188 rpt. 
in Methods of Rhetorical Criticism: A Twentieth Century Perspective, 
Robert L. Scott and Bernard L. Brock eds. (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1972), p. 348-349. 
Recognition is the minimum condition for institution-
alizing conflict .... The decision to negotiate means 
that the authori ti'es publicly acknowledge the opposition 
and their representatives and, in that sense, acknowledge 
the legitimacy of the opposition, though they may not 
agree to their specific demands and manner of protest • 
• . • [T]he act of entering into negotiations represents 
a decision not to resolve the issue by destroying the 
opposition, but to include them as a party in a public 
decision that will affect both groups and the society 
at large. 21 
20 
Some conflicts, however,- cannot be (l'."esolved permanently. There 
must be some continuous form of regulation. 
In the end, lasting conflict regulation requires 
more than ad hoc conciliation whenever disturbances_ 
occur; it requires institutionalization of' the conflict. 
Institutionalization means that certain forms of protest 
are recognized as lawful and that consequently the 
agents of social control not only have no right to 
repress them but must protect the safety of the protesters 
against hostile interference. It also means that the 
leaders and organizations pressing for reforms are 
given the right to conduct their business, to recruit 
followers and raise resources, to publicly voice their 
position, in full freedom. It means that officials are 
bound by law and by public opinion to recognize these 
leaders as legitimate representatives of larger groups 
who must- be received, listened to, and bargained with 
in good faith. Institutionalization may further mean 
that a concrete sequence of steps and appeals 1s spelled 
out for resolving outstanding differences. Thus, the 
question of whom to negotiate with, when, under what 
rules and which issues, 1s answered with reference to 
rights, laws, to precedent, and not the bargaining power 
, , or goodwill of adversaries. 22 
The result is that when conflict is institutionalized, the social 
movement which rebelled against the established order becomes a 
21oberschall, Social Conflict, p. 243. 
22oberschall, Social Conflict, p. 266-267. 
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permanent organization in a new order which represents the interests 
of its members in the institutionalized conflict. 
In industrial relations, unions rebelled against a system which 
gave decision-making power only to employers. The new social order 
which unions sought to establish was based on collective bargaining--
the joint determination of wages and other conditions of employment 
by employers and unions. Collective bargaining institutionalizes 
the conflict between the two parties by ~estricting the expression 
of conflict. Because collective bargaining periodically resolves 
this continuous conflict, both the union and the company must be 
permanent and stable organizations to ensure that the conflict always 
is contained. Consequently, unions had to change from a social 
movement advocat1ng the establishment of collective bargaining to a 
permanent organization. 
Organizational permanency is achieved with bureaucratic 
orgam.zation. In fact, all permanent organization,, even democratic 
organization, eventually will exhibit bureaucratic tendencies. This 
is the argument proposed by Robert Michels, known as the "iron law 
of oligarchy." Michels der1 ved this law from his study of the 
European democratic socialist and trade-union movement before 
World War I. 23 
23seymour Martin Lipset, Martin A. Throw and James S. Coleman, 
Union Democracy (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1956) p. 5 and Lewis 
A. Coser and Bernard Rosenberg eds., Sociological Theory: A Book 
of Readings, 4th edn. (1957; rpt. New York: Macmillan, 1976)--
p. 354. 
Organization implies a tendency to oligarchy. In 
every organization, whether it be a political party, 
a professional union, or any other association of 
the kind, the aristocratic tendency manifests itself 
very clearly. The mechanism of the organization, 
while conferring a solio1ty of structure, induces 
serious changes in the organized mass, completely 
inverting the respective position of the leaders and 
the led. As a result of organization, every part 
[jiQ or professional union becomes divided into 
a minority of directors and a maJority of directed. 24 
22 
Other characteristics of bureaucratic organization were identified by 
Max Weber. These include the division of labor into specialized 
tasks, a system of rules which governs the organization, a hierarchy 
of authority and impersonal relationships. 25 The possession of 
technical knowledge determines who exercises control and has 
d . k. 26 ecision-ma ing power. 
In a collective bargaining relationship, the union must 
become a bureaucratic organization to remain a permanent participant 
in the instutionalized relationship which limits industrLal conflict. 
Consequently, the union leadership becomes concerned about maintaining 
the permanency of the organization--recruiting new members, keeping 
old members and sustaining the union's bargaining power by encouraging 
unified action among members. 
24 Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological ~judy 
of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, trans. en and 
Cedar Paul (New York: Free Press, 1962) p. 70. 
25peter M. Black, Bureaucracy In America O~ew York. Random 
House, 1956) p. 19 and Weber,, Social and Economic Organizations, 
p. 330-334. 
26weber, Social and Economic Organizations, p. 337-339. 
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There also are other external and internal pressures for 
bureaucratic organization. First, the nature of the corporation 
with which the union negotiates pressures a union to acquire a 
bureaucratic organization,"· .. the degree of bureaucratic central-
ization of unions is influenced by the extent of centralization 
27 in the structures of outside groups with which they must deal. 11 
To administer a contract to employees of a large corporation, a 
union also must become a large organization. 
At the same time there are internal pressures for efficiency 
and stability. When a union administers a contract for the employees 
of a large corporation, there must be sys~ems and procedures which 
insure that each complainF or problem in any plant anywhere in the 
country is treated in a similar manner. The more complex the 
industry and the greater the number of employees involved, the 
greater the problem of administration. "These tasks require the 
creation of a specializing staff which is appointed by and under 
control of the ["uniory officials. The knowledge and skill of union 
operation gradually become available only to members of the 
I 
elm . • 1 · ,28 a in1strat1ve e ite.' 
27seymour Martin Lipset, "The Political Process in Trade Unions: 
A Theoretical Statement," in Freedom and Control In Modern Society, 
Monroe Berger, Theodore Abel and Charles H. Page eds. (New York 
Octagon Books, 1964) p. 84. 
28Lipset, "Political Process," Freedom and Control, p. 84. 
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A major goal of organizations is to reduce uncertainty about 
its operations. 29 For most organizations this means reducing 
uncertainty about relationships with other organizations (i.e. suppliers, 
buyers), but since unions are political organizations which ultimately 
derive their power from their members, there is an internal 
uncertainty which makes the union less stable and less predictable 
than a corporation. 
In the context of his union the labor leader is 
an elected official, dependent ("in the last analysis," 
which is not always made by history) upon the loyalty 
of fellow leaders and upon the rank and file of his 
organization. The great organizing upsurge of the 
thirties showed that officers who were not sufficiently 
responsive to the demands qf industrial workers could 
lose power. The corporation managers, on the other hand, 
in the context of his corporation, is not an elected 
official in the same sense. His power does not depend 
upon the loyalty of the men who work for him, and he does 
not usually lose his job if a union successfully invades 
his plant. The upsurge of the thirties did not oust,the 
managers, whose responsibilities are not to the workers whom 
they employ but to themselves and their scattered stockholders. 
This difference in power situation means that the 
power of the business leader is likely to be.more 
continuous and more assured than that of the labor 
leader; the labor leader is more likely to be ~nsecure 
in his job if he fails to "deliver the goods. 113 
This inherent instability in the union leadership threatens the 
collective bargaining relationship with the corporation. Union leaders 
29RJ.chard V. Farace, Peter R. Monge, Hamish M. Russel, 
Communicating and Organizing (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 
1977) p. 74. 
30c. Wright Mills, "The Labor Leaders and the Power Elite," in 
Industrial Conflict, Arthur Kornhauser, Robert Dubin, Arthur M. Ross 
eds. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954) p. 148. 
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try to compensate for this by stabilizing internal union relations. 
A permanent union leadership is a simple and common means of attaining 
this goal. The leadership makes itself indispensable, or so it 
seems to the members, because the leaders possess the skills, 
knowledge and experience necessary to run the union which the rank 
and file lacks. 31 Thus, the control and power for decision-making 
is left more and more in the hands of those who possess the skill and 
knowledge to use it, the union leaders. 
Bureaucratic organization is a necessary outcome of the 
institutionalization of industrial conflict. To limit conflict 
successfully, the parties must have stable and permanent organizations. 
But of what interest is this to a rhetorical critic? The problem 
for unions as bureaucratic organizations becomes maintaining the 
members' commitment to an organization over which they are losing 
influence. Commitment of the rank and file is crucial to the union's bar-
gaining power, since all union power rests ultimately on the economic 
impact of a strike by all union members. Rhetoric is used as a 
device for encouraging commitment to the union. As industrial 
conflict becomes more institutionalized and as union organization 
becomes more bureaucratic, the rhetorical means for inducing 
commitment become more important. 
31 seymour Martin L1.pset, "Introduction," in Seymour Martin 
Lipset, Martin A. Trow and James S. Coleman, Union Democracy (Glencoe, 
Ill: Free Press, 1966) p. 16. 
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IV. A Perspective on Non-discursive Uses of Language 
Rhetoric is'the instrumental use of language to persuade and 
to influence. Aristotle defined rhetoric as "the faculty of 
- 32 observing in any given case the· available means of persuasion. TT 
33 Rhetoric is a faculty, an instrument, for discovering arguments. 
A rhetor's goal is to convince an audience to make a decision about 
the expediency of proposed action, which requires a deliberative 
decision, about the Justice or inJustice of some past action, which 
requires a forensic decision and about an orator's skills, which 
. d . d . 34 requires an epi eictic ecision. Typically, the form of rhetoric 
is discursive, consisting of logical arguments and evidence. 
There is, however, a second aspect of language, what I call the 
consummatory-expressive. Language is consummatory if it is the 
result of the individual's need to speak with symbols. It is speaking 
for the pleasure of speaking, for the aesthetic appeal of language. 
Kenneth Burke's perspective of human beings as symbol-using creatures 
helps to explain the consumm~tory nature of rhetoric. 
32Aristotle, Rhetoric, W. Rhys Roberts trans., Modern Library 
edn. (New York: Random House, 1954) 1355b. 11. 25-26. 
33Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1356a. 
34Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1358b. 
11. 32-33. 
' 11. 1-8 and 21-29. 
If man is characteristically the symbol-using animal, 
then he should take pleasure in the use of his powers 
as a symbolizer JUSt as a bird presumably likes to 
fly or a fish to swim. Thus, on some occasions, in 
connection with aesthetic activities, we humans might 
like to exercise our prowess with symbol ~rstems JUSt 
because that's the kind of animal we are . ., 
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The expressive use of language is very similar to the 
consummatory use of language; in fact, the two are almost inseparable. 
Expressive language articulates the speaker's feelings and emotions. 
Lyric poetry exemplifies this process. The subJect of a lyric poem 
is "usually emotion, often subjectively perceived and presented, . 
By using expressive language, an individual makes statements about 
her or his feelings towards and attitudes about a situation, a goal 
or a problem, for example. Consummatory-expressive language is 
created for the rhetor's own consumption, because of the rhetor's 
need to speak. The consummatory-expressive use of language has a 
non-discursive form, comprised of the ritualistic, aesthetic and 
poetic elements of language. These elements help make discourse 
vivid and memorable. 
35Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, 
Literature and Method (Berkeley,CA: University of California, 1966) 
p. 29. 
36Wilfred L. Guerin, Earle G. Labor, Lee Morgan and John R. 
Williangham, A Handbook of Critical Approaches to Literature (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1966) p. 226. For examples of lyric poems see 
John Keats "Ode on Melancholy," and Thomas Grey, "Elegy Written in a 
Country Churchyard"inWright Thomas and Stuart Gerry Brown, Eds., 
Reading-Poems: An Introduction to Critical Study (New York: Oxford 
University Press-,-1941) ,p. 83 and 123. 
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Yet, consununatory-expressive discourse also can be instrumental. 
The fact that a statement has been made changes the rhetorical scene. 
Through expression, the rhetor's needs may be met. If the statement 
were addressed to an audience or were overheard, it could encourage 
identification with the rhetor. Identification occurs because of a 
pool of "common experiences shared by the rhetor a.,nd the aud.1 tor based 
on common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that make 
them [the rhetor and the audi to!] consubstantial. 1137 A common symbol 
system allows humans to communicate with each other, to overcome 
their division and identify the ways in which they are 11 consubstantial11 
with others. Thus, when a consummatory-expressive statement is 
heard by an audience, members of the audience may identify with the 
persona of the rhetor, because they recognize themselves or what 
they wish to be in the rhetor's statements. Similarly, other members 
of the audience may not understand what the rhetor says, because of a 
dearth of "consubstantiality. 11 
Consummatory-expressive rhetoric is instrumental when identification 
occurs with the rhetor's persona. If the persona represents an 
ideal to which the audience may aspire, the rhetoric may motivate the 
audience to attain that ideal. The persona also may confirm commonly 
help beliefs or deepen commitment to a common goal. The non-
discursive images of the rhetor and tµe rhetor's explanation of reality 
are remembered by the audience, because they are presented in vivid 
and aesth~tically pleasing language. 
37Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (1950; rpt., Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1969) p. 21-22. 
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Most members of a movement or organization already know and 
believe the ideology, the prerequisites of membership, arguments and 
supporting materials of the organization. What members need is to 
reconfirm their commitment to the organization and to the ideology, 
so they are motivated to act as its representatives. By using non-
discursive discourse rhetors can encourage members to reconfirm their 
belief in the ideology of and their commitment to the organization. 
Because non-discursive discourses uses poetic, aesthetic and 
ritualistic elements of language, the members identify with the 
actors found in the rhetoric. 38 \~1en members identify with actors 
who represent the ideals of the organization, members reconfirm what 
they already believe and are motivated to act according to these 
ideal models of conduct. 
For example, when the believer tn Christianity expresses her 
or his belief in salvation through Christ during the ritual of 
communion, the member's expression of belief and the role of believer to 
which a member aspires confirms the fact of salvation in the member's 
mind. It is a self-confirming argument--because I believe I will be 
saved and because I will be saved I believe. A similar process occurs 
when patriotic Americans sing songs like the "National Anthem." By 
singing about the country's ability to win a perilous battle fought 
throughout the night, a patriotic citizen not only expresses the 
38s. H~ Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art 
(1911; rpt. New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1951) p. 257-261. 
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belief that the United States is strong and will endure but also proves 
that belief by the act of singing the song. Through the ritualistic 
expression of belief, the committed person simultaneously articulates 
beliefs and proves them by enactment. 
Rhetoric which encourages commitment is consummatory-expressive 
rhetoric. It is a statement· of beliefs, feelings, emotions or 
experiences which the audience can recognize as its own. The discourse 
affirms previously-held beliefs and proves their validity as an 
accurate explanation of reality by enactment. 
V. The Role of Rhetoric in the Institutionalization of Conflict 
To understand the role of rhetoric in the institutionalization 
of conflict, it helps to recall Robert Merton's theory of functionalism, 
' 
which argues that the social process of ch~nge consists of continuous 
rebellion, institutionalization, rebellion, institutionalization and 
so on. Just as factors which allow institutionalization are ;mplicit 
I 
in rebellion, so the elements which encourage organizational 
permanency are implicit in the rhetoric of protest. Although rhetorical 
critics and scholars have not investigated the role of rhetoric in 
institutionalization, they have investigated rhetoric which encourages 
change in the social order., Within studies of the rhetoric of move-
ments, one finds hints about the role of rhetoric in the process of 
institutionalization. 
Richard B_. Gregg's discussion of the ego-function of the rhetoric 
of protest provides an opportunity to identify a possible role of 
' rhetoric in the institutionalization of a social movement. Gregg 
3.1 
argues that those rhetorical acts of the Black, Women's and Student 
Movements which alienated the public, actually were directed to 
members and were designed to create new identities containing 
desired strengths and virtues. 39 The recognition that Blacks and 
Women, for example, are exploited by society because of its inherent 
racism or sexism, respectively, leads to the conclusion that the 
traditional identities of Blacks and Women are not natural; they 
are imposed by society's institutions to preserve the social order. 
The process of transformation is a painful one for rhetors and 
their audiences, for they must discuss openly the inadequacies and 
failures of their original identity to demonstrate the need for a 
new identity. 40 'According to Gregg, by attacking the racism or 
sexism of society, the rhetor not only aids the transformation to a 
new identi~y, but also enhances and affirms it. 41 Enhancement and 
~ffirmation indicate that the rhetor is not simply concerned with 
changing identity, but also is concerned with maintaining the new 
identity to make it a permanent part of a new social order. 
Unfortunately, Gregg refers only briefly to these maintenance 
processes in his discussion. 
39Richard B. Gregg, "The Ego-Function of the Rhetoric of Protest," 
Philosophy and Rhetoric, 4 (Spring 1971)2, p. 73-75. 
40Gregg, "Ego-Function," Philosophy and Rhetoric, p. 74-75 and 
85-86. 
41Gregg, "Ego-Function," Philosophy and Rhetoric, p. 81-82 and 
84. 
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George Herbert Mead's notions about the development of the self 
can explain more fully the process of transforming one's identity. 
They also indicate a possible relationship between a change in 
identity and the process of institutionalization. Within the self 
there is an "I" and a "me," Mead argues. The "I" is the uncertain, 
immediate and spontaneous aspect of a human being's self. "The 'I' 
is his action over against that social situation wi tlun his own 
conduct, and 1t gets into his experience only after he has carried 
out the act. Then he is aware of it." In contrast, the "me" is 
the "organized set of attitudes of others which he himself assumed" 
which governs conduct. 42 The "me" contains the do's and don'ts 
of society, ail of the roles which an individual is expected to 
play--woman, man, wife, husband, parent, child, teacher and student. 
The complete self is one which "takes on" the attitudes of the "me." 
"A person is a personality because he belong~ to a community, because 
he takes over the 1nst1tut1ons of that community into his own 
conduct. 1143 
A role does not exist except in relation to other roles and in 
a particular context. Within Mead's community there is an inter-
dependent matrix of roles and relationships. A rhetor may enact 
this matrix dramatically. Such a dramatic enactment is what Northrop 
Frye calls a "myth of concern." 
42George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Vol. I of 
Works of George Herbert Mead, Charles W. Morris ed. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1962) p. 175. 
43Mead, Mind, Self and Society, p. 162. 
The myth of concern exists to hold society together, 
so far as words can do this. For it, truth and reality 
are not directly connected with reasoning or evidence, 
but are socially established. What is true, for concern, 
is what society does and believes in response to authority, 
and a belief, so far as a belief is verbalized, is a 
statement of willingness to participate in a myth of 
concern. The typical language of concern tends to 
become the language of belief. In origin, a myth of 
concern is largely undi,fferentiated; it has its roots 
in religion, but religion also at that stage has the 
function of religio, the binding together of the coIIIIIlunity 
in common acts and assumptions.44 
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Frye recognizes that a culture contains a group of stories which 
take on central importance--"they are believed to have really 
happened, or else to explain or recount something that is centrally 
important for a society's history, religion or social structure. 1145 
When combined,, these stories produce the myth of a society. This 
myth is a dramatic enactment of the community's beliefs, values and 
roles, in Mead's terminology. The myth develops as society 
develops, until the former becomes encyclopedic--covering the society's 
past, future, its relationship to deities and neighbors, traditions 
and duties. In short, the "myth of concern" contains in dramatic 
form what a person needs to know to be a member of that society. 
Frye's "myth of concern" is the dramatic counterpart of a 
society's ideology. A "myth of concern" is like an ideology in 
that both synthesize and integrate experience into a consistent 
explanation of reality: II there is a synthesizing and 
44Northrop Frye, The Critical Path: An Essay on the Social 
Context of Literary Criticism, Midland Bookedn. (Bloomington, 
Indiana:-Indiana University Press, 1971) p. 36. 
4SFrye, Critical Path, p. 34. 
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integrating process through which the concept of consciousness lthe 
embryonic conception of ideology,7 comes to furnish a unitary centre 
in a infinitely variable world: • 
The "me" or the "myth of concern" is a form of social control 
over the individual, for it identifies socially acceptable behavior. 
Social control is the expression of the "me" over 
against the expression of the "I". It sets the limits, 
it gives the determination that enables the "I" so to 
speak, to use the "me" as the means of carryin§ out what 
is the undertaking that all are interested in. 7 
Social control is accomplished through a process of internal 
self-criticism. 
The physiological mechanism of the human individual's 
central nervous system makes it possible for him to take 
the, attitude of other individuals, and the attitudes of 
the organized social group of which he and they are 
members, toward himself, in terms of his integrated 
social relations to them and to the group as a whole; 
so that the general social process of experience and 
behavior which the group is carrying on is directly 
presented to him in his own experience, and so that he 
is thereby able to govern and direct his conduct consciously 
and critically, in terms of this social process. Thus 
he becomes not only self-conscious but also self-critical; 
and, thus, through self-criticism, social control over 
individual behavior and conduct operates; by virtue of 
the social origin and basis of such criticism. That is 
to say, self-criticism is essentially social criticism, 
and behavior controlled by self-criticism is esentially 
behavior controlled socially. 48 
46 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to 
the Sociology of Knowledge, Harvert edn. (New York: Harcourt-,-
Brace and Jovanovich, 1936) p. 68. 
47Mead, Mind, Self and Society, p. 210-211. 
48 Mead, Mind, Self and Society, p. 270. 
Social control not only limits behavior, but also enables an 
individual to realize that he or she is part of the community. 
It is the ability of the person to put himself in, 
other people's places that gives him his cues as to 
what he is to do under specific situation. It is this 
that gives to the man what we term his character as 
a member of the community; his citizenship, from a 
political standpoint; his membership from any one of 
the different standpoints in which he belongs to the 
community. It makes him a part of the connnunity, and 
he recognizes himself as a member of it Just because 
he does take the attitudes of those concerned, and does 
control his own conduct in terms of common attitudes. 49 
Social control may be accomplished by encouraging certain 
35 
behaviors in the roles individuals play as members of a community or 
organization. These behaviors encourage commitment to the community 
or organization, making social control easier. In a survey of 
nineteenth century utopian communities, Rosebeth Moss Kanter 
identifies mechanisms which encourage commitment that are incorporated 
into the role of utopian community member. The greater the number 
of mechanisms used by a given utopian community, the greater the 
likelihood that it would exist for at least 25 years, the sociological 
definition of one generation. Kanter identifies five mechanisms--
sacrifice, the conscious distinction of the community from the rest 
' 
of the world, emphasis on the, community as a collective whole instead 
of the separateness of an individual community member, community control 
over an individual's behavior and encouraging a member to surrender 
his or her identity to the community. An example of sacrifice would 
49Mead, Mind, Self and Society, p. 270. 
be selling all personal possessions and donating the proceeds to 
the community. Conscious distinction of the community from the 
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rest of the would could be operationalized by requiring unusual dress, 
such as the dress of the Amish community, or by ideological 
distinctions between members and non-members which "proved" the 
superiority of members over non-members. Group activities, such 
as singing, are ways to de-emphasize the individuality of members 
\ 
and emphasize the community as an undivided whole. Community control 
over an individual member's behavior may be exercised through self 
or group criticism and confession. Kanter argues that sacrifice 
promoted continued membership in the utopian community, because 
members Justified their sacrifice by increasing the importance of 
the community in their lives. Distinguishing the community from the 
rest of the world and emphasizing the group rather than individual 
identity promoted cohesion. Self or group criticism of behavior 
encouraged adherence to the normative behaviors of the community. 
Surrender was the cumulative effective of these other devices which 
was heightened to create a total dependence on the comrnunity. 50 
The social control function of the "me" helps provide a new 
social order with the stability and permanency necessary for 
institutionalization. Commitment to the social order 1s crucial to 
the success of social control. 
50 Rosebeth Moss Kanter, "Commitment and Social Organization: 
A Study of Commitment Mechanisms in Utopian Commun1.ties," 
.1\mer1can Sociological Review 33(August 1968)4, p. 499-517. 
37 
The 11 Itr is the creative and spontaneous aspect of self wluch 
has the potential to change the "me." In Mead's words, "the 
individual ... 1.s continually reacting back against this soc1ety. 11 
The reaction of great' individual and of countless lesser minds 
slowly changes society, the "me" ui the individual self. 51 
The human being's ability to communicate with symbols is what 
allows the self to develop. 
The ability to pick these meanings out and to indicate 
them to others and to the organism is an ability which 
gives percul1ar power to the human individual. The 
control has been made possible by language. It is that 
mechanism of control over meaning in this sense which 
has, I say, constituted what we term "mind." The mental 
processes do not, however, lie in words any more than 
the intelligence of the organism lies in the elements 
of the central nervous system. Both are part of a process 
that is going on between organism and environment. The 
symbols serve their part in this process, and it is 
that which makes communication so i~~ortant. Out of 
language emerges the field of mind.~ 
Symbols also create the common environment in which human 
beings live, in that by describing the environment we emphasize certain 
facets of it and ignore others, because of the words we choose for 
description. This is similar to Kenneth Burke's notion of language 
as a series of termin1st1c screens, that "much that we take as 
observations about 'reality' may be but the spinning out of possibilities 
implicit in our particular choice of terms."53 
51Mead, Mind, Self and Society, p. 210. 
52Mead, Mind, Self and Society, p. 133. 
53 Burke, Language Symbolic Action, p. 46. 
A reflexive relationship arises between the human mind and 
its e,nvironment, the mind "creates" the environment, because 
symbols used to describe the envfronment select what the mind 
perceives. The mind, in turn, must adjust to that environment. 54 
Thus, human beings are responsible for the environment and for 
their mind. 
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Mead does not discuss how to change the "me" in an individual; 
however, Gregg's discussion of the ego-function provides the link. 
The function of the rhetoric of protest is the ~reation of a new 
identity, a new role. This role, however, cannot exist in isolation; 
it must exist in relation to other roles in a particular context. 
If a rhetor creates a new rol~, he or she also must create a new 
"myth of concern" and an ideology in which that role will exist. 
The "myth of concern" and ideology will explain reality and provicl'e 
models of conduct. A rhetor uses the imagery of the "myth of 
concern" or the logical arguments of the ideology to confirm 
certain explanation£ of reality and, indirectly, to preserve the 
institutions which they created. 
I 
VI. A Perspective Drawn From Rhetorical Criticism 
A traditional perspective of rhetoric as a discursive 
phenomenon is not entirely adequate to analyze rhetoric in an 
increasingly institutionalized conflict, so a traditional critical 
perspective also is problematic, for it assumes that rhetoric requires 
54Mead, Mind, Self and Society, p. 245-246. 
logical arguments to persuade an audience, while rhetoric in the 
' 
institutionalization of conflict has a more non-discursive form. A 
traditional perspective 
emphasizes the examination of the presuppositions; 
underlying arguments; the validity of argumentative 
structure; and the credibility, relevance, and 
sufficiency of evidence. It stresses the adequacy 
of the speaker's or writer's analysis of the issue; 
his ability to respond to counterarguments; and his 
capacity to adapt the materials of his discourse to 
the expectations, experiences and interests of his 
audience.55 
In contrast, Kenneth Burke's theory of dramatism focuses on 
rhetorical processes similar to non-discursive rhetoric in an 
institutionalized conflict. For Burke, 
..• rhetoric is not rooted in any past condition 
of human society. It is rooted in an essential 
function of language itself, a function that is 
wholly realistic, and is continually born anew; 
the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing 
cooperation in beings that by nature respond to 
symbols.56 
Identification is the central rhetorical process in dramatism. 
The audience identifies with the rhetor because it recognizes a 
pool of common experiences, ideas and attitudes which make the 
audience and rhetor "consubstantial." Identification induces 
cooperation because of the recognition of "consubstantiality." How-
ever, the divisive nature of human beings, caused by the lack of 
55Karlyn Kohrs Campbell~ Critiques of Contemporary Rhetoric, 
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1972) p. 24-25. 
56 
Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 43. 
"consubstantiality," always is working against identification and 
cooperation. 57 
For Burke, rhetoric is not simply a means of conveying 
information, but is, a mode of action--symbolic action. 58 Thus, 
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the use of language has both causes and consequences which a critic 
must consider. For example, when a rhetor states that a particular 
confrontation is a battle, he or she is shaping the perceptions of 
the audience. The rhetor 1.s limiting the audience's alternatives 
to act in this situation. The critic could explore what motivated 
the rhetor to make this statement and its consequences for future 
public discussion or resolution of the conflict, for example. 
These two perspectives reflect two fundamentally different, 
yet complementary perspectives on language--language as conveying 
information and language as conveying perceptions. The traditional 
perspective emphasizes verifiable facts and logical arguments, 
while the dramatistic perspective emphasizes how language qua language 
affects perceptions of reality and actions. The words an individual 
uses reflect her or his perceptions of attitudes toward the world and, 
thus, are important indications of future action. 3ecause non-
discursive rhetoric utilizes the poetic, aesthetic and ritualistic 
aspects of language, a dramatistic perspective on language would be 
57Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 20-22. 
58Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1969) p. 235-=1'47. 
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a logical perspective for a criticism of the role of rhetoric 1n the 
process of institutionalization. 
VII. Methodology 
The methodology for this thesis consists of a descriptive 
analysis and cluster and agon analyses of all available rhetoric 
generated during the 1936-1937, 1945-1946 and 1970 UAW national strikes 
against GM. A descriptive analysis consists of careful and detailed 
descriptions of arguments, supporting materials, appeals to values, 
thesis statements, purpose, tone, persona, as well as poetic and 
rhetorical strategies utilized by the rhetor. In short, it is a 
description of the ways in which the rhetor used symbols in her or 
h . d h d. 59 is attempt to persua et e au ience. Because of my interest in 
how a rhetor induces commitment through the use of language, I paid 
special attention to how UAW rhetors utilized non-discursive elements 
of language. I noted, in particular, characterizations and imagery. 
FroCT the descriptive analysis I also generated a list of the 
key terms of each strike, based upon freluency and intensity of the 
use of these terms in the rhetoric of each strike. I also noted 1£ 
there were characterizations of these key terms in the discourse. I 
then performed cluster and agon analyses of the key terms or their 
59campbell, Critiques of Contemporary Rhetoric, p. 14-19. 
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characterizations for each strike. 60 Very simply, cluster analysis 
consists of looking for what terms or characterizations go with what 
other terms or characterizations. What characterizations are 
associated with each other 1n the rhetoric of each strike and do 
these associations change with each successive strike? An agon 
analysis looks for the opposition of key terms or characterizations. 
This indicates the existence of any conflict or tension between 
characterizations for the rhetor and provides the basis of any drama 
found in the rhetoric. I also tried to determine if these oppositions 
change with each successive strike. 
Based on the results of the cluster and agon analysis, I 
attempted to reconstruct relationships between the non-discursive 
elements of the rhetoric of each strike, in order to determine the 
union's perception of reality during each strike. I describe these 
perceptions of reality as "myths of concern." I then attempt to 
compare these "myths of concern" and discuss the implications of 
their differences for the UAW as an organization and as part of a 
social movement. This analysis also has broader 1mpl1cat1ons for 
understanding how conflict is institutionalized, because these 
three UAW strikes occur at difference stages in the process by which 
industrial conflict is 1.nstJ. tutionalized. Thus, the rhetoric of 
the strikes provides the critic with an opportunity to study the 
role of rhetoric in this social process. 
60carol A. Berthold, "Kenneth Burke's Cluster-Agon Method:, Its 
Development and an Application, 11 Central States Speech .Journal, 
27(Spring 1977)1 p. 302-309. 
Chapter Three 
THE CONTEXT FOR INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT 
"Anyone," the noted arbitrator Theodore W. Kheel 
once remarked, "who starts a sentence by saying that 
'the trouble with labor or management is' is bound to 
partially right but mostly wrong. 111 
Mr. Kheel's caveat is worth remembering for even the most casual 
discussion about unions, management or labor relations, because 
variety is often the rule rather than the exception. For example, 
definitions of unions vary enough to include organizations which 
are-not usually considered unions as well as organizations widely 
recognized as unions. A general definition of unions, such as 
"an association of individuals 1n a par-;icular trade or place of 
work who voluntarily unite for collective action to improve their 
individual status, 112 could include such professional organizations 
as the National Education Association and the American Bar Association, 
as well as the Teamsters. More specific definitions of unions such as: 
1Theodore W. Kheel, "A Labor Relations Policy for 1964," Personnel 
Journal, April 1964, p. 181 cited in Arthur A. Sloane and Fred Witney, 
Labor Relations, 3rd edn. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977) p. 47. 
2E. Wight Bakke, Clark' Kerr and Charles W. Anrod, Unions, 
Management and the Public, 3rd edn. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
World, 1967) p. 74. 
... any organization of any kind, or any agency or 
emp'loyee representation committee or plan, in which 
employees participate and which exists for the purpose, 
in whole or in part, of dealing with employers con-
cerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates_of 
pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.j 
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delineate union activities with which the public is familiar and 
recognizes as characteristic of unions. Historically, the goals of 
unions are varied. There are the utopian cooperative efforts of the 
Knights of Labor, 4 the syndicalism of the International Workers of 
the World, 5 and the business um.onism which focuses on issues of 
wages, pensions and the like which characterizes most unions today. 
Generally, two types of unions are most common 111 labor relations 
today, craft and industrial unions. Craft unions have a horizontal 
organization of highly skilled workers, such as carpenters or 
machinists, while industrial unions have a vertical organization of 
all workers--skilled, sem1-sk1lled and unsk1lled--who work 1n an 
industry, such as steelworkers or automobile workers. Before the 
merger of the A<11erican Federation of Labor (A. F. of L.) and the 
Congress of I~dustr1al Organizations (C. I. O.), the A. F. of L. was 
an organization of craft unions while the C. ,I. 0. was an organization 
349 U.S. Code 449, sec. 2(5). (National Labors Relations Act) 
4Robert H. \1/l.ebe, The Search for Order: 1877-1920, American 
Century Series (New York-:-H1ll and Wang, 1967) p. 66-69. 
5Melvyn Dubofsky_, We Shall Be All: A History of the IWW 
(New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 196~ --
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of industrial unions. 6 Today, industrial unions like the United 
Automobile Workers (U.A.W.) have made special arrangements for 
skilled workers within the industrial union organization, because of 
what they perceive as differences in the needs of skilled and semi or 
unskilled workers. 7 
There are many factors which affect the particular relationship 
between a union and the management of a business which help to make 
that relationship distinctive. Peculiarities of the industry, such 
as the differences between construction and oil production, the size 
of the company, the company's financial situation, the philosophy of 
mana~ement, the size and structure of the union and the like, all 
make it difficult to generalize about the nature of all union-
management relationships by studying one relationship. This is not 
to say, however, that there are no similarities in union-management 
relationships, but that care must be taken in applying any conclusions 
reached here ,to other relationships. By limiting myself to the 
relationship between the U.A.W. and the General Motors Corporation 
(G.M.), I am focusing on union-management relations in industrial ' 
manufacturing. The fact that both G.M. and the U.A.W. are powerful 
organizations also limits the application of this analysis to other 
6Arthur A. Sloane and Fred Witney, Labor Relations, 3rd edn. 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-nall, 1977) p. 67-84. 
7Arnold R. Weber, "Stability and Change in the Structure of 
Collective Bargaining," Challenges to Collective Bargaining (New York: 
Columbia University, The American Assembly, n.d.) p. 34. 
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union-management relationships. Similarly, the limitation of my 
analysis to the rhetoric of the U.A.W. during national strikes also 
restricts the application of any conclusions reached in this analysis 
to other social movements in which conflict with the social order is 
not institutionalized. 
The strike is part of the collective bargaining process in 
industrial relations and must be viewed as one element within that 
process. Collective bargaining is the Joint determination of hours, 
fringe benefits and other conditions of employment by unions and 
management through negotiation. 
Collective bargaining would have little meaning were it 
not for the possibility of a strike, with attendant 
losses on both sides, since there would be little 
pressure on the parties to modify their positions and 
reach agreements. It follows that the strike and the 
lockout [a lockout is where the employer prevents his 
or her employees from working by locking them out of 
the workplac~ are really two-sided contests and that 
there are two parties to every stoppage, equally in 
disagreement with each other. The fact of a 
lockout does not necessarily mean that the employer is 
at fault, nor the fact of a strike that the union is 
to blame. 8 
The occurrence of a strike is the point at which the union-
management relationship moves out of the realm of private negotiations 
into the realm of public debate. The bargaining relationship is primarily 
between the company and the union, but once the intention to st~ike 
is announced and especially when a strike 1s called, the public interest 
directly 1s involved. The new relationship is between the company, 
the union, other companies who see the outcome of the strike affecting 
8Arthur Kornhauser, Robert Dubin and Arthur M. Ross, eds., 
Industrial Conflict (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954) p. 12. 
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union-management relations at their companies, the government which is 
concerned about the economic impact of the strike and the public as 
consumers of the company's goods or services. The public has an 
interest in ending the strike at some po~nt at which the lack of goods 
or services provided by the company becomes intolerable. The public 
may put pressure on either/or both parties to end the strike, to 
resume barga,ining and to conclude a contract. Consequently, to 
understand a strike and the role of union discourse in it, one must 
understand the context in which strikes occur--the relationship 
between the company and its workers, between management and the 
union, and between both the company and the union and both the public 
and the government. 
I. The Bases of Industrial Conflict 
The conflict of interest between a business person and a worker 
is based on the scarcity of money and of power. 
For what is of fundamental significance in the culture of 
capitalism is its emphasis on the econonuc individual, 
that is, the rational, acquisitive, self-interested, in-
dividual who goes about the pursuit of private ends 
(generally capable of expression in monetary terms in the 
form of wages, rents or profits) in the most efficient 
manner possible. His prototype is popularly supposed to 
be the ingenious Yankee, whether as industrious 
laborers with the reasonable hope of better ghings, the 
inventive manufacturer or the shrewd trader. 
9wilbert E. Moore, Industrial Relations and the Social Order 
(New York: Macmillan, 1946) p. 37-38. ----
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The business person makes a profit to pay dividends to investors, if 
any, to buy new equipment, and then to make money for herself or 
himself. In contrast, the worker is interested in making a profit 
from wages, which is seen as a cost of production in business. To' 
pay higher wages, a business person must either pay lower dividends to 
investors, which decreases the desirability of investing in the 
business; decrease the amount of money used to make capital improvements, 
which could hurt future production; or increase the price of products, 
which may decrease consumer demand for the product. 
Ultimately, the conflict over profits is based on a conflict 
over power, since power helps determine who makes the greatest pr~fits. 
The conflict over power is central to disputes about the rights of 
management or of workers. 
The pronouncements of the participants in indu3trial 
disputes are likely to contain repeated references 
to "rights" which are being won or defended. Thus 
the representatives of labor may claim the right of 
union recognition, collective bargaining, or a fair 
return for labor. The representative~ of management 
will uphold the property rights of the company, the 
right of the company to run its own business, or tfO 
right of capital for a fair return on investments. 
' The conflict is over who has the power to determine wage rates and 
other conditions of employment or, more simply, who has power in 
the workplace. 
Theoretically, this conflict of interest contributes to the 
welfare of the economic system and to ~ociety, by preventing one 
10Moore, Industrial Relations, p. 402. 
person or group of people from dominating the marketplace. This 
conflict of interest enhances the significance of individual input 
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in economic relationships, 11 however, the implications of this con-
flict of interest place a worker in a position subservient to the 
employer. If wages simply are seen as part of the cost of production, 
there is little concern by the business person for the people 
earning the wages, which implies that the workers are nonhuman, 
machine-like. 12 The belief that workers are only a cog in the 
process of production is perilously close to anti-democratic notions 
that the working class is incapable of appreciating the "finer" 
things in life, of governing themselves or of deserving a higher 
standard of living. 
The theoretical basis of classical or laissez-faire economic 
theory is individualism. Any organized attempt to affect economic 
processes disrupts the balance created by the conflict of interests, 
which allows the economy to work optimally. The worker must remain 
an individual, since any form of organization disrupts natural economic 
laws. 
11Moore, Industrial Relations, p. 50. 
12Lazar Teper and Sally Loomis' mass recitation Machine, 
translated and adapted from Andreyev's King Hunger, is a statement 
by workers about being treated like machines. Machine was performed 
before different union locals in a traveling Labor Chautaugua 
during the 1920s and 1930s. Brookwood Collection, Labor Chautauqua 
Series, Box 98, Folder: 98-9, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs. 
so 
A critic of laissez-faire economics describes the theory in the 
following manner. 
In economics the manifestation of individualism was the 
theory known as laissez-faire. Based on the paradox 
that private vices could be public virtues, this theory 
saw in the free and unrestricted pursuit of self-interest 
the,key to material progress. Its proponents argued that 
the competition resulting from the nninhibited rush of 
a variety of individuals to increase their fortunes 
would be a sufficient check on avarice and would con-
stitute the only kind of regulation--"natural" self-
regulation--which economic activity required. The 
State had only to keep order, like a policeman, and, 
prevent any combination of individuals that might inter-
fere with the free operation of the law of supply and 
demand. Such a system, or lack of system, would reward 
the energetic and enterprising, and punish the slothful 
and improvident. It would inevitably result in national 
and international prosperity.~3 
Ideally, without governmental intervention or collective action, 
everyone is free to contract for s·ervices, goods and labor as free 
agents, "bound only to those obligations to which he himself has ' 
14 willingly agreed." Thus, the worker and business person, as 
individuals, must try to reconcile their differences as to wages and 
to profits. When a group of workers attempt to influence wages or 
working conditions, they disrupt the economic system, for they are 
entering the domain of the business person. This is the assumption 
underlying statements by managers which express frustration with 
13 Reverend BenJ a.nun L. Masse, S . J. , "The Popes and the 
Industrial Revolution," America, May 12, 1951 p. 157-159; rpt. in 
Bakke, Kerr and Anrod eds., Unions, Management and the Public, p. 32. 
14 d . . .. Moore, In ustrial Relations, p. ~9. 
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unions encroaching on management's decision-making powers by taking 
authority away from managers, by frustrating managers in their attempt 
to meet demands of different economic and social forces, by limiting 
a business's flexibility and by endangering economic progress. 15 
Today, the values of individualism are so entrenched in business 
that a survey of management personnel produced what one author called 
the "conviction of the 'American Way of Life' . 11 
Individualism is the mainspring of our economic and 
political system. Anything that introduces collectivism 
or hampers the individual's opportunity to take advantage 
of his superior worth or "grasp the main chance" breaks 
this mainspring. 
The line of progress in the industrial situation is 
from worker to manager. Advance in these respects is a 
sign of superior brains and ability. 
The best way to preserve these values is to reward 
individuals in proportion to their demonstrated ability 
as measured by men who have demonstrated even greater 
ability. 
A condition of this sort of achievement is the 
preservation of competition among individuals, and in 
this competition the fittest will survive. 
There are natural economic laws which govern this 
process and which, if not interfered with, will work 
out to the advantage of the whole people, not only for 
employers but for consumers and labor as well. Not 
only businessmen, but workers, consumers, union leaders, 
and even government should realize this fact and act 
accordingly, that is not set up16artificial" barriers 
to the operation of these laws. 
The values of individualis~ also pervade American legal theory, 
which helps to create a paradox for the American workers and demon-
strates the importance of collective action for workers. The Bill 
of Rights enumerates the rights of an American citizen which the 
15s1oane and Witney, Labor Relations, p. 26. 
16E. Wight Bakke, "The Goals of Management," in Bakke, Kerr and 
Anrod eds., Unions, Management and the Public p. 208. -
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government cannot deny to ensure the freedom of the individual 
citizen; however, in the legal theory of business, individualism 
takes a strange twist when the corporation legally 1s defined as a 
person with the rights accompanying personhood--property ownership, 
1 b 1 d b 1 . f"l · 17 f d f" . . k ia i ity an a i ity to i e suit. This twist o e inition ma es 
laissez-faire economics consistent by disregarding the fact that 
a corporation is an organization. When a worker contracts with a 
corporation for employment, by definition it is a contract between 
two individuals. 
What makes this significant in industrial relations is that a 
small number of corporations have an important impact on the economy. 
There are more than 200,000 industrial corporations 
in the United States with total assets in 1970 of 
$554 billion. But 100 corporations •.. control 
SO percent ($290 billion) of all industrial assets. 
The five largest industrial corporation--Exxon 
(Standard Oil of New Jersey), General Motors, 
Texaco, Ford Motors and Gulf Oil--control 10 percent 
of all industrial assets themselves (emphasis in 
original). 18 
At this point the theory that an individual worker contacts for em-
ployment with an individual employer is an absurdity, except by the 
twist of legal definition. 
The fact that a corporation functions as an organization and not 
as an individual is further substantiated and complicated by the 
17Henry C. Black, Black's Law Dictionary (St. Paul: West 
Publishing Co., 1951) p. 409. 
18Thomas R. Dye, Who's Running America: Institutional Leadership 
2:!!_ the United States (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1976) p. 20. 
presence of stockholders. Theoretically, the corporation is 
organized as a democracy. 
That is, each unit in the total system is given as much 
weight as every other unit: each counts as one. The 
initial pecularity of corporate democracy, however, is 
the nature of the unit--the share of stock not the 
stockholder. It is not sufficient to say, therefore, 
even in theory, that managers of a corporation are 
elected representatives of the shareholders; they are 
representatives of shares of stock. Put in terms 
which are only slightly oversimplified, the corporation 
in legal theory is a fictional person whose behavior 
is determined by its elements, which are pieces of 
paper.19 
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In corporations where the ownership of stock is diffused so 
that no individual or group can control the corporation, management 
is independent of the shareholders, except for paying adequate 
dividends, and becomes self-perpetuating. 20 The result is that 
ownership of stock in a corporation is not necessarily equal to 
control over the policies of the corporation. 
As far as the physical wealth, patent rights, undivided 
surplus, and other valuable assets are concerned, 
there is no question about their legal ownership; they 
belong to the corporation. The stockholder owns a 
right to a possible return on an investment, plus a 
theoretical right to share in the control of the total 
organization. The extent of the modification in the 
traditional view of property may be seen concretely 
in the fact that an owner of a share of stock can 
claim no particular share in the physical wealth of 
the corporation. He can claim no piece of equipment 
19 Moore, Industrial Relations, p. 74. 
20Moore, Industrial Relations, p. 82-84. 
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of manufactured product as rightfully his because he 
owns part of the company. He owns only an investment. 21 
Consequently, while management and perhaps stockholders applaud the 
advantages of individual competition, individual initiative and 
"natural" laws of economics based on individualism, an individual has 
little impact on the corporation. Decisions are made by management, 
not individuals. Individual stockholders cannot affect corporate 
policy unless they own la~ge amounts of stock. In this instance, 
arguing that an individual worker contracts with an individual em-
ployer for a Job 1s ludicrous. 
In this situation the individual worker faces a management which 
is not the owner of the corporation, which is organized and which is' 
backed by the corporation's' assets in decision-making. Under such 
conditions, contracts ,between individual workers and management ca.~-
not be equal. For the individual worker, the solution literally is 
all around her or him, other workers 1n the same situation with 
similar goals. "The original organizer of the trade-union movement 
is the shop, the factory, the mine and the industry. The agitator 
or the labor leader merely announces the already existing fact. 1122 
21Moore, ·Industrial Relations, p. 81-82. "But how rigorously 
should the concept of ownership be applied to shareholders? In the 
real world, shareholders seldom act as owners. They seldom invest 
with the interest of being--or acting as--owners. Their functional 
relationship to the enterprise is much more that of a lender-investor 
than that of an owner" (emphasis added). Simon M. Lorn, "The 
Impending Raid on your Private Life," The Wharton Magazine, 3 
(Winter 1979) 2, p. 45. 
22Frank Tannenbaum, A Philosophy of Labor (New York: Alf-red A. 
Knopf, 1951) pp. 7-12, 58-61, 79-84, 94-95, 176-177, 198-199; rpt. in 
Bakke, Kerr and Anrod, Um.ans, Management and the Public p. 59. 
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Only an organization of workers in the same workplace which bargains 
with management for a contract to work can begin to equalize the 
worker-management relationship. Yet, organized workers must find a 
counterpart for the capital which gives the corporation its economic 
power. The union counterpart is the strike--the monetary value of 
labor lost to the corporation during the collective cessation of 
working. All union power is based on the strike, or the threat of 
a strike. "The fact is that without strikes or at ~east the right to 
strike, collective bargaining is nothing more than collective 
begging. 1123 
For workers, the freedom to fulfill individual needs and 
desir~s is found by becoming a member of a group, the union. This 
contradicts all of the values of-individualism on which economic and 
legal theory is based. A union worker does not contract for work 
as an individual, but as a member of a group. A union member must 
subordinate his or her individual desires to the desires of the group 
to ensure the group's success. To maintain unity, individual 
) 
workers who stridently obJect to unions or to union policies must be 
disciplined 1n some manner; consequently, unions appear coercive and 
anti-democratic, for they deny the freedom of the individual worker 
to voice her or his opinion. 
23statement made by Floyd Smith, President of the AFL-CIO 
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, in 
Neil Gilbride,"Strike! Is it the only Way," Detroit News 9/20/70, 
Vertical File: Strikes, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs. 
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Yet, unions actually are more democratic than a corporation. 
If ownership of stock is diffused, individual stockholders probably 
have no impact on corporate ~olicies. However, a union is a political 
organization in which members have the right to vote for union 
officials. Depending upon the particular union constitution, members 
may vote directly for national officers, contract proposals and 
other issues. At the local level of union organization, union 
officers are elected directly by the local union membership. 24 For 
business to be as democratic as unions, management would have to 
obtain the consent of stockholders for many decisions or allow that 
II a stockholder •.. could obJect, not by selling his stock 
to someone else but by actually withdrawing capital from the business. 
Management would then be compelled to develop in relation to their 
stockholders the same kind of political strategies which union 
leaders must develop in relation to their members.!' 25 
,Standards of individualism, such as individual initiative and 
individual contract, which are used to criticize unions 'are not 
often used to criticize business; yet, neither unions nor business 
meet such standards. In a union, an individual member defers to the 
24s!oane and Witney, Labor Relations, p. 165-173. 
25E. Wight Bakke, Mutual Survival: The Goal of Unions and 
Management (New Haven, Conn: Labor and Manageiiieri.t"Center, Vare--
University, 1946) p. 13. 
authority of the group to achieve the goals of collective action. 
In a business, a worker or member of management defers to the 
authority of someone higher up 1n the organizational hierarchy to 
coordinate the activity of the company. 
Within a manufacturing establishment coordination 
is accomplished on a different basis; that of 
authority. Thus in contemporary industry a major 
task of management is that of maintaining coordina-
tion of effort and effectiveness of the entire unit 
in the face of large-scale aiversification. It is 
axiomatic, if somewhat paradoxical, that increased 
diversification of individual positions in society 
require at the same time increased cooperation 
because of widespread independence. Economic 
individualists have not always recognized this in, 
theory, although they have done fairly well in 
practice.26 
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For example, in a plant where workers have the freedom as individuals 
to contract for wages and working conditions, the diversity of the 
contracts would be mind-boggling. Different workers would want 
different hours of work, work weeks, rest periods, vacations and 
so on. In order to create some regularity in plant operations, 
management must coordinate the workers' activities on the Job, wages, 
vacations and the like by imposing rules, regulations and wage rates 
on workers. Whatever individuality a worker theoretically has 1s 
lost, because of management's efforts to coordinate and systematize 
plant activity. 
Th~ inability of members of the business community to recognize 
that values of individualism do not fit the realities of corporate 
organization creates this ironic scenario: 
26Herbert G. Gutman, Work, Culture and Society in Industrializing 
America, Vintage Books edn. (New York: Random House,1977) p. 63. 
... the executive is likely to view himself as an 
old-style entrepreneur despite his position as a 
professional manager. Thus one is treated to the 
rather amusing spectacle of a salaried executive, 
with little or no actual ownership of the stock of 
his company, engaging in a controversy with govern-
mental agencies or labor representatives and 
maintaining his individualistic rights of running 
his own company his own way. This is, of course, 
not to be particularly wondered at in view of the 
existence of cultural conceptions which do not 
precisely fit the contemporary characteristics of 
corporation [ii.£] organization. 27 
' Besides contradicting notions about individualism, which are 
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central to economic and legal theory, unions also contradict nineteenth 
century notions about property rights and about business as a cultural 
ideal, which still have enough significance in the twentieth century 
to affect the union's public image adversely. On a very obvious level, 
destruction of company property by union menbers violates a business's 
property rights. Less obvious property rights, based on the ownership 
of relationships necessary to conduct business, also are violated by 
unions. Membership in a union "violates" the contract between a 
worker and his employer for employment. 
By strict application of judicial doctrine, the 
worker had not only given up all claim to his job 
by his refusal to fulfill his "contract'1 with the 
employer, but the banding together of several work-
men constituted a criminal conspiracy. Although 
the doctrine of criminal conspiracy did not last 
much beyond the fourth decade of the nineteenth 
century, it was simply an extreme statement of the 
predominant view of the courts until fairly recent 
years. ["This statement was made during the 1940s 
27 
Moore, Industrial Relations, p. 89. 
referring to the changes in labor law during the 
1930sJ ZS 
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Here, notions about employee loyalty to the employer--loyalty being 
refusal to Join a union--are equated with a contract to work between 
an employee and employer. Employers operationalized this notion by 
using "yellow-dog" contracts" which are contracts for employment in 
which employment is contingent upon the worker not being a union 
member. ~embership in a union automatically terminates the contract 
f . 29 or employment. These notions are related to assumptions of 
feudal1sm--that the serf pledged lifelong allegiance and labor to 
the lord in return for protection--and indentured servitude--where 
a servant was owned until his or her service's equaled the debt which 
the master paid. Employee loyalty is th~ right of the employer 
because of the contract to work, which implies that the employee is 
the "property" of the employer because of that contract. 
The conduct of business also was considered a property right of 
the business person. Strikes or boycotts by unions interfered with 
the relations necessary for the conduct of business: 
28Moore, Industrial Relations, p. 361. For an example of the 
Supreme Court's application of this notion see Hitchman Coal and 
Mitchell (1917), 245 S.C. 229. 
29rrving Bernstein, The Lean Years: A History of the American 
Worker 1920-1933, Sentry edn. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960) 
p. 149.----
••• the courts occasionally claimed to recognize 
the abstract "right" of labor to orgam.ze, and 
even perhaps to engage in "co 11 ecti ve bargaining." 
But what the courts fairly uniformly denied to labor 
was any power to implement those "rights," especially 
if faced with a militantly antiunion employer. Any 
strike which could be shown to interfere with the 
commerce or business of nonpartisans; any picket 
lines which seemed to the Judges to be "coercive" 
in its restraint on nonunion workers; and certainly 
any "secondary boycott" which attempted to induce 
persons not engaged in the dispute to withhold their 
patronage_from the employer--all these were more or 
less uniformly condemned. By means of inJunctions 
secured from the courts, as well as by the less 
austerely legal means of partisan police groups 
and National Guard units, employers forced the 
unions to "bargain" not only with the company but 
with the government. 30 
The existence of wiions also contradict the belief that the 
conduct of business is an American ideal. 
The dominant creed of nineteenth century American 
capitalism, fashioned largely by the Supreme Court 
philosophy of Justice Field, saw in economic freedom 
a natural right. Any state attempt to regulate the 
conditions of work, interfere with the liberty of 
private contract, or curb private property was re-
Jected out of hand. "Throughout the period, indeed 
the presumption of immorality rested on those who 
would detract from the rewards of capitalism," writes 
an historian of the period. The social Darwinism 
which underlay this doctrine sanctioned industry's 
resistance to unionism. In fact, beginning with the 
railroad strike of 1877, which arose at the end of 
the longest depression 1n United States history, 
almost every major strike for the following forty 
years was attended by the outbreak of violence. By 
threatening the integrated philosophical value 
system of the business community, unionism provoked 
anxiety regarding the §orrectness of a style of life, 
in all its dimensions. 1 
30Moore, Industrial Relations, p. 381. 
31oaniel Bell, "Industrial Conflict and Public Opinion," in 
Kornhauser, Dubin and Ross,Industrial Conflict, p. 243. 
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The importance of business to American prosperity from the business 
perspective is still evident today, when members of management 
describe themselves. They are inventors and initiators, leaders, 
organizers, trustees and stewards, builders, benefactors and finally 
successful. 32 Anyone opposing persons so crucial to American pros-
perity must be anti-American. 
Because unions contradict the values of individualism and notions 
about property rights, and because they stand in opposition to business, 
taken to exemplify an America! ideal, unions are not seen bi onlookers 
as truly legitimate organizations. Businesses' legitimacy is based on 
public support and the tradition of legal and of economic theory.. In 
contrast, unions' legitimacy is based on legislative intervention, 
the National Labor Relations Act (N.L.R.A.) which gave workers the 
right to organize without interference from employers and the right 
·33 
to strike and which set up a federal agency to enforce the Act. 
This Act contradicts the attitudes and legal doctrines described above. 
In fact, until the Supreme Court upheld the N.L.R.A., the business 
d d d . . l 34 community i not consi er it constitutiona . This is not to say, 
however, that there was no legal tradition for unions. 
32Bakke, "Goals of Management," in Unions, Management and the 
Public, p. 202-204. 
3349 UrS. Code 449. 
34rrving Bernstein, The Turb~lent Years: A History of the 
American Worker 1933-1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970)p~33 
and 642. ---
There was the development of two mutually incompatible 
national policies toward organized labor, one re-
garding it as creating market restraints inimical to 
the national economy and the other regarding it as 
necessary to the regime of industrial peace based 
upon a balanced bargaining relationship between 
employees /iiJ wielding the combined power of 
incorporated capital wealth and unions wielding 
the power of organized labor. 35 
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Because the courts, as final arbiter in the American legal system, con-
sistently interpreted labor laws in an anti-union manner, union activity 
was not considered legal by the business and much of.the public until 
the Supreme Court upheld the N.L.R.A. Consequently, unions and union 
activity are not considered by much of the public to be a legitimate 
part of American experience, or at least as legitimate as business 
activity. 
II. Institutionalization of Industrial Conflict 
The basis of the conflict between unions and management over 
profits and power and between the values of individualism and of, 
collectivism, indicate that this conflict, if unregulated, easily 
could result in violent attempts of a union trying to force manage-
ment to accede to union demands or a management forcibly keeping 
workers from Joining a union. The history of union-management 
relations 1s dotted with such events. At times violence has been so 
great that it threatened to disrupt society. The success of the 
Minneapolis Teamster's strike 1n 1937 resulted in the arming of 
35 Charles J. Morris, ed., The Developing Labor Law: 
the Courts and the National Labor Relations Act (Chicago; 
American Bar Association, 1971) p. 3. 
The Board, 
Ill: 
business members and their supporters, as well as employers and 
their supporters. It ended after two confrontations, much legal 
maneuvering and federal intervention. 36 During the Pullman Strike 
in 1894, federal troops killed 25 workers and injured 60. 37 In the 
Memorial Day Massacre on May 30, 1937, over-reaction by Chicago 
police resulted in ten deaths and thirty 1nJuries among strikers 
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and thirty-five minor inJuries to police. 38 The Lafollette Committee 
hearings on the violations of free speech and other rights of labor 
documented the purchase of almost $500,000 of tear gas between January 
39 1933 and June 1937 for use in labor disputes. During this period 
businesses purchased sub-machine guns, revolvers, shotguns and 
ammunition also for use in labor disputes. 
In union-management relations, the strike is the union's primary 
weapon; yet, it represents aH that is violent and distruct1ve in 
union-management relations to the public and to management. The 
strike denies the freedom of management to run a company as it sees 
36 Bernstein, Turbulent Years, p. 2~3-252. 
37Ph1lip S. Foner, From the Founding of the A.F. of L. to the 
Emergence of American Imperialism, vol. 2 of History of the Labor 
Movement in the United States, 2nd edn. (1955; rpt. New York: 
International Publishers, 1975) p. 269. 
38Bernstein, Turbulent Years, p. 485-490. 
39Jerold S. Auerbach, American Labor: 
American Heritage Series (Indianapolis, Ind: 
Publishing, 1969) p. 254-260. 
The Twentieth Century, 
Bobbs-Merill Educational 
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fit, because a strike coerces management to accede to the union's 
demands. The fact that the strike is defined as legally sanctioned 
coercion indicates the strength of this perception. 40 The strike 
also is perceived as destructive, for it prevents a firm from con-
ducting business during a strike, a property right of business noted 
above. Thus, to the casual onlooker and often to management, unions 
appear to cause labor unrest, since there were no overt indications 
of dissatisfaction before workers joined the union. One observer of 
' 
labor relations describes this perception in the following manner: 
Even if the manager does not view the nnion as gang, 
he often still feels that they strike a discordant 
note in the happy home. Once there, unrest develops. 
A peer group outside the home becomes more important 
to the children than the parents; the father's powers 
are challenged; the child begins to think his goals are 
not synonymous with those of the parents (he may even 
want his allowance raised); and perhaps worse of all, 
he wants to have his voice heard in how the home 
should be run. 41 
Because unions appear to be the source of violence and coercion in 
labor relations, unions are seen as inherently violent and coercive; 
consequently, business responds to the unions in kind. The violence 
escalates and erupts into incidents like the Memorial Day Massacre 
which threaten to disrupt society if the conflict is not regulated. 
The National Labor Relations Act began such regulation. It 
recognizes that: 
40s1ack, Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1591. 
41 Albert A. Blum, "Management Paternalism and Collective Bargain-
ing," Personnel Administration January-February 1963 p. 38 cited in 
Sloane and Witney, Labor Relations, p. 5. 
Experience has proved that protection by law of the 
right of employees to organize and bargain collectively 
safeguards commerce from inJury, impairment or inter-
ruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing 
certain recognized sources of industrial strife and 
unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the 
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising 
out of differences as to wages, hours or other 
working conditions, and by restoring equality of 
bargaining power between employers and employees.42 
The Act focuses on the commercial role of industry in society and 
, 
recognizes that both employees and employers are essential to the 
continuation of commerce, rather than focusing only on the rights 
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of employees or of employers. It raises above the immediate conflict 
and places it in perspective with other social processes. 
This legislative in~ervention, by recognizing the rights of 
both parties, creates a mechanism for the containment of industrial 
conflict. The new relationship, which is between an organization of 
workers and of management, provides a means for guaranteeing those 
rights by appealing to a third party, the federal government; 
however:,management and unions must attempt to resolve their 
differences through collective bargaining before appealing to the 
government to resolve the conflict. Collective bargaining became 
the primary means through which industrial conflict was limited 
and periodically resoived by the participants in the conflict. 
There are four aspects of collective bargaining that warrant 
recognition. First, collective bargaining is a relationship between 
organizations, not a relationship between management and workers. 
42 49 U.S. Code 449, sec. 1. 
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Only the representatives of management and representatives of the 
union can bargain. Second, collective bargaining is a power relation-
ship between organizations, for it ultimately 1s based upon the 
right of either party to use force in a limited manner. Third, 
collective bargaining is a treaty-makin_~nd treaty-enforcing 
process. The objective of collective bargaining is arriving at 
a mutually satisfying contract which determines wages, hours and 
other conditions of employment for a limited period of time. While 
the contract is 1n force, the primary activity of management and 
the union is interpretation and administration of the contract. 
Finally, collective bargaining 1s a process of accommodation between 
companies and unions. In collective bargaining both parties recognize 
that there 1s a basic conflict of interest, but they also recognize 
that they are interdependent, that employers need workers to make 
d d . b 43 a product and that workers nee employers to prov1 e JO s. 
Collective bargaining also provi4es benefits to workers and to 
management which may not be obvious to the casual observer. For 
workers, collective bargaining helps to humanize the blind and im-
personal economic forces, such as supply and demand, by focusing on 
the productive input of the worker in economic processes. It also 
43Frederick H. Harbison, "Collective Bargaining and American 
Capitalism," 1n Kornhauser, Dubin and Ross, Industrial Conflict, 
p. 270-271. 
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provides a system for seeking redress for grievances against manage-
ment. Seeking redress for grievances is something every American 
is told he or she has a right to do. Because the workplace is 
humanized and because workers have a means for having grievances 
redressed, workers have a rationale for believing that the economic 
system can work for their benefit. In this sense, collective 
bargaining is a means of siphoning off workers' dissatisfaction 
with the economic system, which could be expressed violently if the 
collective bargaining system did not exist, so that expressions of 
dissatisfaction will not disrupt the processes of production. Obviously, 
management prefers the continuation of production. 44 
A strike, which occurs in a collective bargaining relationship 
is considered a failure of collective bargaining by many observers, 
because production has stopped. Both unions and companies consider 
the cost of a strike to exceed the short-term gains which are won. 
Settlements often appear to the public as something which both 
parties should have rationally agreed to without a strike. 45 Yet, 
the strike in the collective bargaining relationship is much less 
destructive and violent than strikes which do not occur in this 
institutionalized relationship. 
44Harbison, "Collective Bargaining and American Capitalism," 1n 
Kornhauser, Dubin and Ross, Industrial Conflict, p. 266-277. 
45 Sumner H. S11.chter, James Healy and E. Robert Livernash, The 
Impact of Collective Bargaining~ Management (Washington, D. C.: 
Brookings Institute, 1960) p. 944. 
As the strike has become ''institutionalized" in 
recent decades, most of the violence and much of 
the excitement have disappeared. The strike is 
no longer an improvident emotional outburst nor a 
pitched battle between opposing armies intent on 
gaining unconditional surrender but rather a 
coldblooded and hardheaded bargaining maneuver 
conducted by professional negotiators. 46 
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The strike is the source of power for the union in collective bargain-
ing, but it only is a means to an end, not the end itself. A union 
leader will not propose a strike unl~ss "(l) he thinks that he has a 
, 
much better than even chance to win the strike, (2) he is driven to 
a strike by the pressure of rank and file sentiment, or (3) in order 
to save face when he has made an 'or else' demand to the employer 
47 from which he cannot back away." 
A strike, however, is not entirely a rational and strategic 
device, for it has~ special significance to rank and file union 
members. 
The strike cannot be treated as the economist might 
like to treat it, as a rational phenomenon, in which each 
side nicely calculates the expected benefit of another 
day's strike and weighs this against an equally nice 
calculated loss. It is, in part, a catharsis, a release 
of tensions, but it is also a drama, something that brings 
excitement and a sense of high purpose into otherwise 
humdrum lives. The labor movement appeals to the heroic 
as well as to the economic in man. This aspect of the 
strike is more important to the workers than 1t is to 
the employers. Employers are actors; they move men 
around, they organize great processes of production, 
46Kornhauser, Dubin and Ross, Industrial Conflict, p. 12. 
47Jack Barbash, The Practice of Unionism (New-York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1956) p. 235-. -
and they are likely to find in the high decisions 
and risk taking of business the danger and excitement 
that help to satisfy the heroic element in man as well 
as the financial rewards that.assuage his economic' 
yearnings. The strike to them, therefore, is a 
meaningless interruption of the grand drama of enter-
prise; it is like a rebellion in the middle of a war, 
and they react to it with distaste and alarm. The 
workers, however, sense very little of the drama of 
enterprise; they make no high decisions, nor are they 
conscious of the excitement involved in keeping an 
organization alive and thriving in a dangerous world. 
The strike to them may be their only chance to 
'participate in what seems to be dramatic and important 
events and to take sacrificial risks in the hope of 
future betterment.48 
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Thus, the strike can represent what the union means to the union 
member, a fight for future security. The strike also is a drama in 
which the union member is an actor, because he or she fights against 
a foe who is trying to prevent the member's attairunent of economic 
security. However, both the drama of the strike and the strike itself 
is limited, because the purpose is to force consideration of proposals 
at the negotiating table, not the destruction of the opposition. 
The institutionalization of industrial conflict by collective 
bargaining limits the potentially destructive elem~nts of strikes, 
for it is a peaceful means for changing worker-management relations. 
We can appreciate the importance of stablizing the basis 
of social change in industry when we,recall that ours is 
an industrial society. It is industry that constitutes 
one of the most basic or central elements of our total 
48Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General 
Theory (New York: Harper and Row, 196~p. 217-218.-
social structure. What happens in society is, to an 
important degree, a direct or indirect consequence of 
developments 1n the industrial sector. 49 
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Collective bargaining institutionalizes conflict by requiring 
that the parties by "loyal opponents," in that each party must 
abide by the agreement reached through the bargaining process for 
the duration of the agreement. Once the agreement is terminated, 
the limited conflict process of bargaining resumes. Both parties 
recognize that a basic conflict of interest exists, but they also 
recognize that they must rise above that conflict to resolve it for 
short periods of time or destroy the opponent. "Collective 
bargaining is the great social invention that has institutionalized 
industrial conflict. In much the same way that the electoral process 
and majority rule have institutionalized political conflict in a 
democracy, collective bargaining has created a stable means for 
resolving industrial conflict. 1150 In the electoral process, 
political opponents are bound by the decisions of the voters until 
the next election, for the sake of political and social stability. 
In courts, lawyers for the plaintiff and the defendant engage in a 
legal conflict over the appropriate and just application of the law 
in a particular situation. Once the judge or the Jury makes a 
decision, both parties must abide by the decision or appeal it through 
49Robert Dubin, "Constructive Aspects of Industrial Conflict," 
in Kornhauser, Dubin and Ross, Industrial Conflict, p. 46. 
SODubin, "Constructive Aspects," in Kornhauser, Dubin and Ross, 
Industrial Conflict, p. 46. 
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the appropriate Judicial channels. Until the next election and 
until the Judicial decision is reversed, both parties are required to 
abide by those decisions for the sake of political and social stability. 
Conflict in a political campaign or in the courts 1s limited so that 
the potential destructiveness of the conflict is minimized. Acceptable 
modes of conduct and ritual arise, such as debates by candidates or 
the cross-examination of witnesses, which help contain the conflict. 
Assassination of one's political opponent is not acceptable, while 
attacking her or his political beliefs and programs 1s proper. Court-
room decorum and procedure help to assure that the legal issues are 
addressed and that due process of the law is given to each participant 
in the legal conflict, instead of allowing the whims and biases of the 
participants to determine entirely the outcome of the legal con-
frontation. 
The creation of a loyal opposition increases the commitment 
of the participants to the system which periodically resolves the 
conflict, instead of motivating participants to find more radical 
resolution of the conflict, because both parties may gain from the 
agreement without escalating the conflict to a more destructive level. 
Energy is focused on periodic resolution of limited conflict and the 
concom1Lant gains. 
The process of collective bargaining also absorbs 
the energies and interests of many leaders of the 
working masses who might otherwise direct their energies 
to the overthrow of the existing economic order. Most 
students of labor movements would agree, I think, that 
the more a union leader concentrates on collectiv'e 
bargaining, the more conservative he is likely to become. 
American labor leaders, almost without exception, have 
moved from left to right as they have gained experience 
with, and become absorbed by, the process of negotiating 
and administering treaties with employers. To the extent 
that collective bargaining appears to bring results and 
to command the support of the rank and file, the labor 
leader devotes more time and energy to it; and, to the 
extent that he concentrates on bargaining, the chances are 
that he may make it more successful. This is, of course, 
one of the reasons why the American labor movement is so 
job centered rather than politically oriented. Labor 
leaders in this country can effectively command the 
support of their constituents and rise to positions of 
fame and power without bothering very much about 
political objectives. 51 
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Because the union leader's power and success is based upon the 
collective bargaining relationship with the company, the union leader 
is committed to the continuation of the relationship. The union's 
leadership and appointed officials negotiate the contract, administer 
it and govern the internal relations of the union. Changing the 
I 
formulas of past success is viewed by union leaders with suspicion, 
because change injects unpredictability into collective bargaining, 
which increases the likelihood of an uncontrollable confrontation 
between the union and management. 
As the union becomes increasingly bureaucratic, the source of 
power shifts from the rank and file members to the leaders. This 
process alienates- many members from the union. The leaders have 
several advantages over rank and file members which help to perpetuate 
the concentration of power at the leadership level-~access to 
knowledge of which the rank and file is not aware, control over 
51Harbison, "Collective Bargaining and American Capitalism," 
in Kornhauser, Dubin and Ross, Industrial Conflict, p. 277. 
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formal channels of communication such as union publications, ability 
to travel from one local to another to present their position on 
issues to the rank and file members at the union's expense, and 
political skills such as making speeches, organizing activities and 
52 the like which the average rank and file member does not have. 
The union leaders soon become experts who see the complete picture 
which the rank and file member cannot see. 
Union leadership could increase rank and file participation in 
union decision-making by educating members about union history, 
union values, how to make speeches, parliamentary procedure and the 
like. 
Nevertheless, union leadership has typically put its 
faith to a far greater extent in control devices, 
such as the union security clause, than in educational 
programs designed to build better understanding and 
thereby inspire greater loyalty. Experience in 
collective bargaining and 1n strikes and the know-
ledge of economic problems in an industry tend to 
make leaders impatient with the proposals offered by 
less experienced and more poorly informed union 
members. The leaders of any union, understandably 
enough, think themselves most competent to determine 
strategy and believe that the membership will progress 
most rapidly by accepting the leaders' advice and 
responding to their orders in disciplined fashion. To 
this must be added the fear, seldom admitted but 
nevertheless real, that, as the membership becomes 
more informed, the number of potential rivals for 
union office is increased. 5~ 
The possibility does exist that leadership and bureaucracy of 
the union could become so out of touch with rank and file members 
52 seymour Martin Lipset, 11 Introduction, 11 Robert Michels, Political 
Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern 
Democracy,-trans. Eden and CedarPaul (New York: The Free Press"; 1962) p. 16. 
53Joel Seidman, "The Labor Union as an Organization," in 
Kornhauser, Dubin and Ross, Industrial Conflict, p. 112. 
that the fonner do not recognize the latter's discontent. 
When discontent seethes in the shop, local union 
leaders at all levels--from stewards to top officers--
bear the brunt. From below, the workers demand strong 
action; from above the International executive board 
and regional staff members insist that the local 
officers "hold the ranks in line," that they prevent 
unauthorized strikes ["wildcat str1kesJ or slowdowns. 
How this puts local officers 1n an untenable position 
was recently told to me 9y a local union officer: 
'We ,lthe local union adm1n1stratio1!7 are in the 
middle. Whatever we do turns out to be wrong. 
If there's a wildcat, the company won't even 
discuss grievances with us until the guys go 
back to work, so nothing gets solved. Besides, 
the International union jumps on our necks, 
gives us hell for not providing responsible 
leadership. And if we succeed in holding the 
guys in line so that they don't walkout then 
our political opposition in the shop does a 
job on us by agitating the workers against us, 
telling them we're not on the ball, and so on. 
It's easy enough for the International to tell 
us to be responsible, to lecture us about pro-
viding good leadership and all that. They've 
been away from the shop so long they don't know 
what goes on there anymore. They think they 
know but they don't. They don't know what it 
means to be in a position where no matter what 
you do it turns out to be wrong. How can people 
on the shop level or on the local level cope 
with the effects of automation, the company's 
drive for more,product1on, management's policy 
of moving operations to another plant or con-
tracting work out to a supplier firm? And, 
because we can't solve such problems our 
political oppoents build themselves up in the 
shop by tearing us down. Their opposition caucus 
is getting stronger all the time. But if we get 
defeated in the next local union election, what 
does the International care? And if Chrysler 
keeps on decentralizing, building new assemply 
plants in other states and dues will roll into 
the International just the same [s1<;;}. Besides, 
small locals are easier to control than large 
locals, especially militant locals like ours. 
We can't win and the International can't lose--
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54 or so they think ••. 
7S 
If discontent is widespread, a wildcat strike by one union local 
could spread to others. Because the strike is not authorized by the 
international union leadership, the institutionalized bargaining pro-
cedures do not apply, and because management legitimately may refuse 
to bargain with the wildcat strikers, ther collective bargaining 
relationship is threatened. The rank and file union members, because 
of their alientation from the union's leadership and bureaucracy, do 
not seethemselves as part of the loyal opposition in the collective 
bargaining relationship. They have chosen the wildcat strike as an 
alternative to the institutionalized collective bargaining channels. 
Wildcat strikes are indications of the tension between the con-
servative tendencies of the union leadership which tries to preserve 
the collective bargaining relationship as well as their jobs and 
; 
prestige and the desire of the rank and file members to change the 
collective bargaining relationship to win more radical concessions 
from management. The fact that the union is a political organization 
in which leaders are elected by the rank-and file and ultimately are 
answerable to them, creates a problem for union leaders. The union 
leader has an interest in preserving the institution of collective 
bargaining, but as a representative of the union members, the union 
54Frank Marquart, "The Auto Workers: Voices of Dissent," a 
collection of articles from Dissent Magazine, 1959, p. 146-147, 
Vertical File: Strikes, Archives of Labor ~nd Urban Affairs. 
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leader also must express the proposals of rank and file members to 
management. In a strike situation these two motives could be incom-
patible. A union leader may appear to coopt the union members when 
reassuring the public and management that the strike will have little 
economic impact, while repetition of militant rank and file grievances 
and proposals could appear to the public and to management to threaten 
economic ox even social stability. 
III. Rhetorical Implications 
During a strike, a labor union rhetor speaks in a situation in 
which conflicting motivations direct her or his rhetorical activity. 
There is the conservative motive to preserve the bargaining relation-
ship with management by avoiding potential conflict situations and 
the more radical motive to express the prqposals and feelings of the , 
rank and file members which may antagonize management in order to 
remain an elected union official. This is somewhat similar to the 
situation described by Herbert Simons in "Requirements, Problems and 
) 
Strategies: A Theory of Persuasion for Social Movements." 
Movements require a diversity of leadership types 
with whom any,•one leader must both compete and 
cooperate. Theoreticians, agitators and propagandists 
must launch the movement; political and bureaucratic 
types must carry it forward. Ideaological differences 
among ~he leadership must also be expected insofar as 
the leadership reflects internal divisions among 
the following. 55 
55 -
Herbert Simons, "Requirements, Problems and Strategies: A 
Theory of Persuasion for Social Movements," Quarterly Journal of 
Speech, 56(Februaryl970) p. 7. 
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The union rhetor must enact both the conversative tendencies 
of the union leadership and the radical tendencies of the rank and 
file in discourse during a strike, to ensure the continued institutionaliza-
tion of industrial conflict. The union rhetor must depict the union 
members as good American citizens ~hose actions do not Jeopardize 
freedom, business relations and the well being of society. To 
management the union must appear a necessary inconvenience rather than 
as a threat to successful conduct of business. In discourse to union 
members union rhetors must encourage the members' loyalty to the 
union and at the same time limit their behavior so it does not 
threaten the collective bargaining relationship. 
Chapter Four 
THE WAGE SLAVE AND THE UNION MEMBER: 
THE 1936-1937 SITDOWN STRIKE 
I. The General Motors Corporation 
The General Motors Corporation (GM) is the giant of the 
automobile industry. 1 Its policies are conservative and cautious. 
2 Since the 1920s it has aimed for a profit of 20 percent. In fact, 
GM has changed its policies and its structure very little since the 
1920s. At the time of the 1937-1937 sitdown strike, GM was composed 
of 33 divisions and 112 manufacturing plants in 67 cities. 3 
William Crapo (Billy) Durant founded GM on September 16, 1908. 
Under Durant's direction GM acquired Buick, Olds, Oakland (later 
Pontiac), Cadillac Motor Company, Chevrolet, a refrigerator company 
which he renamed Frigidaire, Hyatt Roller Bearing Company and various 
\ 
small companies which manufactured automobile parts such as New 
Departure Manufacturing (ball bearings), Remy Electric Company 
(electrical starting and igniti~n equipment), Dayton Engineering 
1williarn Serrin, The Company and the Union: The "Civilized 
Relationship" of the General Motors Corporation and the United 
Automobile Workers (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973) p. 105. 
') ~serrin, Company and the UnJon, p. 71. 
3 Serrin, Company and the Union, p. 70-71. 
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Laboratories also known as Delco (electric equipment) and Perlman 
Rim Company (wheel rims). However, Durant's poor management practices 
produced near bankruptcy, on two occasions. In 1910 a group of 
Eastern investment concerns headed by James J. Storrow loaned GM 
the money which prevented bankruptcy, on the condition that Durant 
resign as chief executive. Durant stayed in the automobile industry. 
In 1911 he and Louis Chevrolet founded Chevrolet Motors. By pro-
ducing a small, low-priced car, Durant met a growing market demand. 
In 1915, Durant regained control of, GM when he exchanged Chevrolet 
stock for undervalued GM stock at a ratio of five to one. By ,1920, 
Durant had succeeded in almost bankrupting the corporation again. 
This ,time the du Pont family and a group of J.P. Morgan bankers 
assumed the corporation's debts on the condition that Durant resign. 4 
Pierre S. du Pont became president of GM in 1920. du Pont re-
quested that Alfred P. Sloan become the cpief operating officer. 
Sloan is responsible for reorganizing GM and for setting some 
important early policies. His strategy for reorganization was 
centralization of policy-making powers. 
What Sloan did was merely impose a formal method of 
control upon what was then a loosely organized 
corporation /J,isJ structure of sixty or more largely 
autonomous organizations. The organizations were 
grouped into divisions according to function. 
Division managers retained much autonomy, as they 
do today, but centralized control was placed 1n the 
head of what was to become a largely expanded central 
4 . Serrin, Company and the Union, p. 77-89. 
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office headed by general executives and staff officers. 5 
Sloan also was responsible for the GM policies of making a complete 
line of cars from the lowest priced, Chevrolet, to the highest priced, 
6 Cadillac, and for the policy of the annual model change. 
II. The Environment of Protest 
The Depression and a series of new labor laws, starting with 
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA.), passed in 1933, and ending 
with the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA.), passed in 1935, are 
the two factors primarily responsible for creating the environment 
of protest in which the 1936-1937 sitdown strike against GM occurred. 
The Depression proved to workers that their jobs were, at best, 
marginal in the American economy during times of crisis. 
By 1932 half of all manufacturing units had closed 
down; production fell by 48 percent; reported corporate 
income fell from $11 billion to $2 billion; the value 
of industrial and railroad stock fell by 80 percent; 
and the numbers out of work continued to rise. An 
estimated 8 million were Jobless by the spring of 
1931, 13.5 million by the end of 1932, and over 7 
15 million, or one-third of the work force, in 1933. 
In the automobile industry almost fifty percent of the workers lost 
their jobs. In 1929, there was slightly more than 470,000 workers 
in Detroit's auto plants; by 1931 there were 257,000 workers, with 
5serrin, Company and the Union, p. 99. 
6serrin, Company and the Union, p. 101-102. 
7Frances Fox Pivan and Richard A. Cloward,~ People's 
Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail, Vintage Books Edn., 
(New York: Random House, 1977) p. 108. 
8'1 
8 very few working a full work week. The American relief and charity 
system was not equipped to provide food and housing to unemployed 
workers, let alone the large numbers of unemployed during the Depression. 
A national relief system did exist, but it severely restricted the 
type of people to which it would give support. It restricted the 
dispersal of its funds to the aged, crippled, widowed and orphaned--
9 "deserving people" who clearly could not work. 
Franklin Roosevelt realized that for the country to recover from 
the Depression, industry must be revitalized. The Roosevelt adminis-
tration concluded that business must be given the right to fix prices, 
i 
so it could make a profit and, hence, employ more workers to help 
bring America out of the Depression. This was the intent of the 
NIRA. To make this legislation palatable to organized labor, 
essentially the ,American Federation of Labor (A. F. of L.), the 
administration included what was known as Section 7(a). This section 
required "that every industry code or agreement £industrial codes and 
agreements set wages, hours and prices for the,industryJ promulgated 
under the statute provide 'that employees shall have the right to 
organize and bargain collectively_through representatives of their 
own choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or 
coercion of employers. 11110 
8rrving Howe and B. J. Widick, The UAW and Walter Reuther (New 
York: Random House, 1949) p. 29. 
9Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements, p. 41-42. 
ioPiven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements, p. 111. 
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For the first time workers were told that they had a right to 
organize and to seek redress for'their grievances against management. 
"Felt grievances became public grievances, for the federal government 
11 itself had declared the workers' cause to be Just." Membership in 
already existing unions increased dramatically, while workers in 
unorganized industries were organizing themselves and asking for 
recognition from the A. F. of L. It, however, was not enthusiastic 
about organizing the nonunion workers, especially workers in mass 
production industries, because the A. F. of L. was a federation of 
craft unions. Workers organize into a craft union when they possess 
a common skill, such as carpentry, which is highly valued and requires 
much knowledge and training to acquire. Workers in the mass production 
industries, such as automobiles and steel, generally did not possess 
highly-valued skills and, consequently, were e~sy to replace. The 
best method of organization in a mass production industry is the 
organization of all workers into one union, rather than organization 
based upon workers' skills, so that management would bargain with 
all workers rather than bargain only will skilled workers because 
they are more difficult to replace. Because of the greater number 
of mass produ~tion workers than skilled craft workers, industrial 
12 unions eventually would dominate the A. F. of L. 
Business was successful in resisting the unions, because the 
A. ~- of L. was not eagerly organizing workers, and because business-
11Piven and Cloward,~ People's Movements, p. 113. 
12Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements, p. 115-119. 
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men dominated the industrial code authorities, authorized by the 
13 NIRA, which set an industry's wages and hours. GM's attitudes 
towards workers and unions were typical of business during this period. 
GM followed an open shop policy--that a worker does not have to be a 
union member to be employed. The legal application of the open shop 
policy, however, gave employers the right to intervene in attempts 
to organize workers into a union and to refuse to bargain with the 
14 union. To GM, collective bargaining meant accepting a closed shop, 
in which all employees must be members of the union, and surrendering 
the prerogatives of management. 15 GM officials believed that there 
was no basis for a co~flict of interest between workers and employers 
and that any problems could be settled within the organization. 16 
GM made sure that few problems between workers and management ever 
surfaced by paying detective agencies to spy on workers and to report 
on any union activity. Between January 1, 1934, and July 31, 1936, 
GM employed at least 15 detective agencies and paid at least $1 million 
for industrial espionage. 17 
13Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements, p. 119. 
14Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years: A History of the American 
Worker 1920-1933, Sentry edn. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,1960) 
p. 205 and Sidney Fine, Sit-down: The General Motors Strike of 1936-
1937 (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1969) ~9. 
15F1ne, Sit-down, p. 29. 
16Fine, Sit-down, p. 33. 
17 . Sit-down, 37-38. Fine, p. 
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The increasing interest in unions among workers and the intran-
sigence of businessmen to recognize unions as legitimate organizations 
resulted in large numbers of strikes. This was exactly what the govern-
ment was trying to avoid to bring the country out of the Depression. 
"Three times as many workers struck in 1933 after NIRA as in 1932; 
the number of disputes rose from 841 in 1932 to 1,695 in 1933 and 
then to 1,856 in 1934 when a million and a half workers were involved 
. k 18 To f in stri es." e con hcts began to erupt into actual battles 
19 between workers and employers. To stop this industrial conflict 
so that the economy would have a chance to recover from the Depression, 
Congress passed the NLRA which contained Section 7(a) of the NIRA and 
an effective enforcement mechanism, the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) which had powers to enforce the Act as well as its own dec1s1ons. 20 
Business, however, did not consider the NLRA constitutional and believed 
that they did not have to obey it. This reasoning was reinforced by 
a Supreme Court dec;is1on in 1935 which found the NIRA and Section 7(a) 
unconst1tut1ona1. 21 
18Harry A.Millis and Royal E. Montgomery, Organized Labor, vol. 2 
of The Economics of Labor (New York: McGraw-Edison, 1945) p. 700-701 
c1 ted 1n Pi ven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements, p. 121. 
19Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements, p. 125. See also 
Irving Bernstein, Turbulent----vears: A History of the American Worker 
1933-1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin-:- 1970) fora detailed account of 
labor relations and labor conflicts during this period. 
20Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements, p. 131-132. 
21Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements, p. 133. 
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III. The History of the Sitdown Strike 
During the early thirties the auto workers organized themselves 
into several different organ1zat1ons--Automob1le Workers of America 
(AAWA), Automobile Industrial Workers Association (AIWA) and the 
Mechanics Educational Society of America (MESA). 22 The A. F. of L. 
half-heartedly tried to organize the auto industry by founding the 
United Automobile Workers (UAW) and appointing Francis Dillon president 
Of the new Union J.n 1935. 23 Th A F f L' 1 k f t f th e .. o . s ac o suppor or e 
new union became evident;when the labor federation did not support auto 
24 workers in several strikes against employers. Not until John L. 
Lewis founded the Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO) within 
the A. F. of L. did any labor leader ser1ously·try to organize mass 
production workers. Lewis later withdrew from the A. F. of L. and 
made the CIO a permanent organization and changed the name to the 
25 Congress of Industrial Organizations. Members of the UAW began 
to express their support for Lewis and the CIO rather than for the 
A. F. of L. At the UAW convention in South Bend, Indiana, on April 7, 
1936, 1:he A. F. of L. rnfluence on the UAW ended when Dillon stepped 
down as president. For the first time the UAW elected all of its 
own officers, and Homer Martin became president. 26 That summer 
22Fine, Sit-down, p .. 71- 72. 
23Fine, Sit-down, p. 81-82. 
24F. ine, Sit-down, p. 73-75 and 83. 
25Fine, Sit-down, p. 84-85. 
26Fine, Sit-down, p .. 89-90. 
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Martin met with the CIO leadership and annowiced that the UAW would 
Join the new organization. The UAW's general executive board soon 
ratified this decision. 27 
Shortly after the South Bend convention, the AIWA and AAWA 
affiliated with the UAW. Three of MESA's Detroit locals also 
28 affiliated, bringing in a large number of Commwiist Party members. 
The influence of the Communist Party is evident throughout much of 
' the early history of the UAW. In fact, many historians argue that 
the Communists were crucial to the UAW's success, because they had 
experience in organizing and an ideological commitment to the radical 
actions required during the 1936-1937 strike. 29 The presence of 
Communists in the UAW also contributed to the factionalism which was 
to plague the union witil 1947. Within the union there were Communists, 
Socialists and supporters of the A. F. of L. policies. 30 
The UAW leadership never made a conscious decision to have a 
maJor confrontation between itself and GM in Flint, Michigan, during 
the last days of 1936. A major confrontation was planned, but it 
was questionable whether or not it would occur in Flint. Flint was, 
a company town. GM's employees were more than two-thirds of all 
' 
gainfully employed workers in the city and more than one-fourth of 
27Fine , Sit-down, p. 93. 
28Fine, Sit-down, p. 90. 
29Fine, Sit-down, p. 90-91 and 220-221. 
3°Fine, Sit-down, p. 220-221. 
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the city's entire, population. Almost 80 percent of Flint's families 
depended on GM in some manner. 31 The concentration of rni11 s production 
capacity in Flint made the plants there strategically important to 
the fledgling UAW; however, the union had few members in the Flint 
plants. 32 
Flint auto workers were disillusioned with the UAW's ability to 
negotiate with GM; however, several months before the sitdown strike 
this attitude began to change. By working closely with the La Follette 
Senate committee, which was investigating the violations of the rights 
of union workers by business, UAW organizers were able to expose GM 
spies on w1ion committees. This demonstrated to the workers that the 
federal government was on their side. 33 
A successful strike in the Fisher Body No.I plant in Flint on 
November 13, 1936, demonstrated to the auto workers that the union 
could beat GM. 34 However, the UAW executive board was very cautious 
about urging union members to strike, because they didn't want to 
force a confrontation before they were ready. 35 Union members, however, 
' had different ideas. There was a spontaneous strike in a Kansas City, 
31Fine , Sit-down, p. 107. 
32Fine, Sit-down, p. 310. 
1 33Fine' , Sit-down, p. 114-115. -----
34Fine , Sit-down, p. 116-117. 
35~. Sit-down, 136-137. rine, p. 
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Missouri, plant lasting 8 days. After this strike, UAW president 
Martin sent a letter to William Knudsen, executive vice-president of 
GM, which stated that negotiations with local plant officials were 
fruitless and that the UAW wanted a national meeting with GM officials 
to discuss GM's labor policies. Because GM's policies were made at 
a national level, national negotiations rather than local negotiations 
were needed. Knudsen refused Martin's offer and told him to return 
to the local plant to resolve differences. 36 
Shortly after this exchange of letters there was a sitdown strike 
at the Cleveland Fisher Body plant on December 28 which lasted 3 days. 37 
On December 30, workers at the Fisher Body No. 2 plant in Flint sat 
down on the Job, beginning the Flint sitdown strike which would cul-
minate 43 days later in GMts recognition of the UAW as the autoworkers' 
sole bargaining agent. The sitdown strike in Fisher No. 2 was a 
spontaneous strike apparently caused when management requested that 
three union members quit the union because management considered them 
supervisors. 38 That night UAW organizer Robert Travis decided to 
expand the strike to include Fisher Body No. 1, because of a report 
that GM was transporting dies to other plants so production could 
continue even 1f there was a strike in the Flint plants. 
36Fine, Sit-down, p. 139-140. 
37F. ine, Sit-down, p. 141-144. 
38 
Fine, Sit-down, p. 144. 
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Workers in other GM plants around the country Joined in the 
strike--Norwood, Ohio; Anderson, Illinois; Toledo, Ohio; Janesville, 
Wisconsin; St. Louis, Missouri; and Oakland, California. However, 
attention was focused on Flint, Michigan, because it was here that 
the UAW would win or lose the strike. 
Because Flint was dependent on GM for its livelihood, many citizens 
supported GM during the strike. Prominent citizens associated with 
GM organized the Flint Alliance, which urged the workers to leave the 
plants in GM's control and later return to work. 39 Throughout the 
strike, in order to dispute the UAW's claim to be the sole bargaining 
agent of the auto workers, GM treated the Flint Alliance as an official 
representative of the autoworkers, even though anyone in Flint could 
Join the Alliance. 40 
The 1936-1937 strike literally was like a battle. There was the 
"Battle of Running Bulls" on January 11, 1937, between auto workers 
and police. Police shot tear gas against picketing workers, while 
sitdown strikers 1n Fisher Body No. 2 and pickets responded with water 
from fire hoses and missiles made from cans, car-door hinges, pieces 
of pavement and the like. After the police retreated, Victor Reuther, 
who directed the auto workers' barrage, ordered that workers put up a 
barricade of automobiles to prevent the police from reaching Fisher 
No. 2. The police responded by intermittently firing tear gas at long 
39Fine, Sit-down, p. 187. 
40Fine, Sit-down, p. 252. 
range toward the pickets and the plant. 41 The use of force and 
violence throughout the strike prompted Governor Frank Murphy to 
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42 call out the National Guard on January 12 to prevent further violence. 
The appearance of the National Guard, however, did not prevent the 
UAW from taking the offensive. On February 1, the UAW expanded the' 
sitdown strike to include Chevrolet No. 4, the only plant at that 
time which produced Chevrolet engines. The UAW had control of the 
two plants crucial to the continued production of GM autornobiles. 43 
For GM the primary issue during the strike was the protection of 
private property. Because the strikers remained in the plants and 
denied GM officials access to the plants, the strikers violated GM's 
property rights. GM officials used this argument in attempts to 
convince Governor Murphy to use the National Guard to evict sitdown 
strikers by force from the plants. Only Murphy's fear of the blood-
shed which would ensue prevented this. 44 
GM and UAW were at a stalemate throughout the strike. GM 
refused to recognize the UAW as the sole representative of the auto 
workers and continually tried to include the Flint Alliance 1n all 
proposed solutions. The UAW refused to leave the plants until GM 
41F. ine, Sit-down, p. 1-6. 
42Fine , Sit-down, p. 239. 
43Fine, Sit-down, p. 266-270. 
44 . Sit-down, 296-300. Fine, p. 
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gave the UAW recognition. The UAW was in the better bargaining 
position in this situation. GM was losing money because it was not 
producing cars. GM officials could not convince the government 
to protect its property rights by evicting the strikers so production 
could resume. To end the strike, GM capitulated to many of the UAW's 
demands. In the February 11 agreement, it recognized the UAW as the 
bargaining agent for GM employees who also were members of the union, 
recognized and promised not to interfere with the right of its em-
ployees to be union members, and agreed not to discriminate against 
workers simply because they were union members. More importantly, 
GM agreed not to bargain with any other representative of the auto 
workers for six months, which essentially made the UAW the only bar-
gaining agent for the auto workers. 
end the strike and to evacuate the 
I 
The UAW, in return, agreed to 
plants. 45 
The 1936-1937 sitdown strike probably was the maJor factor in 
the UAW's early growth. The union not only proved that it would 
fight for its members, but also that it could beat the most powerful 
auto manufacturer in the u.s. 46 
45Fine, Sit-down, p. 304-305. 
46rhe 1936-1937 sit-down strike was not only an important factor 
in the early growth of the UAW, but also in the early growth of the 
CIO, for the strike was the first conducted under the CIO banner. The 
strike demonstrated to industrial workers that the UAW and the CIO 
:fought for the rights of workers against management and won. Some 
historians argue that the success of the UAW strike primarily was 
responsible for the rapid growth of the CIO during the late thirties, 
especially in light of the CIO's unsuccessful organizing drive in 
the steel industry. See for a discussion of the industrial union 
movement in the 1930s Piven and Cloward Poor People's Movements, 
Chapter 2 and Irvan Bernstein, Turbulent Years. 
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IV. The Beginning of Institutionalized Conflict 
Conflict theory can help one to understand this strike in relation 
to other societal processes. The 1936-1937 strike was not a discrete 
event, but part of a continuous process of conflict, because the 
struggle between workers and employers over profit and power is never 
resolved. Both parties seek periodic resolution of this continuous 
conflict. The process of mobilization, confrontation and resolution 
through re-gulation all occur in this strike. 47 The strike and the 
rhetoric of the strike mobilized the uncommitted GM workers to support 
the strike and to join the union by proving to them that the UAW could 
stand up to GM. The rhetoric of the strike is important for describing 
the positive cnaracteristics of the union member and demonstrating the 
advantages of union membership. In this particular strike, the con-
frontation may be characterized as industrial war, for there were 
occupations, battles, and t~e use of some weapons of war. The fact that 
the strike occurs to pressure GM to recognize the UAW as the sole bar-
gaining agent for the auto workers ties the confrontation to the third 
process of resolution and of regulation of future conflict. 48 The UAW's 
right to recognition by GM is based on the NLRA which gives workers 
the right to organize into unions and through the unions to bargain 
with the employer. The NLRA was a conscious attempt by Congress to 
regulate industrial conflict by institutionalizing the process through 
collective bargaining. 
47Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflict ~nd Social Movements (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973) p. 31. --
48oberschall, Social Conflict, p. 243. 
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The NLRA, however, was not dealing with a short-term conflict, 
but with an on-going conflict, which requires procedures to resolve 
differences again and again. Institutionalization through collective 
bargaining requires that both parties recognize each other as legitimate 
organizations, that they bargain in good faith and that the procedures 
for resolving differences be made explicit. 49 
I 
The result of collective bargaining is to make relations between 
the union and management predictable. 50 The conflict is restricted 
to the bargaining table. The contract produced by the bargaining 
process governs the behavior of both parties until it expires or is 
renegotiated. 
V. The Rhetoric of the Sitdown Strike 
The rhetoric of the sitdown strike which is preserved today 
takes the form, for the most part, of short, two and three paragraph 
statements51 and songs52 which were written by workers, rank and 
file union members, and individuals sympathetic to the UAW. There 
49oberschall, Social Conflict, p. 266-267. 
50Louis Kriesberg, The Sociology of Social Conflict (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973) p. 113. -
51see various editions of the Punch Press: Official Strike Bulletin 
of Local #156, Mary Van Kleeck RSH Labor Research Papers, Series II 
Subseries 31, Folder: 13, A-1 and 14, A-1, Archives of Labor and 
Urban Affairs. 
52 See for examples, United Automobile Worker, 22 January 1937, 
p. 7. 
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are two maJor sources of this discourse, the United Automobile Worker, 
which was the official magazine of the UAW, and the Punch Press, 
which was a strike bulletin written and edited by a group of University 
of Michigan students at the urging of UAW officials. 53 Other forms 
of rhetoric did exist, such as speeches made at rallies or broadcast 
from the union sound car, but this discourse was never preserved. 
The UAW rhetors were not trying to convince the public that the strike 
was Justified, but were trying to convince auto workers to support 
the strike and join the union. 
The short form of the discourse is not conducive to logical 
reasoning and explanation of the strike, but to the ~se of dramatic 
elements, such as images, characterizations of the strike and character-
' 
izations of the participants with· which an auto worker might identify. 
The structure and appeals of the rhetoric of the 1936-1937 strike are 
dramatic rather than logical in the sense that the rhetoric describes 
53Fine, Sit-down, p. 245. During the 1930s it was not unusual 
for some worke~in auto plants to have one,to two years of college 
education or to want to go to college. ,The Depression prevented many 
capable people from continuing or starting a college education. They 
went to work as laborers or skilled workers. For example see Clayton 
W. Fountain, Union Guy (New York: The Viking Press, 1949); Wyndham Mortimer, 
Organize! My Life as a Union Man ed. Leo Fenster (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1971) and Victor G-.-Reuther, The Brothers Reuther and the Story of the 
UAW (Boston: Houghton Mifflin:-1976). These workers often assumed--
leadership positions in the UAW. The Punch Press, however, was not 
simply addressed to educated workers, but to all auto workers. The 
persona of the bulletin was t~at of a group of auto workers directly 
involved in the strike. Bob Travis and Merlin Bishop, two UAW 
organizers, were advisors to the staff and wrote some of the articles. 
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scenes of the strike, creates characters such as GM, the UAW, the 
union worker and the non-union worker and describes past and future 
action, rather than making arguments based on facts and statistics. 
The following are examples of typical rhetoric in this strike. 
Industrial democracy is the democracy of the living 
wage, of seniority rights, of a human speed on the 
line. It is the right to collective bargaining. 
It is the only real democracy. 
Men have always had to fight for industrial demo-
cracy. The situation in Flint is no different. 
Workers here are fighting for the right of a happy 
life for themselves and for their women and children. 
Industry hasfuught industrial democracy with 
every means at its control. 
It has used local city government--sometimes the 
national guard (when industry controlled it)--tear 
gas and guns from its private arsenals--armies of 
thugs and spies from strike breaking agencies--the 
courts, the legal system, the press. 
When it could not organize vigilanti mobs from 
sentiment it paid for them. _ 
Workers have fought all these weapons with the only 
weapons they have--unity and their lives. They have 
been willing to die to establish industrial democracy. 
This is what the boys in Fisher 1 and 2, from Chevy 4, 
and all those who are not in the plants are fighting 
for--industrial democracy.54 
"Hot Time in the Old Town Last Night" 
I 
Cheer, boys, cheer 
For we are full of fun; 
Cheer, boys, cheer, 
Old Parker's on the run; 
We had a fight last night 
And I tell you, boys, we won, 
We had a hot time in the old town last night. 
54Punch Press: Official Strike Bulletin of Local #156, #12, 
7 February 1937, p. 1, Van Kleeck Papers, Series II Subseries 31, 
Folder: 14, A-1, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs. 
II 
Tear gas bombs 
Were flying thick and fast; 
The lousy police, 
They knew they couldn't last, 
Because in all their lives they never ran so fast, 
As in the hot time in this old town last night. 
III 
The police are sick 
Their bodies-they are sore 
I'll bet they'll never 
Fight us any more; 
Because they learned last night 
That we had quite a corps. 
We had a hot time in the old town last night. 
IV 
Now this scrap is o'er; 
The boys are sticking fast 
We'll hold our grounds 
And fight here to the last 
And when this strike is o'er 
We'll have out contract fast, 
We'll have a hot time in the old town that nite! f:sic;JSS 
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Because of the reliance on dramatic structure and technique, it is 
not posible to perform a critical analysis of this rhetoric using 
traditional logical standards. If, however, one analyzes all of the 
discourse of this strike as one rhetorical act, paying special attention 
to the dramatic aspects of the rhetoric, a scenario begins to appear. , 
Different characters, relationships between characters and different 
scenes describe the world of the auto worker in a way which makes sense 
to an auto worker. I shall argue that a scenario, comprised of 
dramatic elements and structures, is the dramatic counterpart of the 
ideology of the UAW during this strike. The scenario is a specific 
5511Hot Time in the Old Town Last Night" United Automobile Worker, 
22 January 1937, p. 7. 
arrangement of common symbols and images which union rhetors use in 
their statements throughout the strike. The following is the 
scenario which I recreated from the rhetoric. 
According to the scenario the individual worker has been living 
56 as a "wage slave." A worker's children were destined to grow up 
only to work in the factory, to lose their jobs when they get older 
and, because low wages prevents them from saving for their forced 
retirement, to die poor. 57 The wage slave works for GM, a tyrannical 
and autocratic corporation which "does not want anything that cuts 
into profits--that gives auto workers decent working and living 
conditions. 1158 The wage slave passively accepts the decisions of 
management about hirings, wages, grievances against management and 
the like. The wage slave even passively accepts the speed of the 
machine at which he or she59 works, because there is nothing a wage 
slave can do to stop or slow down the machine. 60 
5611 Gains Marked Since Sitdown," United Automobile Worker, 22 
January 1937, p. 5. 
5711 Rock a Bye Baby" and "Soup Songrr in Bud and Hazel Simons 
Collection, Box 1, Folder: Misc. Picket Cards, Songs, etc., Archives 
of Labor and Urban Affairs. 
5811GM Balks at Collective Bargaining," Punch Press: Official 
Strike Bulletin of Local #156, #6, p. 1, Van Kleeck Papers, Series II 
Subseries 31, Folder: 13-;T-"l, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs. 
59women were employed at the AC Spark Plug plant in Flint. See 
Fine, Sit-down, p. 119. 
60 -
"Gains Marked,r' United Automobile Worker, p. 5. 
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. Once the strike occurred, the role of the wage slave changed. 
Auto workers stopped passively accepting the decisions and treatment 
of management and began to act independently. "After years of speed up 
and small pay the boys didn't find it hard to lay down their tools that 
Wednesday morning, and tell GM they were out for better conditions. 
Comical, the way the bosses hung around and watched us make up nice 
beds from cotton upholstering and seat springs and make ourselves 
th .. 61 a ome ••. The discourse argues that the union was responsible 
for the strike and the independent action among the auto workers, 
because "£1i/hen the dies they started moving,/ The Union Men they had 
a meeting. / To decide right then and there what must be done. 1162 
Historians, however, argue that the strike was originally a spontaneous 
action by auto workers, with the small UAW appointing itself speaker 
for the strikers.63 Because the union did not instigate the strike 
and because many participants in the strike were not union members, 
union rhetors were vulnerable to arguments that the UAW did not represent 
the majority of auto workers. To refute these arguments, union rhetors 
characterized the non-union worker as supporting the union. "In not 
a single instance could GM get a worker to take' part against his fellow 
6111Remarks of a Fisher #2 Sitdowner," Punch Press, Official Strike 
Bulletin of Local •#156, #6, p. 1, Van Kleeck Papers, Series 11 Subseries 
31, Folder: 13, A-1, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs. 
6211The Fisher' Strike," United Automobile Worker, 22 January 1937, 
p. 7. 
63Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements, p. 137-140. 
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workers. On the contrary, in each case, many non-union workers helped 
the union men--and then joined the union. 1164 
The union had a special importance to the average auto worker, for 
it was through the union that a worker could transfom herself or him-
self from a wage slave into a human being who assert her or his right 
to respect, humane treatment and a decent standard of living. The 
workers ran the union, which made it an even greater threat to GM, 
because, as a result, management could not coopt union leaders as 
easily. 65 The style of the rhetoric also confims this argument, 
for the persona found in the discourse is that of a rank and file 
union member. 
In the union the workers were actors, running the union, striking 
GM and actively trying to change their lives for the better. 
Joining the union means participation in a gigantic 
fight against a corporation which has a monopoly 
on financial and legal weapons, which has a strangle 
hold on Flint. Join the union now and lend your 
services to a movement which will give you new 
life and courage as well as a means to live ~6 
decent American life when the strike is won. 
6411What Next for GM?" Punch Press: Official Strike Bulletin of 
Local #156, #5, p. 1, Van Kleeck Papers, Series II Subseries 31, 
Folder:13, A-1, Archives of Labor and Urban ,Affairs. 
6511 GM Balks at Collective Bargaining," Punch Press, p. 2. 
6611To Non-Union Men," Punch Press: Official Strike Bulletin of 
Local #156, #6, p. 2, Van Kleeck Papers, Series II Subser1es 31, 
Folder: 13, A-1, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs. 
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After the strike, the workers had a new sense of self respect, for 
they had "held control of the factory which before had ruled their 
lives. They had completely silenced the machines whose speed had 
formerly dictated their every motion. They had measured their own 
strength and resourcefulness against the money power of management; 
and the management had admitted defeat. 1167 Because the union gave a 
worker a chance to be proud, to be confident and to work for a'better 
future, the worker 1s loyal to the union. 
You're in a mass meeting listening to speeches, 
you're ready to go out picketing, you're talking in 
the hall about the latest Journal hot air--then 
something happens ... Somebody comes out of the 
office, shouts--"Everybody out!" You grab your 
hat and coat and run for the stairs in a crowd. 
You pile five and six into cars, and there's 
women with you •.. 
You race around curves, the springs snap on 
bumps. Nobody talks much, there's cars following 
behind, filled with men like yourself. You"park, 
open its door and run to the plant. You slow down 
as you get near because you don't want the cops 
on you before you can fight. And you walk, heart 
pwnping, fist clenched with your brother with you, 
knowing there's tear gas and bullets ahead of you. 
You watch for stools, for uniformed gun wielders. 
Then you see the sound car~-you go for it, for you 
know your leaders are there. 
And then--you find it 1s a mistake. You are thankful, 
but you say in the deepest part of you, "if it had been 
tonight, 11 I 1 d have been in there with all my strength 
for the 1.U1ion! 11 68 
' 
6711Gains Marked," United Automobile Worker, p. 5. 
6811 Gives Us 5 Minutes " Punch Press: Official Strike Bulletin of 
1 ' Local #156, unnumbered, p. 3, Van Kleeck Papers, Series II Subseries 31, 
Folder: 14, A-1, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs. 
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The strike itself is part of the fight of the union to establish 
Industrial Democracy, "the democracy of the living wage, of seniority 
' rights, of a human speed on the line. It is the right to collective 
[j~ bargain. It is the only real democracy. 1169 GM feared the UAW 
because the company feared industrial democracy, which would allow 
workers to affect decisions concerning the workplace. 7° Consequently, 
"General Motors has bought tear gas from chemical companies, hired 
spies and thugs from strike breaking corporations, used city govern-
' ment, the courts and a small army of company stool pigeons all to 
strike Industrial Democracy. 1171 The strike soon took on the 
characteristics of a war that"· won't be won until every plant 
has signed u~ for the Union, 1172 wi~h each confrontation becoming a 
ba~tle between union supporters and opponents. 73 Even death in battle 
is a possibility. "Unarmed as we are, the introduction of the militia, 
6911 Industrial Democracy," 
of Local #156, special AC edn., 
Subseries3I';" Folder: 14, A-1, 
' Punch Press: Official Strike Bulletin 
p. 2, Van Kleeck Papers, Series II 
Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs. 
7011 GM Balks at Collective Bargaining," Punch Press, p. 2. 
' 7111 GM Balks at Collective Bargaining," Punch Press, p. 1. 
7211The Strike Today," Punch Press: Official Strike Bulletin of 
Local #156, special AC edn., pw 2, Van Kleeck Papers, Series II Subseries 
31, Folder: 14, A-1, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs. 
7311After the Battle" and "Hot Time in the Old Town Last Night," 
United Automobile Worker, 22 January 1937, p. 7. 
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sheriffs or police w~th murderous weapons will mean a blood bath of 
unarmed workers. 1174 
The goal of the strikers and of the union members is the 
establishment of collective bargaining, in which the union represents 
the workers in the joint determination of wages, hours, working con-
ditions and the resolution of workers' grievances against management. 75 
The following described this desired relationship: 
In one department we had the machines down ~or a 
few minutes. Our Shop Stewards went into the 
Superintendent to request a conference and met a 
surly refusal., They left the office and went straight 
to pull the whistle cord for a sit-down. The 
conference was arranged in ten minutes in a very 
polite atmosphere and machines began again. 1176 
The rhetoric of the UAW in the 1936-1937 strike is an example of 
rhetoric in an uninstitutionalized conflict. The conflict is unlimited, 
as the imagery in the scenario would indicate. The auto workers are 
battling GM for Industrial Democracy, their self respect and their 
l 
livelihoods. There are battles in the "old town last night!" in 
which death or physical injury are real possibilities. The second 
indication that this is an uninstitutionalized conflict is evidence 
of democratic organization. The strike is run by auto workers, not 
union leaders. Auto workers "held control of the factory which_before 
74Text of a telegram from the strikers in Fisher #2 to Governor 
Frank Murphy, Walter P. Reuther, pre-presidential series, Box 2, Folder: 
GM Department, Flint Sit-down Strikes, 1937, Archives of Labor and 
Urban Affairs. 
7511A Union that Fights and Wins Is a Union Worth Belonging To!" 
United Automobile Worker, 22, January 1937, p. 8. 
76 11Gains Marked," United Automobile Worker, 22 January 1937, p. 6. 
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had ruled their lives." Auto workers decided whether or not they 
would participate in the strike. In fact, the success of the strike 
depended on their participation. The workers also participated in the 
union's system of government. 
My department held its first meeting immediately 
after work the second day after the strike. Out of 
350 workers in the department, over 300 were present. 
We first elected our Operation Stewards--one man from 
each separate line or gang in the department--to collect 
union dues, to handle complaints, to watch for unsafe 
working conditions, and to check on the speed-up.77 
VI. Fro~ Wage Slave to Union Member 
The rhetoric of the strike and the scenario contained in it 
have instrumental functions similar to those described by Richard Gregg 
in his discussion of the ego-function of the rhetoric of protest. 78 
The scenario found in the strike rhetoric depicts the average worker as 
an individual who is immobilized in the workplace, because of the 
immense power which the corporation has over the legal system, police 
and society in general. However, as a member of the union, a worker 
has a chance to become an actor who changes her or his life for the 
better, instead of being a passive recipient of the corporation's 
decisions. 
Gregg's discussion is not adequate to describe fully the rhetorical 
creation of a new identity or role for workers and the subsequent pro-
cess by which a worker might assume that role. A role does not exist 
7711 Gains Marked, 11 United Automobile Worker, 22 January 1937, p. 6. 
78 Richard B. Gregg, "The Ego-Function of the Rhetoric of Protest," 
Philosophy and Rhetoric, 4(Spring 1971)1, p. 73-86. 
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except in relation to other roles 1n a particular context. There is an 
interdependent matrix or roles and relationships which create the scenario 
described above. This scenario functions as a "myth of concern" to 
h ld h . . h 79 o t e union community toget er. The union "myth of concern" is a 
dramatic counterpart of the union's ideology, for it describes union 
members, relationships to GM and to non-members and proper modes of 
behavior. 
George Herbert Mead's notion about the development of the self 
indicate how the non-union auto worker becomes a union member. To be 
a self-conscious human being, an individual's self must have both an 
"I" and a "me. 11 1In the union "myth of concern" the wage slave is the 
"me" in the non-union workplace. This "me" severely restricts the 
behavior of workers to the extent that "I" aspect of their selves 
becomes dissatisfied and begins to react against the restrictions of 
the "me." 
The reaction of the "I" against the restrictions of the "me" 1s 
'not without purpose. Recall that for Mead it is the human being's 
ability to communicate with symbols which allows the self to develop. 
< 
The symbols which humans use to communicate with each other "create" 
the environment in which they live. Humans, in turn, must adjust to 
80 the environment which they created. This reflexive relationship 
79Northrop Frye, The Critical Path: 
of Literacy Criticism, Midland Book edn. 
University Press, 1973) p. 36. 
An Essay on the Social Context 
(Bloomington, Indiana=- Indiana 
80George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society, 
George Herbert Mead, Charles w.Morri-s-er(Chicago: 
Vol. I of Works of 
University of 
Chicago Press, 1934), p. 133 and 245-246. 
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between humans and their environment contains within it the possibility 
of liberation from an overly restrictive environment, which severely 
limits an individual by emphasizing the "me" aspect of the self over 
the "I" aspect. The "I" may create new roles and a new conununity in 
which the self may exist through its reactions against an overly 
restrictive "me." The union "myth of concern" is an example of humans 
creating a new community and new roles for the movement's membership. 
The rhetoric contains a new set of terms which provide the audience 
with a new look at reality, Implicit in the new terms are new roles 
and relationships which explain the world of the member. 
Yet, somehow individuals dissatisfied with the restrictive roles 
of society must find a means to transform themselves, so that they may 
acquire new roles which more accurately fit the creative and spontaneous 
aspects of themselves. In the rhetoric of the 1936-1937 strike, a wage 
slave transforms herself or himself into an active and proud worker 
by Joining the union. Union membership enables the industrial worker 
to live 1n a new environment centered around the union. Note the 
similar transformation which church membership has for Christians. 
Members of the church are believers who will be saved from eternal 
damnation, in contrast to non-believers who are lost forever. The 
transformation from non-believer to believing church member had developed 
into the ritual of baptism. The signing of a union,membership card 
performs the same function. The rituals of baptism and of signing the 
union card separate believers in Christianity from non-believers and 
union members from non-union members, respectively. The believer or 
member has the ritual as evidence of this distinction. 
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The transformation from wage slave to a union member occurs 
because the role of union member is part of a symbolic community, a 
"myth of concern," which explains why events happen and explains why 
people act the way they do and provides models for conduct. 
The dramatic form of ,the scenario and the rhetoric is important 
in and of itself, for it transforms the conflict over power between 
two organizations into a personal struggle for every auto worker. 
For example, a shop steward in an auto worker's department negotiates 
with the immediate supervisor over disagreements. Similarly, the 
l 
images of an individual auto worker rushing to the picket lines not 
know what awaits her or him there creates a perception of her or 
his action as a personal sacrifice which, in turn, develops commitment 
to the UAW. 
VII • Summary 
which 
The rhetoric of the 1936-1937 strike is an example of protest/rhetoric 
1 enables the members of a protest movement to change their identities. 
Gregg's discussion of this process, however, does not take into account 
all of the elements which rhetoric must contain to enable a person to 
change her or his identity. Although Mead does not describe this 
process of transformation, he does discuss the factors crucial to the 
development of self. Thus, when one combines Gregg and Mead, one 
can better understand this process of transformation. There must be 
a "me," the organized attitudes and assumptions of the community, and 
an "I, 11 the spontaneous and creative aspect of self. The "me" contains 
the commum.ty' s "myth of concern11 which is a dramatic counterpart of 
the community's ideology and which demonstrates the community's beliefs, 
explanations of existence and norms for behavior. The "me" is as 
necessary for the development of identity as 1s the "I." 
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For a group of people to transform their identities, to acquire 
a new set of roles, there must be a new "me" and a new 11myth of concern" 
which they may "take on." Rhetoric which appears to change the 
identities of a group of people will not be effective unless the 
rhe.toric contains a system of roles which exist in relation to other 
roles and which exist in an environment. In short, a rhetor must 
create a new symbolic world which explains events and guides conduct 
and which makes sense to the members of the group. The scenario found 
in the rhetoric of the 1936-1937 strike is a new "myth of concern" for 
auto workers. This new explanation of industrial reality focuses on 
the union and on union membership and how they may change an auto 
work~r•s identity and her or his relationship with GM. 
Chapter Five 
TWO BATTLES 
THE 1945-1946 STRIKE 
I. The UAW between 1937 and 1945 
Fractional politics dominated the UAW from 1937 to 1947. 
Immediately after the 1936-1937 strike there were two maJor factions, 
one which supported President Homer Martin and preferred conservative 
policies and another which was anti-Martin and dominated by Commwiist 
Party members. The latter faction also included a small group of 
Socialists lead by Walter Reuther. 1 The UAW was so severely divided 
that in 1939 two separate UAW conventions were held. In the convention 
run by Martin supporters, Martin urged the UAW to return to the A. F. of 
L. Because this policy was unpopular among the majority of union 
members, Martin's A. F. of L. union died out. In the anti-Martin 
convention to which most UAW locals sent representatives, delegates 
decided to remain with the C. I. 0. The problem of factionalism, 
however, was not resolved with Martin's departure. Three groups 
participated in the anti-Martin convention--Commwiists, the most 
-
powerful group, Socialists and a group of unionists more concerned 
with bread and butter issues than with political ideologies. Only 
intervention by the C. I. 0. leadership prevented the Communists from 
entirely dominating the union. R. J. Thomas, a "bread and butter" 
1Irving Howe and B. J. Widick, The UAW and Walter Reuther (New 
York: Random House, 1949) p. 70. 
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unionist, was the compromise candidate for UAW president. Thomas held 
2 this position until 1946, when he was defeated by Walter Reuther. 
The factionalism between the Communist and Socialists divided the 
union until 1947, when Reuther was overwhelmingly re-elected president 
of the UAW and removed lmown Communists from their official positions 
in the union. 3 
World War II exacerbated the factionalism within the UAW. The 
Communists in their support of the Soviet Union made 180 degree changes 
1n their proposals for union policies toward the war. During the 
Hitler-Stalin pact, the Communists supported an isolationist policy 
which called on workers to slow down war production. They supported 
wildcat strikes which would momentarily stop war production. When 
Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, however, the Communists changed their 
official positions. They opposed all strikes for any reason and 
4 advocated incentive pay proposals to increase war production. The 
incentive pay proposals were attempts to re-establish the piecework 
system in which a worker is paid for the amount of work he or she 
finishes rather than by a standard hourly wage. The advantage from 
the Communist perspective was that workers would work faster to earn 
\ 
more money and, thus, increase war production. The Socialist faction 
2Howe and Widick, UAW and Walter Reuther, p. 77-78. 
3Howe and Widick, UAW and Walter Reuther, p. 79 and William Serrin, 
The Company and the Un10~ The "Civilized Relationsh1pH of the General 
Motors Corporation and the United Automobile Workers (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1973) p. 141. 
4Howe and Widick, UAW and Walter Reuther, p. 79-80 and 223-224. 
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headed by Reuther opposed this proposal, because it would threaten 
the economic security of older workers who could not work as fast as 
younger workers. However, the Reuther faction did Join the Communists 
in their opposition to strikes during the war. Both of these proposals 
5 were very unpopular among union members. 
The anti-inflation policy of the federal government during the war 
also increased the discontent among union members. The government 
wage policy, knows as the "little steel" formula, restricted wage in-
creases to 15 percent of the wage rates of January l, 1941, regardless 
of how much prices increased during the same period. 6 The result was 
that at the end of the war wages had increased 15 percent, but the cost 
of living had increased 30 to 40 percent. By some estimates food costs 
7 had increased as much as 50 percent. 
After the war, Walter Reuther, as head of the GM department in 
the UAW, capitalized on rank and file discontent over wages in the UAW 
proposa,ls for negotiation with GM. The anti-inflation policy of the 
Truman administration which attempted to control post-war inflation 
allowed a company to give its workers a wage increase if the company 
would not pass the cost of that wage increase on to consumers in price 
increases. 8 This enabled Reuther to adopt the strategy of arguing 
5Howe and Widick, UAW and Walter ---- Reuther, p. 111 and 115. 
6Howe and Widick, UAW and Walter Reuther, p. 116. ----
7serrin, Company and the Union, p. 157. 
8serrin, Company and the Union, p. 157. 
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that GM could increase wages by 30 percent without subsequently in-
creasing the prices of cars and without hurting GM's profits. GM 
reJected the UAW proposal and, instead, argued that the work week 
should be increased from 40 to 45 hours to help the U.S. attain a high 
level of peacetime production. 9 GM officials refused to respond to 
Reuther's arguments that a wage increase without a price increase was 
possible with economic facts and-statistics from GM's records. At no 
time during the strike did GM open its records to prove that the 
corporation could not afford a wage increase without a price increase. 10 
GM officials argued that the corporation was concerned with re-
conversion of the wartime economy to a peacetime economy. GM's 
proposal of increasing the work week while maintaining the same weekly 
salary would increase production and produce a healthy economy. With 
this argument GM appeared to consider the economic health of the nation 
before its own profits. The UAW's proposal to increase wages by 30 
percent, when compared with GM's proposal, would appear selfish to 
the American public. Consequently, UAW rhetors faced a ho5tile 
public audience. This was further compounded by the coercive appearance 
of the potential strike, i.e., that the striking union was not only 
forcing GM to give workers a wage increase but was also dictating 
company pricing policies. 
9serr1n, Company and the Union, p. 158. 
10 Serrin, Company and the Union, p. 163-169. 
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II. The 1945-1946 Strike 
The 1936-1937 strike was very different from the one in 1945-1946. 
The former was a strike for recognition so that a collective bargaining 
relationship could be established between the UAW and GM, while the 
latter strike was a strike to continue that relationship. In 1945-1946 
there were no physical confrontations between the workers and representa-
tives of GM; instead, there were verbal confrontations at the negotiating 
table and in newspapers. 
Reuther encouraged the public to judge the positions of GM and the 
UAW during the negotiations and the strike. Stenographers made tran-
11 
scripts of negotiating sessions which UAW personnel read to reporters. 
Reuther invited fifteen prominent citizens who were sympathetic to the 
UAW's position to read the transcripts and to recommend a settlement. 
12 Not surprisingly, the group's findings support the UAW proposal. 
President Truman also appointed a panel to investigate the positions 
of the UAW and GM and to propose a settlement for a strike. GM 
officials, however, walked out of the proceedings, when they were told 
they must present company records to prove their contention that Q,! 
could not raise wages without raising prices. GM's refusal to present 
private records to prove that it could not afford a wage increase with-
out a price increase became a maJor issue during the strike. 13 Based on 
11serrin Company and the Union, p. 159-162. , ----
12serrin ' Company and the Union, p. 164. 
13s errin, Company and the Un10n, p. 165. 
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the facts available to it, Truman's panel announced that it recommended 
a 17.5 percent or 19.5 cents wage increase without a price increase. 
The UAW considered this decision a victory, but GM reJected it. 14 
The UAW members were on strike for 113 days, the longest UAW 
strike to that date. Strikers received little economic support from 
the union, although union officials tried to organize charity for 
the strikers. 15 
The strike ended, in part, because the Truman administration 
retreated from its policy of allowing wage increases which did not 
result in price increases. To end the steel strike which occurred 
during the GM strike, the administration allowed an 18.5 cent wage 
increase and allowed the steel companies to increase their prices 
to cover the cost of that increase. This wage settlement set a 
16 pattern for all subsequent settlements. The settlement pattern 
was further strengthened in the auto industry when the United Electrical 
) 
Workers, representing 30,000 GM employees, settled for an 18.5 cent 
increase. 17 Reuther, however continued to refuse GM's offer of 
18.5 cents for a full month. 
III. An Institutionalized Conflict 
The 1945-1946 strike is an institutionalized strike, in contrast 
14serrin, Company and the Union, p. 166. 
15w. Jean Gould and Loren Hickock, Walter Reuther: Labor's Rugged 
Individualist (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1972), p. 229-232. 
16serrin, Company and the Union, p. 167. 
17serrin, Company and the Union, p. 167. 
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to the 1936-1937 strike, for in 1945-1946 the conflict occurred at the 
negotiating table rather than on the streets. There was the recognition 
by both the UAW and GM that they were interdependent--employers needed 
workers to produce cars and workers needed employers to provide jobs. 
At the time of this strike, the UAW participated in a collective bar-
gaining relationship with all three of the maJor auto manufacturers. 
Chrysler had recognized the UAW as the auto workers' bargaining agent 
in 1937, shortly after the sitdown strike against GM, while Ford put 
off recognition until 1941. 18 
One of the consequences of the institutionalization of 
industrial conflict through collective bargaining 1s 
that the limits of industrial order come to be in-
stitutionally determined. For any given conflict there 
is inevitably introduced a long-time perspective, a 
vista of continuing relations between company and union 
regardless of the outcome of the current controversy. 
This time perspective can have an important tempering 
influence toward limiting disorder. It is significant 
that in the U.S. strike violence has been inversely 
related to the permanence of unionism. As collective 
bargaining becomes an established feature of our 
society both sides come to recognize that each conflict-
created disorder 1s inevitably succeeded by a re-
established order and that permanently disruptive 
disorder may materially impede the resolution of the 
conflict. Thus collective bargaining tends to produce 
sel limiting boundaries that d1st1nfuished perm1ss1ble 
from subversive industrial disorder. 9 
The ability of the union and of management to negotiate collective bar-
gaining agreements 1.s" . enhanced to the extent that both sides 
18uAW Solidarity, May 13, 1977, p. 10, 15 and 16. 
19Robert Dubin, "Constructive Aspects of Industrial Conflict!' 1n 
Arthur Kornhauser, Robert Dubin and Arthur M. Ross eds., Industrial 
Conflict (NewYork: McGraw-Hill, 1954) p. 45. 
115 
are highly organized, united, and strongly led, with leaders able to 
enforce discipline down to the rank-and-file who man the front lines, 
since then the likelihood of inJurious incidents poisoning the conduct 
of negotiations is low. 1120 
Because of the continuous nature of the collective bargaining 
relationship and because of the advantage in negotiations of having a 
well disciplined and controlled organization, union leaders are con-
cerned about organizational maintenance. They search for devices which 
will provide the union with stability, permanency and the capability 
to control the behavior of union members. Bureaucratic structure is a 
device which has enabled unions to achieve these goals. A rhetorical 
critic should be able to observe bureaucratic tendencies in the union 
"myth of concern" as the relationship between the union and the company 
becomes institutionalized. Peter M. Blau has identified four character-
istics of bureaucratic organization, which he derived from Max Weber's 
classic discussion of bureaucracy--specialization, a hierarchy of 
authority, a system of rules and impersonality. 21 Another important 
characteristic o~ bureaucratic organization is the concentration of 
power in the leadership. 22 A critic should discern the existence of 
' some of these characteristics in the "myth of concern" if institutional-
20Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973) p. 264. 
21Peter M. Blau, Bureaucracy in America (New York: Random House, 
1956) p. 19. 
22Robert M~chels, 
Oligarchical Tendencies 
(New York: Free Press, 
Political Parties: A Sociological 'study of the 
of Modern Democracy, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul 
1962) p. 70. 
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ization does occur, because the "myth of concern" is a dramatic 
explanation of reality. For example, the existence of rules of 
behavior are evident in the role of union members. The role enacts 
these rules and provides a model of appropriate behavior for a union 
member. 
At the same time that the union tries to maintain itself as a 
permanent and well disciplined organization, it must maintain the 
source of its power, the collective action of union members. If 
union officials encourage loyalty and commitment to the union and its 
goals among the entire union membership, then union members would 
want to remain in the union and, thus, provide a stable source of 
negotiating power for the union. 
However, because of the factionalism in the UAW, to consider the 
1945-1946 strike an institutionalized strike in which the union 
functions as a bureaucracy would be inaccurate. The UAW was not 
completely united on policy during 1945 and 1946. The UAW's actions 
were unpredictable because a factional dispute or a change in the 
relative political power of one faction could result in unexpected 
action. Factionalism prevented the UAW from becoming a bureaucratic 
organization. Thus, a rhetorical critic should expect to discover 
evidence of tendencies toward institutionalization (the use of 
qualifications in the union description of GM and the strike) as well 
as evidence of tendencies toward unrestricted conflict in the discourse 
(the use of imagery of battles, death and blood and of characterizations 
of GM as the UAW's mortal enemy). 
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IV. The Home-front War--Public Rhetoric 
By 1945 the rhetorical situation had changed from the scene in 
1936-1937 in which UAW rhetors spoke to workers to encourage union 
membership to a scene in which union rhetors speak to two different 
audiences, the public and union members. I call discourse addressed 
to the general audience "public rhetoric" and discourse addressed to 
union members "intra-union rhetoric." Because there are two audiences, 
which union rhetors address with two different purposes--to convince 
the public to support the UAW proposal and to maintain commitment of 
union members to t~e union and to the strike--two slightly different 
scenarios appear. 
In the UAW rhetoric directed toward the general public, the 
rhetors emphasized the actions of the UAW and of GM in negotiations 
before and during the strike. This emphasis on action indicates that 
a dramatic scenario exists in the public rhetoric which argues for 
public support of the strike. The following is the scenario which I 
recreated from the public discourse. 
The UAW was the first to initiate negotiations immediately after 
the end of World War II, by demanding that GM give its workers a 
thirty percent wage increase without passing the cost of that increase 
on to consumers. 23 The UAW presented this proposal in an economic 
brief which used "published facts about the auto industry, about 
General Motors' past performance, about costs, prices, profits and 
23walter Reuther, "This is Your Fight~" The Nation, 12 J_anuary 
1946, p. 35-36. 
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the certainty of a market for capacity production for the next three 
years, . . . 1124 UAW rhetors argued that tlus proposal was necessary 
if consumers were to increase their consumption above pre-war levels, 
h h h 1 f 1 . 25 w ic waste goa o government po icy. 
GM's response at the beginning of negotiations was to state that 
there must be a price increase if there is a wage increase; however, 
26 GM did not present a counterproposal for negotiating purposes. GM 
went so far as to say that the corporation's prices, costs and profits 
27 were none of the union's nor of the public's business. By re3ecting 
the UAW's wage proposal without basing the re3ection on facts available 
to the union or to the public, GM refused to support the government 
policy of increasing the purchasing power of consumers and, instead, 
chose to cut consumer purchasing power by increasing prices. 
After GM's refusal to negotiate, the UAW proposed that their 
differences by arbitrated by a third party. The arbitration proposal 
sent to the president of GM by Walter Reuther is an interesting 
rhetorical document, for it is an ultimatum in the form of a proposal. 
The UAW proposed that the board of arbitration have full access to 
24 Walter Reuther, 11 GM v. The Rest of Us, 11 The New Republic, 
14 January 1946, p. 41. 
25Reuther, This is Your Fight11 Nation, p. 36 and Reuther, "GM v. 
Rest of Us, n New Republic, p. 42. u 
26Reuther, "This is Your Fight'." Nation, p. 35-36; Reuther, "GM 
v. Rest of Us," New Republic, p. 41-42; New York Times, 20 November 1945 
p. 14 and New York Times, 21 November 1945, p. 13. 
27New York Times, 20 November 1945, p. 14. 
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GM's books and records. This is the very point on which GM refused to 
compromise throughout the strike. In the arbitration proposal, Reuther 
questioned GM' s motives, "£0e prefer the conference table and the 
hearing room to the picket line. Do you?" He characterized GM's actions 
as anti-government, "l't7he position taken by the corporation flies 
in the face of and contravenes the President's statement of national 
wage-price-profit policy," and anti-American, "[t;Jhis proposal would 
slam the door of job opportunity in the faces of millions of returning 
war veterans and millions of war workers at a time when we are faced 
with rising mass unemployment." In contrast, "['w] e, [the UAi/ refuse 
to join you [J;rg in sandbagging the American consumer." 28 The fact 
that GM refused to arbitrate its differences with the UAW, Reuther 
argues, indicated that GM did not want to resolve these differences 
with rational discussion but rather with force. 
We have presented our case to the public and we believe 
that never before has it been so clear in the minds of 
the public that an arrogant corporation, which has now 
refused to bargain collectively, refused public negotia-
tions, refused conciliation and has not refused arbitra-
tion, is solely and exclusively responsible for the 
strike which is about to occur. 29 
GM refused to act according to the principles of collective 
bargaining, the principles of institutionalized conflict, by its refusal 
to present a counterproposal or to attempt to resolve differences 1n 
arbitration based on facts. By 1ts refusal to negotiate, GM questioned 
28New York Times, 20 November 1945, p. 14. 
29New York Times, 21 November 1945, p. 13. 
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the very existence of the union and of collective bargaining. According 
to the union rhetoric, the strike for GM was a "war to break the back 
of organized labor, both craft and industrial unions; to turn the 
clock back to the days of tame plant or company unions, helpless against 
the strength of great employing groups, to bring back a longer work 
30 week in the face of rising unemployment." GM was not simply fighting , 
organized labor, but was also fighting the American public through the 
union: "General Motors workers and their families are the front-line 
troops in a home-front war 1131 Union members recognized that 
they must fight GM because they "are part of the community" and "intend 
to make progress with the community and not at the expense of the 
community."32 This latter argument is made more frequently than the 
former argument in the public discourse. 33 In contrast to the UAW, GM 
refused to recognize that it 1s part of the community and is responsible 
h . 34 tote community. 
30New York Times, 25 November 1945, p. 3. 
31 Reuther, "This is Your Fight!" Nation, p. 36. 
32 Reuther, "GM v. The Rest of Us," New Republic, p. 42. 
33see for example, New York Times, 20 November 1945, p. 14; 
~ew York Times, 25 November 1945, p. 36; "Letter to the Editor," 
New York Times, 5 December 1945, p. 24; Reuther, "This is Your Fight!" 
Nation, January 12, 1946, p. 35-36 and Reuther, "GM v. The Rest of Us," 
New Republic, January 14, 1946, p. 41-42. 
34 
New York Times, 20 November 1945, p. 14. 
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Walter Reuther's proposal for arbitration is representative in 
some respects of UAW discourse addressed to the public during this 
strike. In the letter Reuther attempts to structure the audience's 
perceptions of the strike so that only one course of action available 
to GM was acceptable to the public--acquiescing to the UAW proposal of 
' 
a wage increase without a resulting price increase. In this sense the 
proposal for arbitration actually was an ultimatum. Reuther 
' 
identified two standards of behavior--responsibility to the public and 
government and reasonableness in negotiation. After presenting one 
standard of behavior, Reuther describes the actions of the UAW and of 
GM which indicate whether or not each was responsible and reasonable. 
For example., after identifying that both parties recognize the "heavy 
responsibility the public lays on both parties," Reuther describes 
how the UAW has met its responsibili ties-- 11.liJn addition to our 
responsibility to the public, we have responsibility also to the more 
than 300,000 General Motors workers covered by our agreement, and to 
their families. As the union has demonstrated in its economic brief, 
our responsibilities to the GM workers and to the public are in 
harmony." Much of the remainder of the letter describes how GM avoided 
its responsibility to the public and to government and to its workers 
in its disregard of governmental policy and its unreasonable positions 
in negotiations. For example, "["t]he pos1 tion taken by corporation 
representatives flies in the face of and contravenes the President's 
statement of national wage-price-profit policy. • . . " The UAW 
presents proposals in negotiations to which representatives of GM refuse 
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to respond--" J.:q]ur wage negotiations are deadl~cked because of the 
continual refusal of the corporation to discuss basic economic facts." 
The following is Reuther's pointed characterization of GM's unreasonable 
negotiating position. 
Corporation representatives have told us in negotiations that: 
1. The Corporation cannot and will not pay even 1 per 
cent higher wage rates without a compensating in-
crease in prices. 
2. Corporation prices are none of the union's or the 
public's business. 
3. Corporation costs are none of the union's or the 
public's business. 
4. Corporation profits are none of the union's or the 
public's business. 
5. The corporation books will not be opened to the union 
in wage negotiations. 
6. The union should cease concerning itself with prices, 
limiting our negotiations solely to wages. 
7. The union should Join the corporation in persuading 
Congress to amend the Wage-Hour Act to lengthen the 
nonnal work-week from forty hours to forty-five hours. 
8. The corporation offers the union a 10 per cent wage 
increase tied to higher prices for consumers. 
The only way GM could be as responsible and as reasonable as the 
UAW was to agree to the arbitration proposal in the letter. Agreement 
to the proposal, however, would grant the arbitration board full 
access to GM's books, records and the like and would make the decision 
of the board final and binding for both parties. These were the points 
on which GM refused to compromise. Acceptance of the arbitration pro-
posal would have required repudiating GM's previous position on the 
strike, wages and prices. Yet, because of the standards of behavior 
which Reuther established in the letter, GM's refusal to arbitrate 
confirmed Reuther's descriptions of GM's irresponsibility and unrea-
35 sonableness. 
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Aristotle identifies three genres of rhetoric--deliberative, 
forensic and epideictic--all of which urge the audience to make a 
d . b . 36 ecision a out action. Analyzing the rhetoric directed towards the 
I 
general public from a perspective of Aristotelian genres allows one 
to see how union rhetors use a dramatic scenario to encourage public 
' 
support of the strike. The discourse argues about the appropriateness 
of action, which requires the audience to make a forensic decision, 
rather than the expediency of proposed action, which requires a 
deliberative decision. 37 Union rhetors ask the public to make a 
decision about the Justice or 1nJust1ce of the conduct of GM and of 
the UAW before and during the strike. Because of this focus on past 
action rather than on future action, the ethos or characterizations 
of GM and of the UAW are particularly important to the audience in its 
decision about who acted most justly. 
Aristotle identifies three elements of ethos: good sense 
(phronesis), good moral character (arete') and good will (eunoia). 38 
Conceivably, different audiences have different standards for good 
35New York Times, 20 November 1945, p. 14. 
36Aristotle, Rhetoric, trans. W. Rhys Roberts, The Modern Library 
edn. (New York: Random House, 1954) 1358b 11.21-~9. 
37 For examples, see New York Times, 20 November 1945, p. 14, 
New York Times, 25 November 1945, p. 36 and Reuther, "GM v. The Rest 
of Us," New Republic, p. 41-42. 
38Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1378a 11. 8-9. 
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will and the like. I contend that in UAW rhetoric of the 1945-1946 
strike, the union has an ethos which is attractive to the American 
public because the union is characterized as more American than is 
GM. In short, the UAW and the American public share values, while GM 
and the American public did not. tlenry McGuckin made a similar arglDilent 
in his analysis of Richard Nixon's Checkers Speech. Accordingly to 
McGuckin, the speech was effective because Nixon identified himself 
with representative American values. 39 
It was crucial for the UAW to be seen as part of the American 
' public, because it was easy to interpret the UAW position as unpatriotic. 
By striking so close to the end of World War II, the UAW appeared to be 
Jeopardizing the country's ability to reconvert to a peacetime economy, 
while GM appeared to be trying to speed this reconversion by returning 
to pre-war policies. UAW rhetors overcame this negative characteriza-
tion by identifying the union with the American values, as characterized 
by FDR, for which the war was fought. These values are the "Four 
Freedoms"--freedom of speech and expression, freedom to worship, freedom 
from want and freedom from fear. 40 After fighting a war in Europe and 
39Henry E. McGuckin, Jr., "A Value Analysis of Richard Nixon's 
1952 Campaign-Fund Speech," Southern Speech Journal, 33(Summer 1968)4, 
p. 259-269. 
4°Franklin D. Roosevelt, "The Four Freedoms," from a message to 
the 77th Congress 6 January 1941 in Readings for Citizens at War, ed. 
Theodore Morrison (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943) p-.-196-197. 
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the Pacific to preserve freedom of speech, of religion and from fear 
for all Americans, the UAW is fighting a battle for freedom from want 
for all Americans at home aga1nst GM. The appeal to freedom from want 
is equivalent to an appeal for economic security for all Americans. 
Today, with the strike in its second month, and with 
the G.M. attitude being copied by other employers across 
the whole country, General Motors workers and their 
families are the front-line troops in a home-front war 
to win the very peace that, only five months ago, it was 
generally agreed we must have if the war aims of the Four 
Freedoms were to be more than a sour phrase on the lips of 
apple-selling veterans of World War II. 41 
Here, the vivid image of apple-selling veterans suggest that this 
war means nothing if America returns to the pre-war economic conditions 
of the Depression~ 
In this battle, the UAW and its members are characterized as 
American fighting for .i\mericans. The UAW has the positive attributes 
of the audience--Americans concerned for the welfare of the country 
and willing to fight for its welfare at home or abroad, reasonable in 
negotiation and, finally, willing to assume responsibility for its 
actions. In contrast, GM is characterized as fighting, against 
Americans to prevent their attairunent of economic security. 
The grim fact is that if free enterprise in America 
is to survive, it has got to work; it must demonstrate 
more than an ability to create earnings for investors; 
it must master the technique for providing full employ-
ment at a high standard of living, rising year by year 
to keep pace with the annual increase in technological 
efficiency. Incidentally, this increment, estimated 
at more than 2.5 percent a year normally, may amount to 
41 
Reuther, "This is Your Fight!" Nation, p. 36. 
more than 30 percent in the first three post-war years 
according·to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Free enterprise has got to demonstrate a willingness 
to adjust itself to national policies such as the 
present wage-price policy, not being appealed by GM 
from President Truman to Congress. Good will must be 
substituted for the obstructionism, arrogance and 
refusal to cooperate--the latter Mr. Truman's ~hrase--
that have marked GM's conduct in this dispute. 2 
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A scenario which emphasizes ~haracterization and present action 
is an appropriate rhetorical device for the union rhetor, because a 
debate about the feasibility of a 30 percent wage increase without a 
price increase never develops. The debate never occurs, because GM 
argues without evidence that the proposal for a thirty percent wage 
increase without a price increase is not possible. The UAW's requests 
for evidence are ignored by GM., Since UAW rhetors cannot urge the 
public to deliberate about future action without arguments and evidence, 
the rhetors turn to present conduct as the evidence for making a 
decision. GM cannot hide the evidence of its own conduct. If the 
public considered the explanations made by UAW rhetors plausible, the 
public would accept the scenario found in the discourse as a valid 
chronicle and support the strike. 
V. The Fight of All Organized Labor 
The scenario created 1n intra-union rhetoric is similar to the 
scenario created in public discourse; however, union rhetors make 
( 
assumptions about the audience's knowledge of events. For example, 
the pre-strike maneuvering, described in detail in public discou~se, 
42 Reuther, "GM v. The Rest of Us," New Republic, p. 42. 
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1 h h h 1 . d" 43 1s dea twit rat er l1g t yin intra-union 1scourse., Similarly, 
characterizing the union as reasonable and re~ponsible, which is 
emphasized in public discourse, is omitted here; it is assumed that 
the intra-union audience perceives the union in this way. The union's 
desire to negotiate with the facts proves that it is reasonable and 
"bl 44 responsi e. Both public and intra-union rhetoric characterizes 
union members as Americans fighting for "full production, full employ-
ment and full consumption in our nation and the wor'ld. u 45 For the 
individual union member, this means fighting for economic security and 
assured employment. 
The way in which union members and the nature of the relationship 
between the UAW and GM were characterized in the intra-union scenario 
are the important differences from the public scenario. According 
to the intra-union scenario, the GM workers unanimously voted for the 
.k 46 stri e. These union members possessed the courage, sense of 
43"Highlight of General Motors Strike: GM Forces Strike," United , 
Automobile Worker, December 1945, p. 4-5. 
4411Highlight, 11 United Automobile Worker, p. 4-5 and "Letter to all 
UAW-CIO Local Unions," United Automobile Worker, December 1945, p. 1 and 
8. 
4511Letter, 11 United Automobile Worker, p. 1. See also Walter P. 
Reuther, Letter to All GM Local Unions, 24 January 1946, George Lyons 
Local 174 Collection, Box 2, Folder: Misc. Strikes, 1945-46, Archives 
of Labor and Urban Affairs; and nNLRB Charges GM Corporation with 
Precipitating and Prolonging the Strike, 11 United Automobile Worker,, 
January 1946, p. 1 and 8. 
4611Highlights, 11 United Automobile Worker, :p. 1 and 8. 
128 
sacrifice and determination which gives strength to the union during 
tlns fight. "The courage and willingness to sacrifice which the GM 
workers are showing in order to establish the beachhead that will win 
greater security and a higher standard of living for all workers has 
won the respect and gratitude of men of 47 good will everywhere." 
More importantly, union members realized that they must work and fight 
h h . k 48 toget er, as a union, to win tis stri e. 
The importance of these attributes for the union member was 
underscored by the nature of the conflict between GM and the UAW, for 
l 
it was not simply a strike over a wage increase, but a fight for the 
survival of the union. GM, the 11giant octopus of the automotive 
1ndustry1149 and one of the "barons of industry, 1150 was part of 11a 
conspiracy by Big Industry to destroy organized labor and wipe out 
every social and economic gain we have made since the first Roosevelt 
administration. 1151 GM's refusal to bargain with the union questioned 
the validity of the union and the validity of collective bargaining. 
4711Highlights," United Automobile Worker, p. 1 and 8. 
48George F. Addes, "Secretary Addes Says: A Union's Greatest Asset 
is Solidarity," United Automobile Worker, February 1946, p. 7. 
4911Strategy Board Outlines Strike Donations Policy, 11 United Auto-
mobile Worker, December 1945, p. 2. 
50George F. Addes, "DuPont Interests Block Settlement of GM Strike." 
United Automobile Worker, March 1946, p. 7. 
51Reuther, Letter to All GM Local Unions, 24 January 1946. See also 
"GM Yearns for Old Days of No Union, Open Shop," United Automobile Worker, 
December 1945, p. 3, "Letter," United Automobile Worker, p. 1 and 8; 
"Highlights," United Automobile Worker, p. 4-5 and Walter P. Reuther, 
Letter to All Organized Labor, 30 January 1946, R. J. Thomas Collection, 
Box 8, Folder: GM Dispute 1945-46, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs. 
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GM's refusal to negotiate with the facts and its decision to withstand 
the union's strike "proved" that GM preferred industrial warfare to 
collective bargaining, because the only alternative to negotiation 
was force. Thus, the union was in a battle for its survival, a battle 
in which the sacrifices and solidarity of its members became even 
more important. References to battle and battle imagery are frequent 
in this scenario. For example, GM strikers were in the "front-lines 
in the fight of all organized labor • . . 1152 and were fighting an 
"anti-labor offensive. 1153 
The conflict between the UAW and GM as depicted in the intra-union 
rhetoric was never fully resolved. ' The end of the strike was not 
discussed in the official magazine, the United Automobile Worker. 
Newly elected president Walter Reuther only referred to the strike 
as a "bitter struggle. 1154 Even public statements made by the union 
leaders do not resolve this conflict between the UAW and GM. 
The scenario created by intra-union discourse continues the 
"myth of concern" created in 1936. The discourse, however, does not 
focus on the transformation of an auto worker into a union member, 
but rather on e~couraging the union member's continuous commitment to 
the union during the strike. The worker in this scenario already has 
the positive characteristics of union membership, such as pride, self-
5211Strike Donations Policy," Um.ted Automobile Worker, p. 2. 
53Reuther, Letter to All Organized Labor, 30 January 1946. 
5411New President Urges Unity in First Speech," United Automobile 
Worker, April 1946, p. 3. 
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respect and the ability to act. Instead, the discourse emphasizes the 
economic security which workers will have because of their union mem-
bership.55 The standards of economic security frequently change, for 
they are measured by wages on an incremental scale and may increase 
or decrease depending upon economic conditions; therefore, the UAW 
must guard against proposals which would weaken a union member's 
economic security. The relationship between GM and UAW also has 
changed somewhat, for they were no longer battling for the establish-
ment of industrial democracy, but were battling over its continuation. 
The references to physical violence, blood and death that were common 
in the rhetoric of the 1936-1937 strike did not appear, except in one 
isolated instance.56 
Maintaining conunitment of UAW members to the strike and to the 
union was very important because the morale of the members was a 
problem; GM strikers and their families received no money from the 
union for support and depended upon charity and welfare for their 
livelihood. 57 For union members willingly to make the sacrifices 
necessary to continue the strike, members must be committed to the 
5511The Fact-Fin,ding Trend of 'No' Price Increases Can Mean Bright 
Future," United Automobile Worker, January 1946, p. 2. See also Addes, 
DuPont Interests," United Automobile Worker, p. 7 and Reuther, Letter 
to All GM Local Unions, 24 January 1946. 
56Addes, "DuPont Interests," United Automobile Worker, p. 7. 
57 W. Jean Gould and Lorena Hickock, Walter Reuther: Labor's Rugged 
Individualist (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1972) p. 204-232. 
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union and to the goal of economic security. 
The factionalism which divided the UAW until 1947 also increased 
the importance of encouraging commitment. Some union members may have 
felt more loyalty to the Communist Party than to the union. Antagonism 
toward Walter Reuther, who was the principal union decision-maker 
during this strike, could have prevented unified action. If the 
union had not been able to unify itself for this strike, it would have 
indicated that the union was unstable. Such instability would weaken 
the collective bargaining relationship with GM. 
Union rhetors used elements of the union "myth of concern" to 
encourage commitment to the union and its goals and also to augment 
organizational stability. Roles and relationships, if used to elicit 
particular responses from union members, encourage commitment to the 
union. 
There are practical and theoretical bases for the use of these 
devices such as those described by Kanter58 to encourage a particular 
behavior. For example, identification of an enemy 1s one means of 
distinguishing an organization from the rest of the world. Everyone 
either supports the organization or 1s its enemy. Ident1f1cat1on of 
an enemy remains one of the best methods for galvanizing unity within 
58Rosabeth Moss Kanter, "Commitment and Social Organization: A 
Study of Commitment Mechanisms in Utopian Communities," American 
Sociological Review, 33 (August 1968)4, p. 510-516. 
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a divided organization. 59 During the strike, GM is the UAW's enemy. 
However, wiion rhetors needed to distinguish the issues of this strike 
from the day to day conflicts between the UAW and GM since the strike 
of 193~-1937, in order to Justify the extra sacrifices which union 
members had to make during the strike and to counteract the political 
factionalism within the UAW. Union rhetors chose to make this strike 
a battle for the survival of the UAW, for all organized labor and for 
New Deal policies in general. The UAW was battling reactionary forces 
which wished to return America to the politics which le4 to the 
Depression. This characterization of the union's immediate relation-
ship'with GM explained and Justified the sacrifices of the wiion members 
and identifies a common goal for which all union members can work--
survival. 
Cognitive dissonance theory helps to explain how the norm of 
sa~rifice may intensify a wiion member's commitment to the UAW. The 
wiion member already has made the initial commitment to the wiion, 
because it provides a means for attaining a positive identity as well 
as future Job and economic security. However, when the union goes on 
strike, the union member's immediate JOb and economic security is 
threatened, because the member sacrifices her or his wages for the 
duration of the strike and works for the union without pay. Striking 
is in a dissonant relationship with the member's goal of economic 
59Lewis Coser, The Fwictions of Social Conflict (New York: The 
Free Press, 1956) p. "I4o. 
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security. Cognitive dissonance theorist Leon Festinger argues that 
"[t]he existence of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, 
will motivate the person to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve 
consonance. . [IJn addition to trying to reduce it, the person 
will actively avoid situations and information which would likely 
increase the dissonance. 1160 
Cognitive dissonance theory describes the internal conflict 
which a person experienc~s after he or she makes a decision. In this 
particular instance, it is a conflict which occurs after the worker is 
a union member and when he or she is required to go on strike, which is 
inconsistent with an important motivation for joining the union--economic 
security. There are four possible ways a union member,might rationalize 
this conflict and resolve the dissonance. 1) The union member may 
experience an increase in the perceived attractiveness of union member-
ship which decreases,the importance of the dissonance. 2) The union 
member may experience a decrease in the perceived attractiveness of not 
being a union member which also decreases the importance of dissonance. 
3) The union member may choose to become a non-union worker which is 
a behavior change to reduce dissonance. 4) The union member may perceive 
no difference in being or not being a union member, which is the discovery 
of new information which reconciles the dissonance, such as realizing 
61 that union picket lines would prevent her or him from working anyway. 
60 Leon Festing6r, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston, Ill.: 
Row, Peterson and Co., 1957) p. 3. 
61Festinger, Cognitive Dissonance, p. 19-23. 
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Obviously responses 1 and 2 are the ones which union rhetors 
desire members to make. If a member selects one of these responses, 
he or she is resolving the dissonance by intensifying her or his 
connnitment to the union (I will support the strike for increased 
wages and go without wages for as long as it is necessary, because 
without the Union I would have no future Job or economic security). 
This is similar to the process Festinger describes in his study of a 
movement which predicted the destruction of the world. 
If one really believes a prediction (the first con-
dition), for example, that on a given date the world 
will be destroyed by fire, with sinners being destroyed 
and the good being saved, one does things about it and 
makes certain preparations as a matter of course. 
These actions may range all the way from simple public 
declarations to the neglect of worldly things and the 
disposal of earthly possessions. Through such actions 
and through the mocking and scoffing of nonbelievers 
there is usually established a heavy connnitment on 
the part of believers. What they do by way of prepara-
tion is difficult to undo, and the Jeering of non-
believers simply makes it far more difficult for the 
adherents to withdraw from the movement and admit that 
they were wrong.62 
If a union member believes that unions are necessary for workers, then 
he or she also much believe in the use of strikes to gain negotiating 
power for unions. Strikes, however, require sacrifices, lost wages 
which are never, regained. The union member resolves this dissonance 
by rationalizing that the employer will not grant a wage increase 
which would be as high as the wage increase that the union would win. 
This logic increases the member's commitment to the union. 
62 Leon Festinger, Henry W. Riecken and Stan~ey Schachter, When 
Prophecy Fails, Harper Torchbooks edn. (New York: Harper and Row, 1956) 
p. 5. 
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When a larger sacrifice is requested by the union, members who 
make that sacrifice will rationalize making it be increasing the 
importance of the union in their lives (without the union I would 
become a wage slave, with management increasing my hours and cutting 
my wages); however, some union members will choose alternatives .3 or 
4, which would decrease the member's commitment to the union. 
Sacrifice is the often unstated norm which underlies much of the 
imagery and arguments of the rhetoric of the 1945-1946 strike. The 
strike itself requires an immediate sacrifice for future wage increases 
and economic security. "It is a long time to go without a payday and 
all credit due these workers and their families for the spirit and 
determination with which they fight £!!.· 1163 The strike its elf is a 
device for encouraging sacrifice and, hence, commitment. However, this 
particular strike requires even greater sacrifice, and thus results 
in greater commitment, because UAW members are fighting for all 
Americans for "an economy of full production, full employment and full 
consumption. 1164 and for all organized labor by "fighting against 
a conspiracy by Big Industry to destroy organized labor and wipe out 
every social and economic gain we have made since the first Roosevelt 
63Addes, "A Union's Greatest Asset," United Automobile Worker, 
p. l; "Highlights," Um.ted Automobile Worker, p. 4-5 and Reuther, 
Letter to All GM Local Unions, 24 January 1946. 
6411 Letter to All UAW-CIO Local Unions," United Automobile Worker, 
p. 1; "Highlight,s," United Automobile Worker, p. 4-5 and Reuther, Letter 
to All GM Local Unions, 24 January 1946. 
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administration."65 These great sacrifices are necessary because of 
GM's attack on the American public and organized labor a~d because the 
UAW is the only union which can stand up to and defeat GM; hence, the 
UAW deserves its members' loyalty and support. 
By using Mead's notions about the development of self to analyze 
this rhetoric, one can deduce that union rhetors are developing and 
expanding the role of um.on member or the "me" aspect of a union 
member's self. The discourse emphasizes characteristics a union member 
should have which aid the union's fight against GM. Union members 
are American, loyal to the union and willing to sacrifice. The union 
member has the courage to fight for all Americans and for all of 
organized labor, despite the strength and power of GM, and is determined 
enough and tough enough to win this strike. 66 
Mead recognizes that the "me" functions as a form of social control 
over an individual's behavior, by limiting the alternatives for behavior 
in a given situation. 67 When a union rhetor describes the union member 
65Reuther, Letter to All GM Local Unions, 24 January 1946. See 
also "Strike Strategy Board," United Automobile Worker, p. 4-5 and R. J. 
Thomas, "President's Column: Any Decision Important," United Automobile 
Worker, January 1946, p. 4. 
66see for examples: Addes, "Union's Greatest Asset," United 
Automobile Worker, p. 7; "Letter to All UAW-CIC Local Un1ons, 11 United 
Automobile Worker, p. 1 and 8; "Strike Strategy Board, 11 United 
Automobile Worker, p. 2 and 11 NLRB Charge,s, '' United Automobile Worker, 
p. 1 and 8. 
67George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Vol. 1 of Works 
of George Herbert Mead, Charles W. Morrised. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1934) p. 210-211. 
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as courageous, loyal to the union and sacrificing, these are the accept-
able behaviors for the union member. Social co~trol is accomplished 
through a process of self-criticis~ in which the rndividual criti~ally 
compares her or his behavior to the group's standards of behavior. 68 
The social control function of the "me" aspect of self, however, 
does not result in every union member behaving in exactly the same 
manner. The uniqueness of individual response is still asserted 
through the "I." For example, an individual union member recognizes 
the importance of the norm of sacrifice, because the member has internal-
ized the attitudes of the union community about what a good union member 
should do. The individual union member compares her or his behavior 
to that of the community's model of behavior, the role of union member, 
and discovers that her or his conduct does not meet the norm of 
sacrifice. This is the internal process of self-criticism. How an 
individual chooses to operationalize this norm is determined by the 
creative aspect of self, the "I.'' The normal situation, however, is 
one which involves a reaction of the individual in a situation which 
is socially determined, but to which he brings his own responses as 
an 'I.' The response 1s, in the experience of the individual, an 
expression with which the self is ,identified. 1169 An individual um.on 
member may choose to sacrifice by making a special contribution to the 
union or by volunteering for extra strike duty. 
68 Mead, Mind, Self and Society, p. 255. 
69Mead, Mind, Self and Society, p. 211. 
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In Mead's terminology, an institution has arisen for the union 
members, "an organization of attitudes which we all carry in us, the 
, 70 organized attitudes of others that control and determine conduct." 
This institution has advantages for union members, for leaders and even 
for GM. For the union member her or his experience is explained by a 
"myth of concern" in a sensible and reasonable manner. An individual 
finds a goal for her or his behavior or at least a satisfying justifi-
cation for behavior. For leaders of the union and for GM the advantage 
of this institution is predictability and stability. The role of union 
member makes the union membership's behavior predictable, by limiting 
the alternatives of acceptable behavior. This is important to the union 
leader, because he or she is an elected official who is dependent on 
the support of rank and file union members to keep her or his position. 71 
If the union leader makes a decision which is unpopular among the mem-
bership, her or his leadership position may be threatened as the rank 
and file withdraw their support. The beliefs and expectations which 
are part of the role of union member provide the union leader with a 
guide to what the membership will support. In short, the role of union 
member limits the behavior of others who want the loyalty and support 
of the union member and, thus, stabilizes the relationship between the 
membership and the leaders. The union leader may not like to make the 
decisions which the membership expects a leader to make, but at least 
70Mead, Mind, Self and Society, p.' 211. 
71c. Wright Mills, "The Labor Leaders and the Power Elite," 1n 
Arthur Kornhauser, Robert Dubin and Arthur M. Ross eds., Industrial 
Conflict (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954) p. 148. 
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the union leader has an indication of what the response of the member-
ship will be when he or she makes a decision. 
This predictability and stability also is advantageous to GM. 
GM officials can expect a particular type of behavior in a certain 
situation, but more important to the corporation is the fact that all 
union members behave in a similar manner. GM does not have to negotiate 
with several small groups of workers, each with a different idea of 
what a union should be and how a union member should act. Because 
the UAW "myth of concern" limits acceptable behavior and because most 
auto workers are members of the union, GM can focus its efforts on 
a stable relationship with one union, rather than scattering its efforts 
among several different groups of workers, all of which want something 
slightly different from GM. Since less corporate time and money is 
spent on union-management relations, GM officials can put them to 
use elsewhere. 
By analyzing the role of union member and by identifying the 
logical outcome of that role, the social control of the union member 
through rules of behavior, one can begin to see that the role of union 
member can become as rigid and as limiting as the role of wage slave, 
which the former role replaced in 1936. This is implied when Mead 
equates "me," the role of union member, with an institution. 72 The 
"I" functions to prevent this rigidity by slowing changing the "me." 
Robert Merton discusses a similar process of change in his theory 
of structural functionalism, when he discusses bureaucratic structure. 
72Mead, Mind, Self and Society, p. 211. 
From the functional analysis of bureaucratic 
structure, it is clear, that, under determinate 
conditions, conformity to regulations can be 
dysfunctional both for realizing the obJectives of 
the structure and for various groups in the society 
which the bureaucracy is intended to serve. Re-
gulations are in such cases applied even when the 
circumstances which initially made them functional 
and effective have so materially changed that con-
formity to the rule defeats its purpose. 7j 
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A bureaucratic structure may be so dysfunctional that an individual or 
group may seek to change it through rebellion, but implicit in that 
rebellion is a new bureaucratic structure and future rebellion. 74 
Similarly, a role may be so dysfunctional that the "I" 1n an individual's 
self cannot be expressed. The individual rebels by creating a new role 
in a new "myth of concern;" yet implicit in' that new role 1.s the 
rigidity of the old one. When a rhetor creates a new role, the rhetor 
also creates a role which will not fit the needs of the group at some 
future time. A pattern of continually changing roles and "myths of 
concern" appears. Mead recognized that this change exists and con-
sidered it crucial to the improvement of the human condition, but also 
- 75 considered it a means for human degradation. 
If the role of union member 1n the union "myth of concern" becomes 
so rigid that the "I" in a member's self cannot act comfortably within 
the limitations set by the "me," then the entire "myth of concern" 
73Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, revised 
and enlarged edn. (New York: The Free Press, 1957) p. 123-124. 
74Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, p. 140n. 
75M~ad, Mind, Self and Society, p. 216-218. 
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loses its validity for the union member, because it no longer sensibly 
explains reality and no longer provides effective models for conduct. 
The union member may become willing to believe a new "myth of concern" 
if the roles of union member restricts behavior too severely. 
VI. Summary 
Tendencies toward institutionalization of conflict are not very 
obvious at this stage of the UAW-GM relationship. Symbolically, the 
strike is a battle to UAW members. The strike is not seen as less 
intense than the 1936-1937 strike, for the issue remains union survival. 
Internal factionalism in the UAW prevented the qevelopment of a bureau-
cratic organization which is a sign of institutionalization and, thus, 
could not be detected in the discourse. 
The rhetoric of the 1945-1946 strike, however, did show some 
signs of institutionalization. Union rhetors tried to encourage the 
commitment of average union members to the union, to aid organizational 
stability and permanency. It is evident that the devices which 
encourage and maintain comm1 tment are interdependent. Norms wlnch en-
courage commitment and limit the alternatives for appropriate behavior 
are part of the role of union member. Norms of behavior such as 
sacrifice, which help create loyalty to the union can be encouraged 
when rhetors place the union in a conflict for its survival against GM. 
r 
This conflict intensifies the differences between the UAW and GM and 
demonstrates the necessity of union membership for the average auto 
worker in the industrial community. A rhetor may use a dramatic 
scenario to synthesize these elements and to make them memorable and 
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realistic for the union audience. This "myth of concern11 dramatically 
explains the reality of industrial experience for the auto worker. 
The roles and norms of the union "myth of concern" limit a 
member's alternatives for behavior. This social control function 1s 
an important sign of the process of institutionalization. Because the 
conflict between the UAW and GM is symbolically as intense as it 
was in 1936-1937 and because there is little or no evidence of bureauc-
' 
racy in the UAW's organizational structure, the social control function 
of the rhetoric is an important indication of the institutionalization 
of industrial conflict. 
Chapter Six 
QUIET DETERMINATION AND THE BATTLE OF PRINCIPLE 
THE 1970 STRIKE 
In 1970 the UAW was a different organization than it had been 
in 1945. The factionalism which hindered the union's development into 
a bureaucratic organization was gone. When Walter Reuther was re-
elected president of the UAW in 1947 and when his coalition's candidates 
also were elected to the remaining union offices, the UAW was united 
internally for the first time. 1 Reuther removed any organized opposi-
tion to his policies within the UAi'{ by removing all Communists from 
? 
their appointed offices. - The result was to make the UAW a one-party 
union. 3 The removal of organized opposition is indicative of bureau-
cratic tendencies that exist in all unions. 4 The UAW is considered 
lvictor Reuther, The Brothers Reuther and the Story of the UAW/ A 
Memoir (Boston. Houghton Mifflin, 1976) p. 266.--
2William Serrin, The Comuany and the Union: The "Ci villzed 
Relationship" of the General 11otors Corporation and the United Automobile 
Workers (new York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973) p. 141 and Irving Howe~and 
B. J. 1¥idick, UAW and Walter Reuther (New York. Random douse, 1949) 
p. 79. 
JPaul Jacobs, Old 3efore Its Time Collective 0argain1ng at 28 
(Santa Barbara, CA: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 
1963) p. 9-16 and 45-46 in Max S. Wortman, .Jr. ed., Cn ti cal Issues in 
Labor (New York: Mac~hllan, 1969) p. 62. 
4see Seymour Martin Lips et, 11The Poli ti cal Process in Trade Unions: 
A Theoretical Statement," in Monroe Berger, Theodore Abel and Charles H. 
Page, eds. Freedom and Control 1n Modern Society (New York: Octagon 
Books, 1964) p. 82-124. 
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one of the most democrati'c unions in the U.S.; yet, it also exhibits 
'bureaucratic and oligarchic tendencies. For example, the international 
uruon convention 1s the most powerful decisi~n-maker in the UAW. 5 
Through delegates, rank and file union members have an opportunity 
to reJect or to accept proposals made by the International Executive 
Board Officers (president, vice-presidents,and secretary-treasurer) 
and general staff. When a convention is not in session, the Interna-
tional Executive Board is the most powerful decision-maker. In 1951, 
the Reuther administration succeeded in passing a proposal which re-
quired that conventions be held biennially instead of annually which 
made rank and file control of the executive board more difficult. 6 
This change also produced greater stability in the union administration and 
greater control by the union administration over the rank and file. 
Bureaucratic organization fulfilled the need for union permanency 
and discipline as the conflict between management and unions became 
institutionalized. The resources of the µnion are used to maintain 
the organization--i.e., retain members, insure a stable administration 
and insure efficient administration of the collective bargaining con-
tract. The bureaucratic structure of unions exhibits Robert Michels' 
"iron law of oligarchy," which states that organizations evolve a 
structure in which there is a minority of directors and a maJority of 
,followers. Democratic as well as totalitarian organizations evolve 
5Jack Stieber, Governing the UAW (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
1962) p. 16. 
6Stieber, Governing the UAW, p. 34-37. 
7 according to this pattern. 
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There are both external and internal pressures for bureaucratic 
organization in unions. The na~ure of the corporation with which the 
union negotiates is the maJor source of external pressure. The UAW 
negotiates with three maJor American corporations. In 1970 GM was 
ranked the second largest industrial corporation by its assets in the 
8 U.S., Ford was ranked fourth and Chrysler was ranked fourteenth. 
To administer a contract for the employees of corporations of this size, 
the UAW must become a large organization which is as permanent and 
stable as the automobile corporations. 
The management of a corporation also may demand "responsible" 
union leadership in return for concessions at the negotiating table. 
This pressure for union responsibility encourages oligarchy. To be 
responsible, union leaders must make sure tha~ all union members abide 
~by the contract and especially make sure that production is not 
interrupted, except when allowed by the contract. To accomplish this, 
union leaders centralize the political power and control of the union. 
For example, the rank and file members' and union locals' right to 
strike is limited by the union leadership. Unless the strike 1s 
approved by the union bureaucracy and/or leadership, union members 
or the union local will not receive financial support to pay for the 
7Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the 
Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul 
(New York: Free Press,1962) p. 70, 
8Thomas R. Dye, "Who's Running America? Institutional Leadership 
the United States (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1976) p. 20. 
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~trike. 9 In the UAW all strikes must be approved by both the national 
negotiating committee for the particular corporation and by the Inter-
national Executive Board.IO Rank and file union members cannot act 
unless the union leadership and bureaucracy say they can • 
. • • [TJhere is a basic conflict between the value 
of democratic unionism and ''responsible" unionism 
which many conservatives and business leaders do not 
recognize at least in their public pronouncements. 
The dictatorial mechanisms found in many unions may 
be regarded as a functional adaptation to management's 
demand that their yielding on union security issues 
must be followed by wiion responsibility. 11 
Efficiency and stability are the internal pressures for bureau-
cratic organization. The union is an administrative organization, for 
it administers a contract. In industries of the size and complexity 
of the auto industry, the problem of administration is aggravated to 
a point that only a small, elite staff has the knowledge and experience 
' 12 to accomplish the administrative tasks. 
The shift of control from the rank and file members to the leaders 
results in a decrease in the participation of the fonner in union 
activities. 
9swnner H. Slichter, James Healy and E. Robert Livernash, The Im-
pact of Collective Bargaining~ Management (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institute, 1960), p. 920. 
10stieber, Governing the UAW, p. 101. 
11Lipset, "Political Process in Trade Unions," Freedom and Control, 
p. 84. 
12Lipset, "Political Process in Trade Unions," Freedom and Control, 
p. 84. 
As control over decisions shift away from the local 
levels, there is a decrease of membership participation, 
and interest in local affairs as they lose importance. 
Similarly, disagreements over policy are increasingly 
limited to conflicts over national policies, knowledge 
about which is limited to members of the bureaucracy 
itself. Thus, conflicts occur more and more as 
administrative fights at international headquarters 
and less as political struggles between groups in the 
locals. The implications of this shift were once 
graphically expressed to a friend of this writer's by 
a steelworker when he said, in explaining his lack of 
interest in the local union: "We don't have a union 
anymore, we have a contract. The economists and 
statisticians negotiate contracts--all we can do is 
vote yes or no to them.1113 
I. The UAW from 1946 to 1970 
147 
The 1950s and 1960s were a time of recruiting new members to the 
union and of expanding the wages and benefits of the average members. 
The UAW expanded to include workers in the agricultural implement 
14 and aircraft i~dustries, as well as white collar workers at Chrysler. 
In the 1948 negotiations with GM, GM president C. E. Wilson proposed 
that an unlimited cost of living allowance be included in the contract 
to help stabilize autoworkers' wages. 
' 15 The UAW accepted the proposal. 
First at Ford and later at Chrysler and GM, the UAW negotiated the 
supplemental employment benefit (SUB) program, which assured auto 
workers of a substantial portion of their regular wages during periods 
of slow production and layoffs for model changes. The SUB payment was 
13 Lipset, "Politicl:}l 'Process in Trade Unions," Freedom and Control, 
p. 86-87. 
14UAW Solidarity, 
,the Um.on, p. 35-36. 
13 May 1977 p. 33 and Serrin, Company and 
15serr1n, Company- and the Union, p. 20. 
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combined with an unemployment compensation payment to provide workers 
with enough money to maintain their standard of living during periods 
16 when they could not work. In 1961, the UAW successfully negotiated 
that the employer would pay the entire health and medical ins4rance 
premium to auto workers. In 1964, the union negotiated an early retire-
ment program. 17 In 1967, the union negotiated an increase for the SUB 
program so that combined SUB payments and unemployment compensation 
equaled 95 percent of a worker's take-home pay. Skilled tradesmen in 
the auto plants also received a wage increase which was higher than the 
increase for production workers; however, in exchange for these gains 
the UAW gave up its unlimited cost of living allowance. 18 
What is interesting to note is that none of these new programs 
I 
or benefits, with the exception of the cost of living allowance which 
GM gave to the UAW, was first negotiated at GM. "In 1955, the union 
and the companies had entered into a gentlemen's agreement in which 
the companies that were not struck matched the agreement worked out 
19 at the target company." When the UAW would win a strike at Ford 
16Reuther, Brothers Reuther, p. 316-318. 
I 
17UAW Solidarity,' 13 May 1977, p. 34. 
18UAW Solidarity, 13 May 1977, p. 34 and Serrin, Company 
and the Union, p. 7. 
19S . d errin, Company!!!_ the Um.on, p. 18. 
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or Chrysler, GM signed a contract similar to the contract with Ford or 
Chrysler. This arrangement was to the UAW's benefit, because 1n the 
1945-1946 strike the UAW learned that it was very difficult to win 
their proposals by striking GM and that it was easier to strike Ford 
or Chrysler to force concessions at the negotiating table. As one UAW 
official, Emil Mazey, put it, "It 1.s better to make the most possible 
progress with the least suffering. That is, if you can push 
around a Chrysler Corporation, that is the thing you ought to do; 
instead of tackling a GM, which may not give you as much and may result 
in a long struggle. 1120 
At first glance the events leading up to the 1970 strike appear 
similar to those leading up to the 1945-1946 strike. "Both times the 
country had been waging war for several years. Both times price in-
creases had raced past wage gains."21 The 1970 strike, however, was 
different. First, forty percent of the UAW's members were under thirty 
in 1970. The values of these young union members were very different 
from those of the older members. The latter remembered the Depression 
and what it was like without a union, while the former had always had 
22 the benefits of union membership while they worked. Unions were 
losing their image of fighting for the average-worker against manage-
ment. A survey taken in 1968 indicated that the attitudes of "lower-
20serrin, Company and the Union, p. 18. 
21 . Company and the Union, 157. Serrin, p. 
22 Serrin, Company and the Union, p. 13. 
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middle-class blue collar" white workers toward unions and business were 
almost identical. Fifty-five percent of those surveyed had a favorable 
attitude towards unions, 52 percent were favorable to business, 27 percent 
were neutral to unions, 31 percent were neutral to business, 14 
percent were unfavorable to union, 15 percent were unfavorable to 
business with the remainder comprising·"other responses." 23 Black 
auto workers' attitudes toward the unions and business probably were 
more unfavorable to both. Blacks worked primarily on the assembly 
line, often in the least desirable and lowest paid jobs. In 1970 few 
blacks were foremen or skilled tr~desmen. 24 Second, the UAl1 had not 
'called a national strike against GM since 1945. There was growing 
, pressure among rank and file union members to strike GM, because it 
appeared that the UAW was afraid of GM. If the UAW leadership did not 
support a strike against GM, rank and file members could retaliate 
by withdrawing their support from the leadership's proposals or by 
voting the leaders out of office. Third, the rank and file wanted the 
UAW to win back the cost of living allowance which Walter Reuther, 
president of the UAW, negotiated away in exchange for higher wages 
for skilled tradesmen during the 1967 negotiations wit,h Ford. Union 
members wanted to win this escalator back, and they wanted to win it 
back from GM. 25 Reuther endorsed the union demands to be negotiated. 
The 1970 demands for negotiations contained the greatest number of 
23Howard L. Reiter, "Blue-collar Workers and the Future of American 
Politics," in ~-Collar Workers: A Symposium~ Middle America, Sar. 
A. Levitan ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971) p. 106-107. 
24serrin, Company and the Union, p. 234-235. 
25serrin, Company and the Union, p. 19 and 7. 
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demands ever proposed by the UAW. This left the union with little 
flexibility in negotiations that year. 26 
GM put the UAW on notice early in 1970 that the corporation was 
27 going to be tough in negotiations that year, tougher than ever before. 
It' looked as if there would be a strike as long and as bitter as that 
of 1945-1946. The sudden death of Reuther in a plane crash six weeks 
before negotiations began changed the climate for negotiations. 
Reuther's death was a crisis for the union because he had been president 
for 25 years. To some workers Reuther not only represented the UAW, 
he was the UAW. "With Reuther dead, there was no one with the clout 
to go to the workers--as slim as the possibilities for approval would 
I 
have been even had Reuther been alive--and say,'This is a fine settle-
ment; let us accept it. There is no need for a strike. 11128 
This was the situation which Leonard Woodock faced when he was 
elected president of the UAW by a 13 to 12 vote of the executive board. 
Woodcock was left with, little room to maneuver in negotiations, 
because of the absence of unanimous support within the union adminis-
tration as well as his lack of credibility with the rank and file union 
members. A strike against GM would solve many of his problems. First, 
a strike would unify the older and younger members, because they would 
be striking together against a common enemy who threatened their 
26S . errin, Company and the Union, p. 22. 
27 Company and the Union, 10-12. Serrin, p. 
28serrin , Company and the Union, p. 22. 
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economic securfty. The younger members also would be taught that 
sacrifices must be made to enable the union to win economic security. 
Second, a strike against GM would prove that the union was not afraid 
of GM. Third, winning the cost of living allowance back from GM 
would be proof of the UAW's strength. Woodcock realized that he had 
to prove himself to the membership to create a strong constituency 
to support him. "Woodcock became president, and he felt pressure--
pressure from the rank and file, pres~ure to create an image of the 
union as a strong institution, pressure to prove himself, to purge the 
memory of Reuther and at the same time honor it--to strike General 
Motors. 1129 
II. The 1970 Strike 
The strike itself lasted 67 days, from September 15 to November 20. 30 
It ended just before the union's strike fund ran out pf money. The 
strike fund was used to provid~ strikers and their families with small 
amounts of cash, $30 to $40 a week, to buy food. 31 The UAW did have 
a special convention on October 24 in Detroit, to vote on an increase 
in dues so the union could continue paying strike benefits, if the 
strike should last until sometime in December. 32 
29s . errin, Company and the Union, p. 22. 
30s errin, Company and the Union, p. 285. 
31serrin, Company and the Union, p. 202 and 187. 
325 . errin, Companr_ and the Union, p. 201-202 and 297. 
153 
During the strike one can see evidence of an institutionalized 
conflict and of bureaucratic organization. For example, the closing 
of GM plants during the strike cost the,corporation approximately 
$1 billion or more in profits; 33 although not all GM plants were 
' I 
closed during the strike. Fifteen plants which manufactured parts 
sold to Ford, Chrysler and American Motors remained open. 34 In 
contrast, during the 1945-1946 strike, when UAW president R. J. Thomas 
suggested that GM keep its parts plants open so that companies using 
GM parts could continue operation, the rank and file opposition to 
the suggestion caused Thomas to deny that he ever made it. 35 
Most of the activity during the strike occurred at the negotiating 
table, where bureaucratic and oligarchic relationships between 
negotiators are evident. The UAW negotiating team is composed of 30 
persons, twelve of whom are elected from regions to represent the 
workers directly at the negotiating table. 36 After the special 
convention on October 24, Woodcock and Irving Bluestone, the head of 
the GM Department in the UAW, suggested that the size of the bargaining 
commi~tee be reduced to only the top union officers and union staff 
33serrin, Company and the Union, p. 296. 
34serrin, Company and the Union, p. 186. 
35New York Times, 2 December 1945, p. l; New York Times, 
3 December 1945, p. 1 and~ York Times, 4 December 1945, p. 1. 
36 
Serrin, Company and the Union, p. 211. 
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to speed up negotiations. One observer of the UAW argues that the 
elected negotiators are used only as sounding boards of rank and file 
sentiment by top union officials and union staff and to give the 
appearance of democracy. 37 What is apparent is that when crucial 
decisions are made, the representatives of the rank and file'union 
members are excluded. 
A labor scholar says that when negotiations enter 
the critical phase, the committee members are 
excluded because "nobody wants them around, and I 
mean nobody, nobody on either side. You could 
never close the door and say "This is important' 
and 'This isn't important.' Or 'We want this but 
we don't want this.' The elected guys would kick 
and raise hell. 1 Why, if the committee knew what went 
on in these sessions, they'd be surprised as hell. 
They'd say, 'Who the hell gave you guys the right to 
drop anything?' If the committee was there, Oh, God, 
they'd die.""8 
III. Non-offers and Private Negotiations--The Public Rhetoric 
The rhetoric addressed to the Public in 1970 both before and 
J 
during the strike generally is addressed to a small, select group of 
people--Journalists. This results in a two-step process of 
communication. Statements are addressed to journalists, who function 
as intermediaries between UAW rhetors and the public. Journalists 
provided the public with their descriptions of the UAW positions during 
the strike and with descriptions of the participants--i.e. Leonard 
Woodcock and "typical" auto workers. UAW officials did not wr1. te 
articles for national magazines which presented the UAW positions 
37serrin, Company and the Union, p. 212. 
38serrin , Company and the Union, p. 213-214. 
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to the public, as Walter Reuther did with his articles 1n The Nation 
and the New Republic during the 1945-1946 strike. To analyze the public 
rhetoric of the UAW during the 1970 strike, one must turn to tran-
scripts of press conferences and of one broadcast of "Meet The Press, 11 
a television program,on which Leonarq Woodcock was questioned by 
journalists. 39 No speeches and pamphlets were found for analysis. 40 
However, if a scenario does exist from which UAW rhetors draw their 
imagery, a critic should be able to discern it in the available dis-
course. I shall argue that such a matrix of roles and relationships 
does exist in the public UAW rhetoric. The following is the scenario 
which I have recreated from the discourse. 
Because the "monstrous monopoly" GM dominates the automobile 
industry, it also dominates negotiations of all auto manufacturers 
with the uAw. 41 GM presented the UAW with an offer that actually is 
39see for examples of the journalists' perspective of the strike 
"Issues of Strike at G.M. 11 New York Times, 16 September 1970, p. 26; 
William Serrin "The Unknown Who Leads 'The Walter P. Reuther Memorial 
Strike, 111 The New York Times Magazine, 27 September 1970, p. 28-29, 
104-109 and "GM' s Strike Is Not Just a GE Rerun, 11 Business Week, 24 
October 1970, p. 31. 
40The Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, which holds the 
official library of the UAW, does not allow public inspection of internal 
union papers until twenty years after the fact. It is possible that a 
copy of a speech or pamphlet is in a closed file. 
41 Leonard Woodcock, Press Conference at Veterans Memorial Bldg., 
2 September 1970, p. 1 and Leonard Woodcock, Press Conference Announcing 
General Motors as Strike Target for 1970, 13 September 1970, p. 1. 
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a "fraud" or a "non offer, 1142 while the UAW presented concrete 
proposals. These proposals include the re-establishment of the cost 
of living allowance, early retirement for workers who had worked for 
GM for thirty or more years, known as "Thirty and qut, 11 and improve-
ment in the financing of the SUB program. 43 The UAW was willing to 
strike to make these gains, even if it took an "old fashioned strike" 
44 without the union paying strike benefits to strikers; however, a 
strike was not inevitable if GM was willing to negotiate. 45 The 
negotiations were private, with no public discussion of proposals 
made by either party. 46 Because of GM's unwillingness to negotiate 
and despite its legal and moral obligation to do so, a strike became 
. . bl 4.7 inevita e. 
Union members were "disciplined" and expected to sacrifice during 
42 Meet The Press, Moderator Bill Monroe, Prod. Lawrence E. Spivak, 
6 September 1970, p. 3. 
43Meet The Press, p. 7-8; Leonard Woodcock, Press Conference, 
13 September 1970, p. 1 and 3. 
44Meet The Press, p. 8 and Leonard Woodcock, Press Conference, 
2 September 1970, p. 2. 
45Leonard Woodcock, Press Conference, 2 September 1970, p. 9. 
46Meet The Press, pp. 3-5 and 9. 
47 Leonard Woodcock, Press Conf~rence, 13 September 1970, 
p. 1-2. 
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this strike, 48 because the strike was a battle 'to gain principles. 49 
Throughout the strike, union leaders were realistic about the problems 
wh1ch they faced, such as the strike fund running out of money.so 
The final settle~ent which ended the strike was "substantial 
progress" for the union. 51 The union was a better union for going 
through this strike. There was "no animosity in the hearts of this 
leadership against the General Motors Corporation" at the end of the 
strike. 52 
Like the rhetoric of the 1945-1946 strike, the public discourse 
emphasizes the characterizations of GM and of the UAW rather than.the 
issues involved, but there is an important difference. In 1945, the 
UAW asked the public to make a forensic decision based on past conduct 
rather than make a deliberative decision based on the expediency of 
future conduct, because GM refused to support its arguments against 
the UAW proposal with economic facts. The UAW rhetors tried to increase 
the public's awareness of the issues o~ the strike by making state-
ments in newspapers and magazines. In 1970, however, the public's 
I 
Judgment must be based on past conduct because negotiations are 
48Leona~d Woodcock, Press Conference, 13 September 1970, p. 4 and 
Leonard Woodcock, Press Conference, UAW Special Convention, Cobo Hall, 
Detroit Michigan, 24 October 1970, p. 1. 1 
\ 
49 Leonard Woodcock, Press Conference after GM Council Approval of 
Settlement, 12 November 1970, p. 9. 
50Leonard 1Woodcock, Press Conference, 24 October 1970, p. 4. 
51Leonard Woodcock, Pres~ Conference, 12 November 1970, p. 1. 
-
52 Leonard Woodcoek, Press Conference, 12 November 1970, p. 9. 
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private and, more importantly, because both parties want private 
negotiations. "We do not want to bargain in the press and we are not 
going to make these fliegotiation,il public, so that there can be a free 
interchange.1153 . When Woodcock was asked what the UAW's position was 
during negotiations, his response was--"My job and the job of my 
associates is to bargain with the General Motors Corporation and the 
Chrysler Corporation and the Ford Motor Company and not with this very 
I 
estimable panel. You can't settle our problems. 1154 Neither GM nor 
the UAW wanted public involvement in the negotiations. 
The language used for the resolution of an institutionalized 
conflict is the language of bargaining, as described by Murray Edelman. 
The bargainer .•• offers a deal, not an appeal. 
A public reaction is to be avoided, not sought. A 
decision is to be made through an exchange of quid 
pro quos, not through a rational structuring of 
premises so as to maximize, or safisfice {jisif 
values. It is a prerequisite to baS~aining that 
values be incompatible, not shared. 
The privacy of negotiations promotes the free interchange of proposals 
which Woodcock wished to preserve and restricts the bargaining to those 
parties with bargaining power. If for some reason the collective bar-
53 , Meet The Press, p. 9. 
54 Meet The Press, p. 11. 
55Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics 
and Welfare (New York, 1953, Chaps. 10 and 11) cited in Murray Edelman, 
The Symbolic~ of Politics (1964; rpt. Urbana, Ill." University of 
Illinois Press, 1976) p. 146. 
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gaining process breaks down, as it did in 1945 when GM refused to 
respond to the UAW's arguments, GM or UAW rhetors would use discourse 
to encourage public acceptance and support for their respective 
positions. For Edelman this requires the use of "horatory" language 
which is addressed to the general public. Rhetors would encourage 
public participation in the conflict. "The key meanings are popular 
participation and rationality. Regardless of the specific issue 
discussed, the employment of this language style is accepted as evidence 
that the public has an important stake and role in political discussions 
and that reason and the citing of relevant information is the road to 
discovering the nature of the stake.t156 As the conflict becomes more 
institutionalized and, consequently, less disruptive for the society, 
the language actually used to resolved the conflict is not addressed 
to a public audience, but is addressed to private bargainers. 
The 1970 scenario is much less memorable and dramatic than the 
1945-1946 scenario. The lines of conflict between GM and the UAW are 
not as neatly drawn as they were in 1945. Gone are the battles for 
the American consumer and for all organized labor. In 1970, GM 
refused to negotiate by presenting "non offers," which did not con-
tain the programs which the UAW wanted- in the new contract, while in 
1945 GM essentially withdrew from negotiations. The 1970 strike is a 
private dispute in which the public is not really involved and to 
which it is not welcome. 
56 
Edelman, Symbolic Uses of Politics, p. 135. 
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The changes in the characterization of the UAW are interesting. 
For the first time the rhetoric distinguishes between the feelings of 
the leadership and of the rank and file towards GM. For example, 
according to Leonard Woodcock, GM workers have more reason to dislike 
their employer than do Ford or Chrysler workers. 
I suppose the reason really was that the GM delegates 
would like to 'have at them'--they don't like the 
General Motors Corp. and they have good reason not 
to like the GM Corp.--and that dislike can very readily 
be translated into a long and bitter struggle 57 
Woodcock: Well, I think it's a fair thing to say that 
GM worke~s dislike their employer far more 
than Chrysler workers dislike their employer 
or Ford workers dislike their employer. 
Question: Why is that? 
Woodcock: Because they're so goddam arrogant--that's 
why.58 
In contrast, Woodcock characterizes the UAW leadership as not feeling 
anomosity towards GM. 
There is no animosity in the hearts of this leader-
ship against the General Motors Corporation. There 
is certainly.no animosity in us personally against 
any of the executives of the General Motors Corpora-
tion. I have a high regard for them but there are 
times when the policies that are followed we have 
to fight and we have to resist. 59 
57Leonard Woodcock, Press Conference, 2 September 1970, p. 4. 
581eonard Woodcock, Press Conference, 2 September 1970, p. 6. 
59Leonard Woodcock, Press Conference, 12 November 1970, p. 9. 
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The changes between the 1945-1946 and 1970 scenario indicate 
that the conflict between the UAW and GM has become institutionalized. 
This institutionalization 'withdraws the conflict from the public view, 
so that the two parties may resolve it between themselves. The con-
flict is limited because both parties recognize that for their own 
survival, they must rise above their differences and find a common 
ground for periodic resolution of those differences. They must con-
sider obJectively what they will win or lose during a strike. 
As the strike has become "institutionalized" in 
recent decades, most of the violence and much of 
the excitement have disappeared. The strike is no 
longer an improvident emotional outburst nor a 
pitched battle between opposing armies intent on 
gaining unconditional surrender but rather a cold-
blooded and hardheaded bargaining maneuver conducted 
by professional negotiators.60 
IV. The Leaders and the Followers--The Intra-Union Rhetoric 
The distinction made between union leaders and rank and file union 
members in the UAW rhetoric directed towards the public becomes more 
pronounced in intra-union discourse, which is directed toward two 
different audiences, union leaders and rank and file members. The 
rhetoric directed toward union leaders is found around moments in which 
decisions for the entire UAW are made--the special convention on 
October 24 when delegates voted to raise dues to fund the strike and 
after temporary ratification of the new contract by the GM Council. 
Leonard Woodcock makes both of these speeches to the middle and upper~ 
60Arthur Kornhauser, Robert Dubin and Arthur M. Ross eds., Industrial 
Conflict (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954) p. 12. 
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levels of UAW leadership. These people administer the contract, 
organize union activities and run the union at its various organiza-
tional levels. In contrast, the rhetoric directed to the rank and file 
union members is found in UAW Solidarity, the official magazine of the 
UAW. All dues-paying members of the UAW receive a copy of the magaz~ne, 
whether or not they are active in the union. 61 The rhetoric directed 
towards union leaders contains a scenario which is slightly different 
from the scenario found in the rhetoric directed towards the rank and 
file. I shall describe the scenarios and follow with an analysis 
which compares the roles and relationships of union leaders and of 
rank and file members depicted in each. 
In the scenario found 1n rhetoric addressed to rank and file union 
members, the giant GM gives the UAW no choice but to call a strike 
in 1970, because the union and GM are "far apart on economic matters" 
in negotiations. 62 The UAW leadership tried to avoid the strike, 
but t~e inadequacy of GM's economic offer prevented this. 63 Before 
and during the strike GM tried to weaken a possible agreement by 
61stieber, Governing the UAW, p. 119. 
6211Entire UAW Rises in Support of GM Strikers," UAW Solidar1 ty 
October 1970, p. 3. -
6311Analysis of GM' s Latest Economic Offer," UAW Solidarity, 
October 1970, p. 4. 
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64 , negotiating for a system of "take-aways" which would "raid" benefits 
from workers65 and force the workers to pay for the cost of some 
66 benefits, such as insurance premiwns, which GM previously paid. 
The UAW leadership participated in intense negotiations almost 
~very day throughout the strike, 67 trying to resolve the differences 
. . . f . 68 in a minimum amowit o time. This work of the leadership, combined 
with the "solidarity and dedication of GM workers and their families, 
their willingness to endure the hardship and sacrifice to gain an 
honorable settlement," enabled the UAW to make "solid and substantial 
progress at the bargaining table. 1169 Rank and file members,were 
determined to win equity and justice in the new contract70 and knew 
71 they they might fight to achieve these goals. Rank and file 
6411 GM Seeks to Take Away Worker Gains," UAW' Solidarity, October 
1970, p. 4 and "Pace Quickens in UAW-GM Bargaining," UAW Solidarity, 
November 1970, p. 5. 
6511Pace Quickens," Solidarity, p. 5. 
66 "Pace Quickens," Solidarity, p. 5. 
67 "UAW Support of GM Strikers," UAW Solidarity, October 1970, 
p. 3 and "Pace Quickens," Solidarity, ~S. 
6811UAW Rises in Support of GM Strikers," Solidarity, p. 3. 
69Howard Lipton, "GM Strikers Blaze Victory Trail," UAW Solidarity, 
December 1970, p. 2. 
70 "UAW Support of GM Strikers," Soh.darity, p. 3; Bobbie Barbee and 
Karl Mantyla, "Thoughts on the Picket Lines,'" UAW Solidarity,October 
1970, p. 8, and "Delegates Speak Out on Dues," UAW Solidarity, Dec-
ember 1970 p. 7. 
' 
71Barbee and ~antyla, "Thought on Picket Lines," Solidarity, p. 8. 
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members also participated in a mass_education program, because they 
h d b . k h . h" k 72 a an o ligation to nowt e issues int is stri e. 
In the scenario found in the rhetoric addressed to the union 
leadership, the 1970 strike was part of a continuous fight for which 
\ 
Walter Reuther laid the 
its members and for the 
foundation, 73 in which the union fights for 
74 defenseless. The union was fighting so 
that "we will have protection and security for years into the future. 1175 
Striking members were "soldiers in battle1176 who were fighting the 
77 "monster" GM, who acted "almost as a sovereign government" and who 
had completely abandoned any social responsibility. 78 The UAW was 
striking so that there will be "sanity and reason in the setting of 
wages so that we do not have ever-rising and escalating costs .•. 1179 
and to win principles. 80 All union members were sacrificing and 
72 Bobbie Barbee, "We're Made Aware of Union Spirit, 11 UAW Solidarity, 
November 1970, p. 2. 
73Leonard Woodcock, Speech to UAW S,pecial Convention at Cobo Hall 
in Detroit, Michigan, 24 October 1970, in Leonard Woodcock presidential 
speech series in process, p. 1. 
74Leonard Woodcock, speech before GM Council in Veterans Memorial 
Bldg. 12 November 1970, in Leonard Woodcock presidential speech series 
in process, p. 6. 
75woodcock, Speech to Special Conventionr p. 11-12. 
76woodcock, Speech to GM Council, p. 1. 
77 Speech Special 1 and Woodcock, to Convention, p. 5. 
78woodcock, Speech to Spec,ial Convention, p. 11 
79woodcock, Speech to Special Convention, p. 1. 
80woodcock, Speech to Special Convention, p. 11 and Woodcock, Speech 
to GM Council, p. 1. 
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giving their "solid support" to this strike. 81 
The final settlement which GM and UAW reached, which ended 
th . . k . f . . 1 82 d " 1 · d h t 1s str1 e, was a victory o pr1nc1p es an a soi ac 1evemen 
for this union; 1183 however, the union was not satisfied with the 
b . 11 . b f h · · d · d · 84 agreement, ut w1 accept it ecause o t e gains it i contain. 
' The appearance of the separate roles of union leader and of rank 
and file union member, in contrast to the earlier role of union member, 
indicates that there is' a difference in the importance of these roles 
to the union. Union leaders are decision-makers, while rank,and file 
members are followers. Insofar as the union 1s an agent, the leaders' 
constitute the union because they are actors. This becomes apparent 
in the depiction of negotiations in the rank and file scenario." 
Negotiations "intensify," "stall," "step-up" and "quicken," while 
the union negotiators make "full-scale good-faith efforts to avoid a, 
strike," "propose," "offer" and "demand. 1185 Local union leaders vote 
to raise dues temporarily to cover the costs of the strike so 
81woodcock, Speech to GM Council, p. 2, 3 and 8. 
82woodcock, Speech to GM, p. 4-5. 
83woodcock, Speech to GM Council, p. 7. 
84woodcock, Speech to GM Council, p. 1 and 9. 
l 
8511 UAW Support of GM Strikers," Solidarity, p. 3; "Pace Quickens," 
Solidarity, p. 5 and "It Is Regrettable that a Strike Had To Be Called," 
UAW Solidarity, October 1970, 'p. 7. 
166 
the union will not go bankrupt. 86 Without the negotiators pro-
tecting the interests of the rank and file members, GM would succeed 
in "raid.ling? present benefits and weaken[ing] the working agreement. 1187 
In contrast, rank and file members support the union leaders' decisions 
with their detennination, strong spirit, sense of sacrifice and 
dedication, so that the UAW may win the strike. 88 The contrast 
between the two roles was made very explicit once the strike was over 
and rhetors assessed the strike's gains. 
Solid and substantial progress at the bargaining 
table doesn't Just happen. It's the result of long 
hours, weeks and months of technical study and 
preparation, of countless bargaining table sessions. 
Breathing vigor into all this, giving it heightened 
meaning and significance was the solidarity and 
dedication of GM workers and their families, their 
willingness to endure the hardship and sacrifice 
of a long strike to gain an honorable settlement. 89 
The solidarity of rank and file members is crucial for creating the 
collective power of the union, but union leaders at the bargaining 
table wield that power, not the 'rank and file members. 
8611DeLegates Speak Out on Dues," Solidarity, p. 7. 
87 
11 Pace Quickens," Solidarity, p. 5. See also "It Is Regrettable, 11 
Solidarity, p. 7. 
88ttoward Lipton, !!Retiree Rings Doorbells to Boost Union Cause, 11 
UAW Solidarity, September 1970, p. 11; "Entire UAW Supports 
Strikers," Solidarity, p.3 and Howard Lipton, "Billy Bond's Family 
Shares His Strike, 11 UAW Solidarity, November 1970, p. 7. 
89 d . Howar Lipton, "Strikers Blaze Victory Trail, 11 UAW Solidarity, 
December 1970, p. 2. 
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The role of a rank and file member requires that a worker acquiesce 
to the decisions of the union, for this role is limited to determination, 
solidarity, possessing a strong spirit and sacrifice. It is interesting 
to note that models for the behavior of members ar~ made explicit in 
the rhetoric directed to rank and file union members. There ~s Billy 
Bond who is modest, who possesses quite determination, who recognizes 
the need for sacrifice and who realizes that you must work to gain 
what you want. 90 Retired UAW worker Ed Partaka continued to work for 
the union with dedication, spirit and sincerity. Union rhetors used 
Ed to remind young union members that there was a time when the UAW 
did not exist, when "workers were constantly beset by frightening 
insecurity engendered by their bosses." The union was what enabled 
these workers to "feel like men again. 1191 James and Ed Power are 
members of a model union family where father, son and grandparents 
all were or are members of the UAW. 
Ed notes: "We've always had a strong union family. 
I remember my father and grandma sitting around the 
kitchen table when I was eight or ten years, old, 
discussing the sitdown strike. The biggest idea I 
got out of the discussions was the determin~iion: 
anything worthwhile is worth fighting for." 
The norm of sacrifice is important to the role of rank and file 
, member. The strike requires sacrifice for economic security. "'You 
know you're sacrificing when you have to cut back from take-home pay 
901ipton, "Billy Bond~s Family," Solidarity, p. 7. 
91L. ipton, "Retiree," Solidarity, p. 11. 
92Barbee and Mantyla, "Thoughts," Solidarity, p. 8. 
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of about $120 a week to strike benefits of $40 a week,' he ~"illy B01!97 
said. 'But I'm willing to give up things rather than have the same 
kind of contract we had before. Or take what the company has offered 
so far. 11193 
In rhetoric directed towards union leaders, the scenario depicts 
the union leaders as actors and the rank and file members as passive 
followers. Union leaders made decisions which rank and file members 
follow. 
But at all times during a strike there have to be 
continuing decisions made in which one must weigh 
the additional gains that might be possible against 
the sacrifices that are required of the soldiers in 
the battle who are carrying on the strike. 
We have constantly to ask ourselves: can sufficient 
progress be made iij vital are,as and can the battle of 
principle be won. 4 
Local union leaders make decisions about local problems and negotiate 
95 in local collective bargaining sessions. The strikers, the soldiers 
in this battle, must sacrifice their wages during the strike. Union 
leaders, however, also make some sacrifices, such as reducing their 
salaries from the union or eliminating them altogether for the duration 
of the strike.96 This attempt by leaders to make a sacrifice equiva-
93Lipton, "Billy Bond's Family," Solidarity, p. 7. 
94 Woodcock, Speech to GM Council, p. 1 
95 Woodcock, Speech to Special Convention, p~ 5. 
96 Woodcock, Speech to Special Convention, p. 12. 
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lent to that made by workers attempts to lessen the growing inequaliLy 
between leaders and members. 
This comparison of the roles of union leaders and of rank and 
file members indicates that the leaders are the union. When the 
leaders act, the UAW acts; however, when the rank and file acts, it 
,only supports the leaders' actions. There is no joint participation in 
decision-making between leaders and rank and file members in this, 
scenario. This concentration of decision-making power in the leader-
' ship is a sign of the increasing institutionalization of the strike 
and the concomitant bureaucratization of the union which Michels 
identified. The leadership assumes a sense of superiority over the 
rank and file members--the union leaders right and make decisions for 
their members and for the defenseless. 
Bureaucratic decision-making ... may, and 
occasionally does, involve disregard for the con-
stitutional rights of formal democracy but more 
often it involves a "non-responsible leadership" 
that assumes a considerable degree of omniscience 
as to what is best and attainable for the members, 
that restricts access of its opponents to the 
members, and that perpetuates a particular system 
of superordination and subordination through the 
development.of a relatively closed status system. 97 
Limitations which were implied in the role of the union member in 
the 1945-1946 strike rhetoric have become explicit in rhetoric of the 
1970 strike in the role of rank and file union member. In the earlier 
97John R. Coleman, "The Compulsive Pressure of Democracy in Unionism," 
from The American Journal of Sociology, 6l(May 1956)6, p. 5-19, reprinted 
in Walter Galenson and Seymour Martin Lipset, Labor and Trade Unionism: 
Interdisciplinary Reader (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960) 
p. 207-208. 
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strike, union members were fighting and battling GM. Although the 
role of union member included sacrifice, loyalty and courage, decision-
making was never excluded from that role, as it is from the role of 
rank and file union member in 1970. In their role, rank and file 
union members become passive followers of the union leaders. 
The UAW is known as one of the most democratic unions in the U.S. 
Many of the UAW's demands in the 1970 strike were considered by union 
leaders only because of rank and file pressure on them. 98, ' However, 
democracy in a union is limited, because collective action requires 
the discipline of following the commands of the group, as the group 
is represented by the group's leaders. The leader's opinions and 
decisions are more important than those of individual members, because 
' ' the leaders represent the interests of the entire organization while 
individual members represent their individual interests. Although the 
role of rank and file union member is not as restrictive as the role 
of the wage slave in the rhetoric of the 1936-1937 strike, the former 
role severely limits the acceptable opportunities for participation 
in the union for the average member. 
Differences between the roles'of,the union leader and of the 
rank and file member are even more pronounced when one compares the 
relationship between the UAW and GM and the Justifications for the 
strike depicted in each scenario. The scenario addressed to the rank 
and file focuses on the immediate relationship between the UAW and GM, 
98Laurence G. O'Donnell, "The GM Strike--What Happened," Wall 
Street Journal, 20 November 1970, Verticle File: UAW-~M Dept.,--
Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs. 
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in which GM tries to "take-away" what the union won for the workers 
in the past. GM proposals "drastically curtail," "weaken," "water down," 
"straightjacket," and "reduce" the benefits and protections won by ~he 
union over the years, 99 while the UAW is trying to negotiate with- GM 
for an equitable contract. 100 However, this concern with equity 
seldom includes a concern for future equity. I found only two 
references to the future--" in this strike, we're laying the ground-
work for the futurenlOl and "what we lose today, our sons will pick 
up tomorrow. 11102 Rank and file members, one could assume from the 
discourse, are concerned only with the immediate economic situation 
and not with long-range goals. 
In contrast, for union leaders the strike is part of one long 
continuous fight. The union fights for the defenseless who "have no 
one else to fight for them except as this union fights for, them. 11103 
One wonders if union leaders consider rank and file members defenseless 
without their leaders. The union also fights for principles which will 
govern its relationship with GM, "· •• the UAW entered this battle 
99Lipton, "Entire UAW Support GM Strikers," Solidarity, p. 3; 
"GM Seeks to Take Away Worker Gains," Solidarity, p. 4 and "Pace 
Quickens," Solidarity, p. S. 
lOOFor example see "GM Seeks to Ttle Away Worker Gains," Solidarity, 
p. 4. 
lOl"Dues Raised Temporarily: To Win Contract Goals," UAW 
Solidarity, December 1970, p. ,7. 
102Barbee and Mantyla, "Thoughts," Solidarity, p. 8. 
103woodcock, Speech to GM Council, p. 6. 
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over principles and we could continue this battle no matter what it 
cost to win those principles. 11104 
Much of the language in the discourse directed towards the union, 
leaders appears similar to the 1945-1946 intra-union rhetoric; however, 
there are subtle but rhetorically important differences. When language 
is considered symbolic action, the statement that the GM Corporation 
"is a sovereign state within the nation11105 is an analogy which gives 
a critic an important clue to how UAW members perceive the world and, 
thus, provides an important explanation of the actions of UAW members. 
In 1945-1946, UAW members perceived GM as a sovereign state. However, 
in 1970 one discoverd qualifiers in this statement--GM acts "almost as 
a sovereign government," which implies that GM no longer is the UAW's 
and American's mortal enemy. Similarly, in the rhetoric of the 1936-
1937 and the 1945-1946 strikes, the UAW "battles" GM, but in 1970 it 
"fights" the corporation more often than it battles the corporation. 106 
The appearance of these subtle qualifications in 1970 indicates that 
the UAW leadership does not want to polarize the union and the corporation 
during a strike, as it did in 1936-1937 and 1945-1946. Polarization 
would heighten their differences and result in more extensive conflict. 
Obviously, the conflict between the UAW and GM is much less 
104 1foodcock, Speech to GM Council, p. 2. 
105woodcock, Speech to Special Convention, p. 1 and New York Times, 
25 November 1945, p. 36. 
106woodcock, Speech to GM Council, p. 1 and Woodcock, Speech to 
Special Convention, p. 1, 5, 10, 11 and 12. 
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intense than it was in 1945. There are no fights for union survival 
in 1970. The UAW rhetors still identify GM as an enemy, but as a less 
threatening one. While rhetors still utilize the concept that ident1-
f . . f . t 1 . I07 h . ' f GM ication o an enemy promotes in erna unity, t e image o 1 
"taking-away" some benefits inspires less unity and, indirectly, less 
commitment to the UAW, than does the image of GM battling to destroy 
the UAW. The muted imagery of the 1970 strike is a sign of the way 
in which conflict has been institutionalized in the relationship 
between the UAW and GM. Each behaves as a 11loyal opponent" that is 
, 
'committed to the collective bargaining system which periodically 
resolves their conflict. The relationship has become predictable 
and less threatening. To call GM a sovereign state and to argue that 
it is trying to destroy the union would create unity within the UAW, 
but it also would affect the UAW-GM relationship •after the strike, 
when both parties try to administer the contract to which they agreed. 
There would be hostility among union members toward GM, which could 
result in harassment of foreman or even wildcat strikes, for example. 
The hostility of the union members 1nJects unpredictability into GM's 
relationship with its workers, which GM would prefer to avoid and so 
that it can produce cars without interruption. 
Battle imagery is absent from the rhetoric directed to rank and 
file members; yet rhetoric directed to union leaders does contain 
references to battles and to GM acting "almost" like a sovereign state. 
107Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: Free 
Press, 1956) p. 140. 
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The battle, however, is no longer for union survival; it is a battle 
of principle--to provide for the future welfare of UAW members and 
their families and to fight for the defenseless. The battle is more 
generalized and may include others in the opposition, such as 
politicians or government. There also is no immediate threat to the 
union. This strike is just one in a succession of battles. 
The differences between the roles of rank and file members and 
of union leaders becomes even more pronounced whe~ one compares the 
respective scenarios found in the discourse as explanations of reality, 
l 
as "myths of concern" crucial for the development of the self. The 
rank and file's 11myth' of concern" focused on immediate experience. 
Reality is the status .of negotiations with GM, the benefits which GM 
proposed to take away and the demands of the union. The rhetoric 
describes the characteristics of a good union member in this situation--
loyalty, solidarity, quiet determination and sacrifice. There are few 
references to the union's long-term goals, for members are concerned 
with the quality of this contract. In contrast, union members in 1945 
wanted a future of full employment, full production and full consumption. 
The emphasis in 1970 on the immediate si t_1ation is further substantiated 
by the tone of journalistic detachment in the rhetoric. The discourse 
consists of reports on the status of negotiations108 and interviews 
with union members. 109 This "myth of concern" does not provide a 
108For example, see "Pace Quickens," Solidarity, p. 5. 
109Lipton, "Billy Bond's Family," Soli<la;ity, p. 7. 
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context for the role of rank and file union member outside of the strike. 
Once the strike is over, there is no reason to sacrifice and to have 
quiet determination. 
The union leaders' "myth of concern." however, provides a broader 
context for the role of union leader. Union leaders are concerned 
with the future welfare of UAW members. This strike is just one of 
many battles in a war to protect the union members. The principles 
won in this strike will affect the future UAW-GM relationship. Union 
leaders also affect the future in their decision-making. The role of 
union leader continues after the strike 1s over, because there is a 
reason for its continuation, the future welfare of the union members. 
The rhetoric of the 1970 strike encourages commitment among 
union leaders,-,but inadequately encourages commitment among rank and 
file union members. The rank and file's "myth of concern" is so limited 
that it is difficult to utilize it outside of a strike situation, so 
that any commitment which is encouraged is limited in a similar manner. 
Yet, what UAW rhetors exclude from the role of rank and file union 
member is exactly what needs to be included in it to promote commit-
ment to the union and an understanding of and participation in the 
union's programs and decision-making. This is excluded from the role 
-
of union member, because of the potential, threat to the leaders. 
Consequently, union leaders depend upon union security clauses and 
h t 1 d . . L h ll0 o~ er con ro evices to maintain union mem ers ip .. In short, to 
encourage participation successfully and, therefore to develop commit-
llOJoel Seidman, "The Labor Union as an Organization," in Arthur 
Kornhauser, Robert Dubin and Arthur M. Ross eds., Industrial Conflict 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954) p. ll2. 
ment, union rhetors should include elements of the union leader's 
"myth of concern" in discourse addressed to the rank and file. 
V. Summary 
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The Rhetoric of the 1970 strike gives indications that an in-
stit~tionalized relationship between GM and the UAW exists. The 
negotiations are private, because both parties want to negotiate 
without interference from the public, which prevents the public from 
knowing exactly what proposals GM or the UAW present. This lack of 
knowledge in the 1970 strike makes the rhetoric addressed to the public 
very similar to that of the 1945-1946 strike, in which the public was 
limited to making a forensic decision about the strike. Thus, the 
1970 public rhetoric consists of characterizations of GM and the UAW, 
very general proposals and descriptions of action before and during 
the strike. 
The intra-union rhetoric has changed since-1945-1946, reflecting 
the bureaucratic and oligarchic tendencies in the union organization. 
The union audience has been divided into leaders and rank and file 
members. The role of the leader involves actively engaging in decision 
making, while the average member only follows and supports those 
decisions. As noted earlier, roles must exist in a relation~hip, which, 
in turn, exists in a context, a "myth of concern." The distinction 
between the roles of union leaders and of rank and file members widens, 
as one analyzes the roles in terms of the relationship to GM and in 
the context of the "myth of concern." In the union leader's "myth of 
concern" the strike against GM is part of an ongoing battle for the 
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future welfare of UAW members. This battle, however, 1s generalized 
so that GM does not necessarily have to be the UAW's only enemy. 
Because the "myth of concern" places the immediate conflict in the 
context of an ongoing battle, the role of union leader provides a 
guide for behavior outside of the strike situation. Thus, the leader's 
role and the "myth of concern" continuously encourage commitment to 
the union. 
In contrast, the role of rank and file members and their "myth 
of concern" is limited to a strike situation and provides little 
I 
guidance for behavior apart from that context. The "myth of concern" 
developed for the rank and file does not explain social or political 
reality, as does the "myth of concern" of the union leaders; thus, the 
rank and file's "myth of concern" cannot be used for explanations 
of industrial or economic reality. Because the union has no relevance 
for the rank and file union member apart from a strike in the "myth 
of concern," the role of rank and ,file member and the "myth of concern" 
only encourages commitment to the union during a strike. 
Chapter Seven 
THE ROLE OF RHETORIC IN THE PROCESS OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
L. Conflict and Institutionalization 
In the study of movements rhetorical critics recognize that 
social debate and conflict over issues are important social processes; 
however, they do not acknowledge the existence of a second, complementary 
social process--institutionalization--and the role of rhetoric in that 
process. In this thesis I have att~mpted to analyze and criticize 
the role of rhetoric in the process of institutionalization. It is now 
appropriate to pause and evaluate this analysis, and, specifically, to 
draw conclusibns about the role of rhetoric in this process. 
' Social conflict changes the social order, while institutionalization 
1 solidifies the changes made by conflict. A movement attempts to change 
the social order by engaging representatives of that order in a 
"dialectical conflict in the moral arena. 112 For the movement to have 
an enduring impact on society, it must make those changes permanent, 
by creating a new social order. In some instances, however, the new 
social order may not adequately protect the interests of the movement's 
members, because the conflict between the movement and the original 
1 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations, 
trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, ed. Talcott Parsons (New York: 
Oxford Union Press, 1947) p. 364 and Robert K. Merton, Social Theory 
and Social Structure, Second edition (1949; rut., New York: The Free 
Press, 1957) p. 14On. 
2Robert Cathcart, "New Approaches to the Study of Movements: De-
fining Movements Rhetorically," Western Speech, 36 (Spring 1972) p. 87. 
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social order never was entirely resolved. Because this conflict 
cannot be eliminated, a new social order is established which 
incorporates the unresolved conflict between the two parties. The 
conflict is institutionalized, limited and regulated by the parties 
involved. Political campaigns, law suits_, and collective bargaining 
are examples of institutionalized conflict. 
The institutionalization of conflict is a turning point for a 
movement, for its goal no longer is conflict and change, but one of 
protecting th~ interests of participants in the institutionalized 
conflict. To accomplish this, the movement must become a permanent 
organization; it must formalize the structure of the movement into 
a permanent organization and retain its members. Once a movement is 
a permanent organization, sociologists Max Weber and Robert Michels 
argue, it naturally becomes bureaucratic and oligarchic. 3 Attempts 
by the members of the movement to circumvent bureaucratic and oligarchic 
tendencies may not succeed. 4 
As the movement becomes institutionalized, leaders of the organ-
ization and representatives of the opposition jointly limit conflict, 
because both parties recognize that they will not benefit from unlimited 
conflict, which could destroy or permanently damage either party. Yet, 
3Weber, Social and Economic Organizations, p. 364-369 and Robert 
Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical 
Tendencies of Modern Democracy, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: 
Free Press,1962) p. 70. 
4Jo Freeman, The Politics of Women's Liberation: A Case Study of 
an Emerging Social 14o'vement and its Relation to the Policy7>'rocess 
(New York: David McKay Co.,1975) p. 119-146-.---
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the suppression of all conflict is wiworkable, especially by leaders 
of the movement's organization, since rank and file members want to 
express their dissatisfaction with the policies of the opposition. 
Because the movement's leaders are dependent on the rank and file's 
support to retain their lead~rship positions, the leaders must 
articulate some of this dissatisfaction and acknowledge the potential 
for conflict. 
To maintain the organization and their positions of leadership, 
leaders try to encourage feelings of loyalty and commitment to the 
organization among the rank and file members. The process of 
institutionalization places the rank and file members in a position 
subservient to the leadership, because the leaders are the experts in 
dealing with the opposition. 5 If the membership does feel that a 
fundamental conflict exists between the opposition and the organization, 
attempts by the leaders to limit conflict may appear to betray the 
organization. Some members may believe that the leaders have become 
a part of the opposition. Because the rank and file have lost decision-
' 
making power in the organization, it is difficult for them to regain 
control of the organization. The members may either withdraw their 
support of the leader~hip or withdraw from the organization to create 
a new organization to engage in conflict with the established order. 
The possibility of conflict is present throughout the process of 
-5Michels, Political Parties, p. 70. 
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institutionalization. 
To the public, it appears that the conflict between the two 
parties is disappearing as the relationship between the two parties 
is institutionalized. The former enemies appear to be partners who 
desire public support for their decisions. What actually has happened 
is that the process of resolving the institutionalized conflict has been 
withdrawn from public view. Only when attempts to resolve the conflict 
privately do not succeed, do the two parties appeal to the public for 
. 6 
support. 
II. The Role of Rhetoric in the Process of Institutionalization 
Rhetoric is important for the success of conflict and of 
institutionalization. The rhetoric of a movement attempts to persuade 
potential members to become actual members, by presenting an explanation 
of reality in a "sensible" manner. The rhetoric of the movement 
provides potential members with roles possessing admirable virtues 
7 lacking in their existing roles. A role, however, cannot exist in 
isolation; it must exist in a relationship with other roles and in 
8 a context. A potential member Joins a movement because the role 
of member is appealing and because the movement's explanation of reality 
"makes sense." 
6Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (1964; rpt. Urbana, 
Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1976)p. 55. 
7Ri<;hard B. Gregg, "The Ego-Fwiction of the Rhetoric of Protest," 
Philosophy and Rhetoric, 4(Spring 1971)2 p. 73-84. 
8George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society, Vol. I of Works of 
George Herbert Mead, Charles--w:-i~orris Ed. (Chicago: University of-
Chicago Press, 1962) p. _169, 175 and 270. 
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The rhetors of a movement dramatically enact their explanation 
of reality in the discourse of a movement. This dramatic enactment 
of reality is the movement's "myth of ,concern," all of the stories, 
beliefs, characterizations of the opposition, roles for movement 
members and rules of conduct which together explain reality. 9 The 
non-discursive nature of the "myth of concern" enables members to 
reconfirm their belief in the ideology and commitment to the movement 
or organization. The poetic, aesthetic and ritualistic elements of 
non-discursive rhetoric enable members to experience the image or 
act depicted in the discourse. This experience reconfirms the belief, 
, rule of conduct or role. A member of a movement identifies with the 
character of a model member who sacrifices for the organization and 
follows the leadership's decisions. The actual member may see herself 
( 
or himself as a model member or may try to emulate the model member 
d d h d . 10 epicte int e iscourse. If rhetors of the organization included 
virtues such as sacrifice and loyalty in the role of member, the rhetoric 
could encourage actual members to practice those virtues. 
%orthrup Frye, The Critical Path: 
of Literary Criticism, Midland Bood edn. 
University Press, 1971) p. 36. 
An Essay£!!. the Social Context 
(Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana 
10s.H. Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art 
(1911, rpt. New York: Dover Publications, 1951) p. 257-261. For an 
excellent example of discourse performing this function see Eliezer Ben 
Yisreal, 11 A Letter to the World From Jerusalem,1' Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, 
Critiques of Contemporary Rhetoric, (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1972) p. 188-
191. 
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A critic may analyze both the ideology and the 11myth of concern" 
of a movement. When a critic studies the- rhetoric of a movement as it 
becomes institutionalized, the "myth of concern11 will reflect the 
bureaucratic and oligarchic tendencies which accompany that process. 
The discourse addressed to the public should de-emphasize the conflict 
between the two parties. Discourse addressed to members of the 
organization would emphasize the importance of loyalty and commitment 
to the organization as members lose decision-making power. 
III. The Rhetoric of the UAW During GM Strikes 
The relationship between the UAW and GM exemplifies the social 
processes of conflict and institutionalization. The UAW was part 
of the industrial union movement of the 1930s which was in conflict 
~'\<,, 11 
with the industrial social\order. During the 1930s, confrontations 
between management and unions during strikes and lockouts became 
increasingly violent. Union proposals threatened the traditional 
rights to property ownership of management. The process of collective 
bargaining was the means used to institutionalize industrial conflict and 
to stabilize industrial relations. In this process conflict is confined 
to the bargaining table. Management and the union are legally bound 
to a negotiated contract, until it expires. Although conflict is 
limited to the negotiating table 1n collective bargaining, both parties 
retain the right to resort to economic force, a strike or a lockout, 
11 Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Poor People's 
Why They Succeed, How They Fail, Vintage Books Edn. (New York: 
House, 1977) p. 96-180. 
Movements: 
Random 
to compel the second party to accede to a 12 proposal. 
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In short, 
within the institutionalized relationship either party has the right 
to engage the other party in a conflict which could become unlimited. 
In this institutionalized relationship, strikes and lockouts are points 
of tension between the desire of the leadership for permanency and 
stability and the desire of the rank and file to defeat the opposition. 
Any strike ?r lock-out may escalate into an unlimited conflict. One 
would expect union leaders to try to keep the conflict within the 
boundaries of the relationship, yet try to encourage loyalty and 
commitment to the organization among the rank and file members. 
The rhetoric of the UAW during national strikes against GM 
reflect the process of institutionalization and provides an opportunity 
to study the role of rhetoric in different stages in this process. 
The first strike occurred in 1936, when conflict was unlimited and the 
institutionalized relationship between the two was not established. 
The second strike in 1945-1946 occurred within the institutionalized 
relationship, which the rhetoric of the strike reflects. The third 
strike in 1970 occurred twenty-five years later, when the process of 
institutionalization was almost complete. 
The "myths of concern" in the rhetoric of each strike reflect 
the process of institutionalization. The rhetoric of the 1936-1937 
strike was addressed to potential members. It depicted an unlimited 
12 . Arthur Kornhauser, Robert Dubin and Arthur M. Ross eds. 
Industrial Conflict (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954) p. 12. 
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conflict between the UAW and GM. Union members were characterized 
as proud, loyal, and willing to sacrifice and to follow their elected 
, 13 
leaders. In the rhetoric of the 1945-1946 strike which was addressed 
to union members, the conflict was depicted as more limited than it 
was in the 1936-1937 strike.14 The union members were characterized as 
possessing solidarity. Their willingness to fight GM to the finish 
was evidence of their loyalty to the union and their willingness to 
sacrifice. 15 In 1970, one finds a dramatic change in the UAW'rhetoric 
addressed to union members. One discovers a distinction between 
I 
union leaders and rank and file members and two separate "myths 
of concern," one directed toward the leadership and one toward the 
rank and file members. In both "myths of concern" the leaders were 
characterized as actors making decisions about negotiations with GM, 
while rank and file members were characterized as passive followers 
. . d . . d . f. 16 possessing quiet etermination an sacri ice. 
13For example see "To Non-Union Men," Punch Press: Official 
Strike Bulletin of Local #156, #5, p. 1. Van Kleeck Papers, Series II 
Subseries 31, Folder: 13, A-1, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs and 
"Give us 5 Minutes," Punch Press: Official Strike Bulletin of Local #156, 
unnumbered, p. 3 Van Kleeck Papers, Series II Subseries 31, Folder: --
14, A-1, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs. 
14walter P. Reuther, Letter to All GM Local Unions, 24 January 
1946, George Lyons Local 174 Collection, Box 2, Folder: Misc. Strikes 
1945-1946, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, "GM Yearns for Old 
Days of No Union, Open Shop," United Automobile Worker, December 1946, 
p. 3, "Letter to All UAW-CIO Local Unions," United Automobile Worker, 
December 1945., p. 1 and 8 and "Highlight of General Motors Strike: GM 
Forces-Stri~e," United Automobile Worker, December 1945, p. 4-5. 
1511Highlights," United Automobile Workers, p. 1 and 8. 
16Howard Lipton, "Billy Bond's Family Shares His Strike," UAW 
Solidarity., November 1970, p. 7. 
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Another important difference between the two "myths of concern" 
in 1970 is their respective capacity to explain reality. The "myth 
of concern" of the union leaders provides a broad context for action, 
for this strike is Just one in a series of battles for human dignity. 
In contrast, the rhetoric addressed to the rank and file provides a 
,narrow context for action, since 1t focuses on the immediate situation--
the status of negotiations, GM proposals and UAW demands. 
The "myth of concerns" of each strike provide evidence that 
bureaucratic and oligarchic tendencies existed. There is evidence of 
rules of conduct such as loyalty, solidarity and sacrifice. The 
characterization of,union leaders as active decision-makers and Fank-
and file members as passive followers is vivid evidence of the iron 
law of oligarchy. These conclusions, however, only confirm historical 
evidence and sociological theory and ind1cat~ that rhetoric does 
reflect reality. This is not the significance of this analysis. Its 
significance is that bureaucratic and oligarchic tendencies can be 
detected in the rhetoric of the 1936-1937 strike, before the 
institutionalized relationship between the UAW and GM was established. 
The role of union member in the UAW "myth of concern" illustrates this. 
In 1936 the role of union member liberated the auto worker from the 
passive role of wage slave. The auto worker exchanged one explanation 
of reality (worker as wage slave) for another (worker as union member). 
In 1936 the role of union member contained rules of conduct which 
would limit future participation of union members in UAW decision-
making, such as loyalty to the union, sacrificing to win the strike and 
allowing representatives to negotiate the contract. Although the 
187 
union member is not described as a follower, he or she is depicted as 
one. By 1970, the rhetoric of the UAW both describes and depicts the 
union members as passive followers,and even provides explicit models 
for sacrifice and "quiet determination." 
Through a criticism of the rhetoric of these three strikes I 
discovered that the words which liberated the auto workers in 1936 were 
also the words which constrained their part1c1pat1on in decision-
making during the 1945-1946 and 1970 strikes. The role of union member 
actually changed very little between 1936 and 1970. Evidence of 
bureaucratic and oligarchic tendencies can be found in the rhetoric 
of the union movement before the onset of institutionalization. It 
appears that the rhetoric of institutionalization is implicit in the 
rhetoric of conflict. 
The fact that the constraints found 1n institutionalization are 
implicit in the changes resulting from conflict has an important 
implication for the study of rhetorical movements. 'A movement may 
be part of a continuous cycle of conflict ~nd institutionalization. 
An understanding of the rhetoric of 1nst1tut1onalization would·be 
helpful in understanding why a conflict re-emerges. In turn, the 
rhetoric of a movement in conflict would be helpful in understanding 
the rhetoric of institutionalization. 
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Characterizations Found in the Union "Myth of Concern" 
The 1936-1937 Strike 
UAW 
provides economic security 
has the power to negotiate with 
GM 
democratic 
fighting for JOb security 
responsible 
a rank and file organization 
in which leaders 
respond to members 
fighting for workers 
Auto Workers 
Supporting the union, eventhough 
they are not members ' 
not assured of a Job 
builders 





uses violence and industrial 
espionage 
abuses workers with speed-ups 
and low wages 
Union Members 
tough, winners and actors. 
men, not wage slaves dependent 
on GM. 
proud of and loyal to the union 
willing to fight for a decent 
A.inerican life 
smart, not pushovers 
above using GM's methods 
willing to sacrifice so that the 
nnion will win the strike 
willing to follow their elected 
leaders 
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The 1945-1946 Strike 
Intra-union Discourse 
UAW 
fighting an anti-wiion conspiracy 
willing to negotiate 
willing to compromise 
winners 
willing to stick to its guns 
has only one weapon, the strike 
cares for the strikers 
fighting reactionary tendencies 
Union Members 
possessing solidarity 
tough, militant, determined, 
winners, united and 
responsible 
prepared to fight to the finish 
fighting an anti-union conspiracy 
sacrificing 
GM 
a sovereign state 
rebelling against the American 
government 





willing to negotiate 
responsible to the public 
American 
responsible to its members 
using the strike as a legitimate 







wanting industrial war 




part of an anti-labor offensive 
ruthless and reactionary 
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GM continued 
Obstructing negotiations by refusing 
to present economic facts 
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The 1970 Strike 
Public Discourse 
UAW 
concerned with the needs of workers 
striking to win principles, not to 
teach GM a lesson 
Rank and File Members 
do not like GM 
not anxious to strike 
expecting to sacrifice 
disciplined 
learning through economic struggle 
supporting the strike 
wanting economic security 
GM 
a monstrous monopoly 
having a moral obligation to 
negotiate 
acts almost like a spvereign 
government 
dominates the auto industry 
is cruel and backward 
Union Leaders 
responsible 
having no animosity toward GM 
making hard decisions 
participating in long meetings 
realistic 
sacrificing 
participating in private 
negotiations 
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The 1970 Strike 
Intra-union: Rank and File 
UAW 
having no choice but to strike 
economists 
insisting, asking and demanding 
during negotiations 
UAW Leaders 
responsible for progress 
pressing for better offers 
participating in intense 
negotiations 
working long hours 
tough and determined 
looking toward the future 
concerned for members 
proud 
Rank and File 
possessing quiet determination 
sacrificing 
possessing solidarity 
against GM "take-aways" 






seeking a settlement with honor 
battling over principles 
UAW Leaders 
sacrificing 
made a mistake in 1967 
negotiations 
realistic 
representing the workers 
negotiating a sound and 
honorable settlement 
Rank and File 
sacrificing 
pressuring GM to negotiate by 
striking 
soldiers in battle 
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The 1970 Strike 
Intra-union: Rank and File Intra-union: Leadership 
GM GM 
giant and mammoth raping the sub-employment 
benefit fund 
treating the workers with less a demogague, monster 
respect than before 
wiping out protections for workers dragging its feet 
wa ter1ng down protections does "lousy" arithmetic 
taking-away benefits abandons social responsibility 
Ignores the needs of members and 
their families 
